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Conventional wisdom insists that the Framers believed in a
hierarchical executive branch, with the President in charge of all
administration of the laws.... There is no historically sound reading
of the Constitution that compels anything like [this] claim. Any
faithful reader of history must conclude that the unitary executive,
conceived in the foregoing way, is just myth.'
Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein
1. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein. The President and the Administration. 94 COLUM. L R-Ev.
1, 4 (1994) (emphasis added).
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If the Constitution has invested all executive power in the President,
I venture to assert that the Legislature has no right to diminish or
modify his executive authority. . . . I conceive that if any power
whatsoever is in its nature executive, it is the power of appointing,
overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws.'
James Madison
One of the oldest debates in American constitutional law has concerned the
scope of Congress' alleged "power" to carve up the executive department of
the federal government into minifiefdoms independent of presidential control.
From the Decision of 1789 to the controversy over the Tenure in Office Act,
down through recent Supreme Court opinions, Presidents, members of
Congress, judges, and scholars have disagreed over whether Article II of the
U.S. Constitution, as originally understood, creates a strongly "unitary"
Executive. After two hundred years, no scholarly or judicial consensus has yet
emerged on this vital question of the proper scope of presidential power.
That such a question should remain unresolved for so long is in some
ways quite odd. The claim made by unitary executivists that the Constitution
creates only three branches of government and that the President must be able
to control the execution of all federal laws is easily understood and resonates
strongly with the very earliest lessons we learn about our constitutional system.
In grade school, we are taught that our nation's laws are made by the
Congress, executed by the President, and adjudicated in specific cases by the
federal courts. By junior or senior high school, when we are first introduced
to the constitutional text, we quickly learn that it vests certain legislative
powers with the Congress, the executive power with the President, and the
judicial power with the Supreme Court and inferior federal courts. At some
point along the way, many of us put two and two together and conclude that
the Congress' grants of legislative powers must enable it to legislate, the
President's grant of the executive power must enable him to execute all federal
laws, and the federal judiciary's grant of the judicial power must enable the
federal courts to decide certain cases and controversies.
It is thus perhaps a bit surprising to arrive at law school and discover that
this "high school civics" conception of the separation of powers, particularly
presidential control over execution of the laws, has for some time now been
out of favor. The modern academic debate about presidential power to execute
the laws began promisingly in 1984 with a leading article by Professor Peter
Strauss, who argued thoughtfully for the constitutionality of some agency
"independence," while recognizing that the President had to retain at least
2. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463 (Gales & Seaton eds., 1789).
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minimal powers of control over all federal law execution.' Over the next few
years, a number of prominent scholars, led by Professors Geoffrey Miller and
Stephen Carter, weighed in forcefully on the unitary executivist side, arguing
in favor of full presidential control of all execution of the laws.4 These unitary
executivist scholars were followed by scholars arguing that the President need
not have any control over at least some law-execution activities.' Recently, the
weight of academic opinion has shifted back to the theory of the unitary
Executive.6
The most recent contribution to this growing body of scholarship is The
President and the Administration,7 a seminal article by Professors Lawrence
Lessig and Cass Sunstein. They conclude that, notwithstanding its many
academic advocates and its firm textual foundations, the theory that the
Framers of our Constitution meant to create a strongly unitary Executive is
"just plain myth." According to Lessig and Sunstein, the theory
is a creation of the twentieth century, not the eighteenth. It derives
from twentieth century categories applied unreflectively to an
eighteenth century document. It ignores strong evidence that the
framers imagined not a clear executive hierarchy with the President
3. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 597 (1984) (asserting that whatever the administrative arrangements.
President must be "politically accountable head of all law-administration").
4. See Geoffrey P. Miller. Independent Agencies. 1986 SUP. Cr. REV. 41; Stephen L. Carter. Comment.
Tie Independent Counsel Mess. 102 HARV. L. REV. 105 (1988); see also David P. Cume. The Distribution
of Powers After Bowsher 1986 SuP. Cr. REV. 19.
5. See A. Michael Froomkin. The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments. 88 Nw+ U L REV 1346
(1994) [hereinafter Froomkin. New Vestments]; Bruce Lxdewitz. The Uncertain Power of the President To
Execute the Laws, 46 TENN. L. REV. 757 (1979); Morton Rosenberg. Congress's Prerogative over Agencies
and Agency Decisionnakers: The Rise and Denise of the Reagan Administration's Theor of the Unitary
Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627 (1989); A. Michael Froomkin. Note, In Defense of Adninistrative
Agency Autonomv. 96 YALE L.J. 787 (1987) Ihereinafter Froomkin. Agency Autonom'y
6. See Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of
Administrative Authoritty Outside the Federal Government. 85 Nw. U. L REV. 62. 72-82 (1990); Gary
Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State. 107 HARv. L. REV. 1231 (1994): Lee S. Liberman.
Morrison v. Olson: A Formalist Perspective on Why the Court Was Wrong. 38 A.%t. U. L, REV 313 (1989);
Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers. 1991 SUP. CT. REV 225; Martin
H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern ": The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in
Separation of Powers Theory. 1992 DUKE LJ. 449. For an exceptionally thoughtful explication of the
theory of Article II that underlies the unitary Executive position, see Henry P. Monaghan. The Protective
Power of the Presidency. 93 COLUM. L. REV. I. 3. 16 (1993) (asserting that Constitution appears to
contemplate only a "law enforcement" Executive and that Philadelphia conventioneers constructed "strong.
legally and politically independent chief Executive who could enforce national law").
Both of us contributed to this latest group of articles favoring a unitary Executive. See Steven G.
Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes. The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive. Plural Judiciary. 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1153 (1992); Saikrishna B. Prakash, Note, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and the
President's Administrative Powers, 102 YALE LJ. 991 (1992).
Of course, in some sense all Article II scholars believe the Constitution creates a unitary Executive.
Those who believe in what has come to be called the theory of the unitary Executive contend that the
Constitution requires effective presidential control of all exercises of the executive power. we shall apply
the "unitarian" label throughout this Article to denote this "strong" unitarian position
7. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I.
The Yale Law Journal
at the summit, but a large degree of congressional power to structure
the administration as it thought proper.'
Thus, Lessig and Sunstein say the originalist case for a unitary Executive is
fanciful and that executive unitarianness may only be compelled today because
"changed circumstances since the eighteenth century"9 have led to a mutation
in the original design. Those who wish to be "faithful to the framers'
constitutional design ' 1 must either reject the unitary Executive or give up the
originalist banner. All originalists who are also unitarians" are thus politely
shown to be in need of a refresher course in American legal history.
We disagree. We feel compelled to revisit this question to respond to the
many interesting issues raised by Lessig and Sunstein's provocative analysis.
While Lessig and Sunstein's recent contribution to the unitary Executive debate
is informative and valuable, we find it unpersuasive because we believe it
focuses far too much on what they think the Framers must have "imagined,'
2
while overlooking the original meaning of the words of the constitutional text
that the Framers actually wrote.
To the extent that Lessig and Sunstein wish to advance an originalist
constitutional argument, we believe that their piece is methodologically flawed.
Lessig and Sunstein err, in our view, because they give dispositive weight to
an incomplete rendition of the relevant history over the legal text itself. Thus,
this Article's first project is to demonstrate that their arguments against the
theory of the unitary Executive should fail to persuade anyone who considers
herself an originalist (or a textualist).' 3
Just as critically, we also believe that Lessig and Sunstein have failed to
place the Article II debate in its proper historical context. In our judgment,
more attention must be given to the relevant pre-1789 history: the history of
8. Id. at 2.
9. Id. at 3. In "translating" the Constitution for modem times, Lessig and Sunstein ultimately claim
that the Constitution requires some degree of presidential control over some types of law execution. See
id. at 85-105. We disagree that such translation is necessary, and, more important, we believe that the
Constitution as originally understood mandates a strongly unitary Executive. Nonetheless, we do not quarrel
with most of their argument from changed circumstances, except to the extent it rests on their originalist
rejection of the unitary Executive. Indeed, one of us has presented an argument for executive unitarianism
based on changed circumstances that is not at all dissimilar to Lessig and Sunstein's argument. Steven 0.
Calabresi, Political Parties as Mediating Institutions, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1479. 1498-1506 (1994)
[hereinafter Calabresi, Political Parties]; Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary
Executive. 47 ARK. L. REv. (forthcoming Dec. 1994) [hereinafter Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments).
10. Lessig & Sunstein. supra note I, at 4.
II. In recent years, supporters of originalism in constitutional interpretation have also tended to be
supporters of the theory of the unitary Executive. Compare Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil,
57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989) (defending originalism) with Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (defending theory of unitary Executive).
12. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I. at 2 (emphasis added).
13. We hope our analysis persuades both original- and present-meaning textualists alike. For an
excellent discussion of some of the differences between these two forms of textualism, and an argument
in favor of original-meaning textualism, see Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104
(1989).
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executive structures under the Articles of Confederation and the discussions of
Article II at the Philadelphia Convention and at the state ratifying conventions.
Similarly, analysis of the relevant post-ratification history must include
President Washington's views of the scope of his administrative powers, his
actual administrative practices, and the legislative history of the acts of the
early Congresses. Thus, the second project of this Article is to paint what we
hope will be a more complete and accurate picture of the history underlying
the original understanding of the President's power to execute the laws. We
believe that there is no better way to begin our projects than by responding to
the ambitious claims made by Lessig and Sunstein. They have skillfully laid
bare all the key issues, even if they have, in our judgment, failed to persuade.
Before proceeding further, we must briefly summarize the Lessig and
Sunstein thesis. They argue that although the Constitution commits certain
"executive" tasks to the President (such as the direction of foreign and military
affairs), the administration of all federal laws is not one of those exclusively
executive tasks. Instead, Lessig and Sunstein claim that Congress has the
power to choose whether the President will or will not be able to control the
execution (or administration) of certain "administrative" laws. 4 In their view,
Congress was originally empowered to make the execution of these
"administrative" laws entirely independent of the President. This argument
amounts to an implicit claim that the Framers believed there was a fourth
"administrative" power of government," which Congress could vest as it saw
fit.
The argument for these propositions is mainly historical, relying heavily
on interpretation of the early statutes creating the first Cabinet departments and
other executive entities passed by the first several Congresses. Presuming that
these statutes faithfully and accurately reveal the original understanding of the
Constitution itself, Lessig and Sunstein claim that these statutes suggest that
the Framers did not believe that the President possessed the constitutional
authority to control the execution of all federal laws.' 6 At the same time,
Lessig and Sunstein seek to connect their interpretation of the early statutes
creating the departments to the Constitution's text. This allows them to
generate their own rendition of the Framers' original understanding of the
scope of the President's law-execution powers. Lessig and Sunstein claim that
14. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I. at 46 (discussing difference between "executive" and
"administrative" laws).
Because one of the theses of this Article is that execution and administration of law arc one and the
same. we use these terms interchangeably. Though they appear to prefer the term -administration.- Lssig
and Sunstein seem to regard each as a substitute for the other. See id. at 4 n.5.
15. By 1787, the three traditional powers of government consisted of the legislative. the cxecuti-,e. and
the judicial powers. See infra part V.A. I.
16. Although Congress sometimes explicitly sanctioned presidential control of officers, it did not
always do so. Accordingly. Lessig and Sunstein read the absence of statutory language reaffirming the
President's constitutional powers of control over all exercises of law execution as a congressional rejection
of any such constitutionally based presidential power.
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notwithstanding the Constitution's explicit grant of "the executive Power" to
the President, 7 and notwithstanding the Take Care Clause duties that the
Constitution imposes upon him, 8 Congress nonetheless has broad power to
decide, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, 9 which federal laws the
President should be able to administer.20
The only constitutional constraint that Lessig and Sunstein identify on
congressional ability to divest the President of the power to control those who
execute laws is a very limited and subtle one. In their view, the Constitution
distinguishes between executive Cabinet departments and so-called
administrative Cabinet departments, with only the former firmly under the
President's control. The former are led by "principal officers," while the latter
are led by "Heads of Departments." According to Lessig and Sunstein, this
distinction is highly significant and might indicate that the President can
demand opinions in writing only from the principal officers who supervise
executive departments and not from those who manage administrative
departments. Lessig and Sunstein claim that the First Congress appreciated all
of these distinctions and wrote them into the statutes that set up our first
departments.2'
While Lessig and Sunstein have assembled much interesting history in The
President and the Administration, their originalist argument suffers from fatal
methodological, textual, and historical flaws. Part I addresses the
methodological flaws. We show that Lessig and Sunstein have misdescribed
and misapplied originalism in reaching their conclusion that no faithful
originalist 22 can believe that the Framers meant to constitutionalize "a
hierarchical executive branch, with the President in charge of all administration
of the laws. 2 3 No originalists that we know of have ever used (or tried to
defend) the methodology that Lessig and Sunstein employ. In our view, they
17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, cl. I.
18. Id. art. II, § 3, cl. 3.
19. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
20. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at 66-69.
21. Thus, they note that Congress created two departments that it denominated "executive" (the
Departments of Foreign Affairs and of War) to be headed by "principal officers." At the same time, it
created one generic department (the Department of the Treasury) led by a "Head." Id. at 27, 34. Lessig and
Sunstein explain that, as an original matter, whenever Congress created institutions to carry into execution
laws passed pursuant to Article I (so-called administrative laws, such as those involving spending or the
postal service), it could have chosen to create an "administrative" department independent of the President.
But where a department was instituted to execute some power conferred by the text of Article II (such as
direction of the military), the department so created had to be made an "executive" one because it was
administering specifically enumerated presidential powers. Id. at 46, 71.
22. "'We think that the conventional wisdom is wrong" in holding "(1) that the framers believed in a
hierarchical executive branch, with the President in charge of all administration of the laws, and (2) that
we must also ensure a hierarchical executive branch, at least if we are to be faithful to the framers'
constitutional design." Id. at 4 (footnotes omitted). Lessig and Sunstein thus assert that "[a]ny faithful





err by first focusing on postenactment legislative history and only later
conducting an analysis of the text and structure.2' In Part II, we begin our
textual analysis and take issue with what we believe is a core assumption of
the Lessig and Sunstein article: their belief that the Constitution contemplates
a fourth unenumerated power of government-an administrative power to be
vested by Congress. We conclude that the very idea that such a power
might exist "is a creation of the twentieth century, not the eighteenth." 6
Continuing our textual analysis in Part III, we endeavor to show that the
unitary Executive thesis holistically explains how the United States
Constitution allocates the power of law execution and administration to the
President alone. The Executive Power Clause27 actually does what it says it
does, i.e., it vests (or grants) a power over law execution in the President, and
it vests that power in him alone. This construction of the Clause is fully
supported by the other relevant constitutional provisions. Finally, we conclude
our textual analysis by looking at three means available to the President for
exercising control over the executive branch.
In Part IV. we begin our historical analysis, focusing on the period before
the Constitution was adopted so that we can see what kinds of problems the
Framers perceived with the arrangements for handling executive power
between 1776 and 1789. Then, in Part V, we turn to a survey of the actual
views of the founding generation on the scope of the President's law-execution
powers prior to the Constitution's ratification. We show that the ratification
debates support the textual arguments made in Part III and cast doubts on
Lessig and Sunstein's attempt to build an executive/administrative distinction
into the Constitution. Finally, in Part VI, we reach the material with which
Lessig and Sunstein very oddly chose to begin-the postenactment legislative
history of Article II generated in Congress, an institutional rival of the
President. We think the historical evidence taken as a whole demonstrates that
the case for a hierarchical executive branch under the control of the President
is overwhelming and fully supports all of our textual claims.
24. Lessig and Sunstein describe the first part of their article as an exploration "'on onginalist grounds.
[of] which version of unitainess is embodied in the Constitution" Id. at I I The, explain that the>
understand originalism to require the interpreter to ask wvhcther the modem unitanan's
limitations on Congress' power were indeed understood as such by those %kho ratified the
Constitution. As Justice Scalia has stated the test. the onginalist would ask ,hether ( I ) the text
standing alone contains strong unitarian limitations, or (2) whether strong unitanan limitations
were so well understood at the founding so as to be implied by the document itself
Id. at 10-11 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan. 501 U.S. 957 (1991)) Scalia's test clearls and emphatically
warns originalists that they must begin their analysis with the text. but "Irlather than beginning susth text
or structure alone. [Lessig and Sunsteinl begin with history.' Id. at 13
25. While Lessig and Sunstein attempt to deny at vanous points that they are adsocating the existence
of such a power, we believe there is simply no other way to capture the essence of their thesis
26. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I. at 2.
27. We use the term "Executive Power Clause," except when companng the vesting Clauses of the
first three Articles, instead of the more familiar designation *'Article II Vesting Clause." because we beliee
that the former more accurately describes the relevant constitutional provision
1994]
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Our thesis is that either the text or the relevant "legislative" history,
considered separately, demonstrates that the founding generation fully
embraced and wrote into the Constitution the "myth" of a chief administrator
constitutionally empowered to administer all federal laws. We think the
originalist textual and historical arguments for the unitary Executive, taken
together, firmly establish the theory.
I. METHODOLOGY
We begin at the most abstract level, that is, with methodology. The Lessig
and Sunstein thesis rests on some commonly held, but erroneous, ideas about
originalism. They essentially equate the original understanding of the
constitutional text with what they believe to have been the intentions of some
of the people who lived around the time when the text was written. We might
normally be tempted to pass over such an error, but it is vital that the error be
exposed here, in the context of the Article II debate, since, as we will show,
the text here is clear. The key difficulty with the Lessig and Sunstein argument
is simply this: We do not believe they have assembled the history they relate
into an argument that originalists or textualists will find compelling.2" This
problem would exist in our view even if we agreed with their analysis of the
relevant history. Thus, before we can even begin to address the textual and
historical arguments for the unitary Executive, we must consider questions of
methodology.
We make three principal points regarding originalist methodology. First
and foremost, in interpreting text, commonsensically enough, one ought to
begin with the text. One should have recourse to history only where one could
assert plausibly that an ambiguity exists. Second, though it is true that
originalists have in the past made arguments based exclusively on history, they
were forced to do so because the textual provisions that they were scrutinizing
were more open-ended than are the provisions relevant to the unitary Executive
debate. Thus, when prior originalist scholarship has looked to history, it has
always done so in a manner consistent with the primacy of the law of the text.
Originalists do not believe that present-day Americans are bound by historical
events or opinions that were not written into the Constitution. Finally, even
after having demonstrated a textual ambiguity, no originalist should rely
exclusively upon the Constitution's postenactment "legislative" history, which
28. We recognize, of course, that many thoughtful constitutional scholars reject originalism and
textualism and will therefore be untroubled by our pointing out how Lessig and Sunstein's argument
violates some tenets of originalist methodology. It is not our purpose here to provide a defense of
originalism or of textualism from the many attacks that have been made upon it, or even to explain
originalist or textualist methodology fully. Either of those projects would take us far afield. Rather, we wish
to show that the argument of Lessig and Sunstein's article is inconsistent with originalist methodology and
that they are therefore wrong in reaching their conclusion that "the framers' constitutional design" does not
require "a hierarchical executive branch." Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at 4.
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is, after all, the history that is least likely to reflect the original understanding.
It is better to examine exhaustively the pre-ratification material first and only
look at the post-ratification material if it is absolutely necessary to do so.
A. The Primacy of the Constitutional Text
At the outset we remind the reader that Lessig and Sunstein's core thesis
is that "the view that the framers constitutionalized anything like [a unitary
Executive] is just plain myth. '29 A corollary to this thesis is their additional
claim that any faithful originalist must join them in reaching this
conclusion. 30 The truth or falsity of the Lessig and Sunstein thesis and its
corollary rests upon some implicit ideas of how it is that we can ever say that
the Framers succeeded in "constitutionalizing" anything. Implicit ideas must
also exist to explain how it is that we can ever know what exactly it is that has
been "constitutionalized."
Constitutional originalism purports to offer an answer to both of these
questions. Briefly put, the answer is that the text of the Constitution, as
originally understood by the people who ratified it, is the fundamental law of
the land.31 This is the explanation that Chief Justice John Marshall gave in
Marbury v. Madison32 when he explained why the federal courts should
decide cases or controversies in accord with the Constitution even when faced
with a conflicting act of Congress. The central premise of originalism (and of
Marshall's opinion in Marbury) is that the text of the Constitution is law that
binds each and every one of us until and unless it is changed through the
procedures set out in Article V.33 It follows that the Constitution is thus like
29. Id. at 2.
30. Id. at 4. "v[W]e suggest ... there is a different model of the onginal executI've that better captures
the original design." Id. at 14.
31. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 143-60 (1Q90). MICHAEL J PERRY. TilE
CONSTITUTON IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 28-53 (1994): Richard S Kay. Adherence to the
Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses. 82 Nw U L REV
226, 230 (1988) [hereinafter Kay. Adherence to the Original Intentions) ("'The model I discuss calls
for judges to apply the rules of the written constitution in the sense in which those rules wvere understood
by the people who enacted them."); see also Scalia. supra note I1. at 854 ("The pnncipal theoretical defcct
of nonoriginalism ... is its incompatibility with the very pnnciples that legitimize judicial review of
constitutionality."); Smith, supra note 13, at 104 (defending originalism as methodology of interpreting
"enacted law-primarily, statutes and the Constitution").
32. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
33. As Judge Bork has explained:
When we speak of "law," we ordinarily refer to a rule that we have no right to change except
through prescribed procedures. That statement assumes that the rule has a meaning independent
of our own desires. Otherwise there would be no need to agree on procedures for changing the
rule. Statutes, we agree, may be changed by amendment or repeal. The Constitution may be
changed by amendment pursuant to the procedures set out in Article V. It is a necessary
implication of the prescribed procedures that neither statute nor Constitution should be changed
by judges. Though that has been done often enough, it is in no sense proper.
BORK, supra note 31, at 143; see id. at 171-76; see also PERRY. supra note 31, at 29-31 Of course, as
Richard Kay has pointed out, "Bork's assumption that the Constitution is law is itself controversial."
Richard S. Kay, The Bork Nomination and the Definition of "the Constitution". 84 Nw U L REV 1190.
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other legal writings, including statutes, contracts, wills, and judicial
opinions. 34 The meaning of all such legal writings depends on their texts, as
they were objectively 35 understood by the people who enacted or ratified
them. 36 Originalists do not give priority to the plain dictionary meaning of the
Constitution's text because they like grammar more than history. They give
priority to it because they believe that it and it alone is law.37
For these reasons, there exists a standard methodology of originalism that
sets out a hierarchy of originalist source materials. This standard methodology
has been endorsed or utilized to some degree or another by writers as varied
as Professor Akhil Reed Amar,35 former Judge Robert H. Bork,39 Professor
John Hart Ely,40  and Justice Antonin Scalia.4 1 This hierarchy directs
1192 (1990). We recognize that many of those who reject originalism do so, in part, because they disagree
with the claim that the Constitution is law.
34. BORK, supra note 31, at 144-45.
35. As Bork explains again:
The search is not for a subjective intention .... [Wlhat counts is what the public understood.
Law is a public act. Secret reservations or intentions count for nothing. All that counts is how
the words used in the Constitution would have been understood at the time. The original
understanding is thus manifested in the words used and in secondary materials, such as debates
at the [ratifying] conventions, public discussion, newspaper articles, dictionaries in use at the
time, and the like.
Id. at 144; see also PERRY, supra note 31, at 42-47 (defending sophisticated originalism over "strict
intentionalism"); Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions, supra note 31, at 273-81. The focus on public
original meaning explains why originalist textualism can legitimately use external accounts of the meaning
of language, even though it should not be guided by legislative history. Language is a social invention, and
thus meaningless without access to those external sources, such as dictionaries, that explain the rules as to
how a particular language is used. It does not follow from this, however, that all social interactions
contemporaneous with the adoption of a law are equally helpful in shedding light on the original public
meaning of the words of that law. The best places to find that public meaning are sources that would have
been available to the Framers or that reflect the Framers' usage.
36. BORK, supra note 31, at 145; see also PERRY, supra note 31, at 31-53 (endorsing originalism with
respect to constitutional text). Smith, supra note 13, provides a particularly compelling explanation of the
argument as to why enacted constitutional and statutory legal writings should be given their original
meaning.
37. Consider in this context Bork's explanation of why he disagrees with the judicial philosophy of
the second Justice Harlan. The issue is whether unwritten historical traditions may rise to the level of
constitutional law or whether it is only the constitutional text, as historically understood, that deserves that
status. Bork explains:
The Constitution ... is intended to check today's majorities, and it seems quite odd to check
them with ... yesterday's majorities. I can think of no reason that rises to the level of
constitutional argument why today's majority may not decide that it wants to depart from the
tradition left by a majority now buried. Laws made by those people bind us, but it is
preposterous to say that their unenacted opinions do.
BORK, supra note 31, at 235 (citing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 62 (1980)) (footnote
omitted).
38. See. e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Article III and the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499
(1990).
39. BORK, supra note 31. at 143-46 (emphasizing first, primacy of law of text; second, public
understanding of text; and discounting relevance of "[slecret reservations or intentions").
40. Something "seems invariably to get lost in excursions into the intent of the framers, namely that
the most important datum bearing on what was intended is the constitutional language itself." JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUST 16 (1980). Although Ely is not an originalist, his views on the primacy
of the text bear noting here.
41. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (Scalia, J.); Scalia, supra note 11. Indeed, Justice
Scalia has become well known for construing statutory texts, as well as constitutional texts, formalistically
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constitutional interpreters to look for the original meaning of the text in
predictable places: (1) Consider the plain meaning of the words of the
Constitution, remembering to construe them holistically 2 in light of the entire
document. (2) If the original meaning of the words remains ambiguous after
one consults a dictionary and a grammar book, consider next any widely read
explanatory statements made about them in public contemporaneously with
their ratification. These might shed light on the original meaning that the text
had to those who had the recognized political authority to ratify it into law."
(3) If ambiguity persists, consider any privately made statements about the
meaning of the text that were uttered or written prior to or contemporaneously
with ratification into law. These statements might be relevant if and only if
they reveal something about the original public meaning that the text had to
those who had the recognized political authority to ratify it into law.' (4) If
ambiguity still persists, consider lastly any postenactment history or practice
that might shed light on the original meaning the constitutional text had to
those who wrote it into law. Such history is the least reliable source for
recovering the original meaning of the law, but may in some instances help us
recover the original understanding of an otherwise unfathomable and obscure
text.45
This is why, as Lessig and Sunstein concede, "originalists would approach
[the question of whether or not a unitary Executive exists] through a (by now)
standard formula [that considers] almost mechanically the key sources of
interpretation, 'text, structure, and history,' as the basis for uncovering the
Constitution's original meaning.,4 6  Indeed, they acknowledge that the
hierarchy of originalist sources set out above "is quite likely to yield (for us)
a very strong conception of the President's power." 7 Nonetheless, because
of their "suspicion that much of the conventional reading of Article l's text
with an emphasis on the plain meaning of words and a rejection of legislatise histories
42. On holism, see Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist %Iew of Article III Separating the Tl'o liers
of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 242 & n.125 (1985) thereinafter Amar. A Neo-Federalst
View of Article I1]; Calabresi & Rhodes. supra note 6. at 1215-16
43. Very briefly, that original meaning is deemed relevant because legal texts are "not just a collection
of words" or markings on paper but are "rather the expression of a collective decision a decision made
by the established political authority and expressed in a form recognized as confermng legal force and
validity upon the decision." Smith. supra note 13. at Il l. Orginalism. unlike other interpretise theories.
prevents "the words of the enacted law" from being separated from "the source of Itheirl authority" Id
44. BORK, supra note 31. at 144; Kay. Adherence to the Original Intentions. supra note 31. at 273-81
(responding powerfully to commonly made criticism of orginalism); see H Jefferon Pos ell. T/he Original
Understanding of Original Intent. 98 HARv. L. REV. 885 (1985); see also PERRY. supra note 31. at 42-47.
Thomas B. McAffee. Reed Dickerson's Orginalsm-- What It Contributes to Contentprars Constitutional
Debate, 16 S. ILL. U. L.. 617, 647 (1992) (offering onginalist critique of Raoul Berger'% focus on specific.
known intentions in construing "Exceptions Clause" of Artcle 111)
45. Some non-originalists, of course. may give great weight to practice oser test. and may indeed
regard the early "customs" under a text as telling us more about what "the IasV' really is than does the text
itself.
46. Lessig & Sunstein. supra note I. at 12.
47. Id.
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is informed by very modem ideas" they openly admit that they "adopt a
distinctive interpretive strategy."48 Thus, "[r]ather than beginning with text or
structure alone, [they] begin with history. '49 Accordingly, they seek "to
dislodge modem preconceptions about the nature of the President and
executive power by contrasting these conceptions with those of the framers and
with the actual theory and practice of the early Congress."5
What this unfortunately means in practice is that Lessig and Sunstein seek
the original legal meaning of the text of the Constitution not in the words
themselves nor even in the publicly held understanding shared by the Framers
and ratifiers. Instead, they seek that meaning in the postenactment behavior of
the Congress, an institutional rival of the President from day one. We have
several reasons for thinking that this "distinctive interpretive strategy" is
completely "distinct" from, even alien to, the originalism they profess to adopt.
First, the premises of originalism do not allow a constitutional interpreter
to go beyond the plain meaning of the words of the document itself (read
holistically) unless there exists a textual ambiguity. The words, in context, are.
law, and one does not consult the legislative history to a law unless it is
needed to understand what the law meant objectively at the time it was
enacted. If the text standing alone would have been clear to an ordinary user
of the language at the time of enactment, one cannot consult the legislative
history to that text in order to create an ambiguity. Legislative history should
be used only to clarify linguistic ambiguity by shedding light on which of
several possible textual meanings was in fact the one that was "intended."
This point holds with the greatest force for postenactment legislative
history, which is the least reliable of all forms of "legislative" history.5" It is
the least reliable form of legislative history precisely because there can be no
guarantee that a later lawmaker's understanding in fact bears on the intent
animating an earlier enactment. Postenactment legislative history thus has been
denounced as "'tricky and unreliable material at best"' when it is used in
statutory construction.52 But, if anything, it is much trickier and even more
unreliable when used as Lessig and Sunstein have used it.
In their article, Lessig and Sunstein try to use the statutes of the first
several Congresses to shed light on the understanding of those delegates to the
state ratifying conventions who actually wrote the Constitution into law (even
though they have not first demonstrated the existence of a textual ambiguity).
Thus, they are in effect using the intentions of one lawmaking body (the First
48. Id. at 13.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Criticism of the use of postenactment legislative history in statutory construction appears in
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION. STATUTES AND
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 757-59 (1988). We note that, properly speaking, postenactment history
is not "legislative" at all. After enactment into law, there is no legislation, but only law.
52. Id. at 758 (quoting Judge Patricia Wald).
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Congress) to shed light on the original understanding of a text enacted by
numerous prior lawmaking bodies (the state ratifying conventions), institutions
that had very different memberships. 53 This use of the First Congress' actions
to shed light on the meaning of the Constitution is not without precedent (or
justification) in constitutional law. But it is not analogous, as Lessig and
Sunstein assert, to the use of the First Congress' actions to shed light on the
meaning of the Bill of Rights. That is because the First Congress played a
role in creating the Bill of Rights when it proposed the first ten amendments
to the states, while it played no role whatsoever in creating the structural
Constitution.55
To return to our first and main methodological point, we think Lessig and
Sunstein's "distinctive interpretive strategy" violates the very premises of
originalism. Accordingly, the conclusions they derive from the application of
their "strategy" will not and should not persuade anyone who is an originalist
or a textualist to give up on the unitary Executive. In effect, Lessig and
Sunstein seek to create textual ambiguities about whether the Constitution
establishes a unitary Executive by looking at the least reliable form of
legislative history (postenactment), produced in this case by a body that is an
institutional rival of the President. We find this unjustifiable because we do not
agree, taking the Constitution as a whole, that there is any textual ambiguity
about whether the Constitution creates a strongly unitary Executive. Put
another way, we think it is as clear that the text of the Constitution, as it was
originally understood, creates a unitary Executive as that it requires the
President to be at least thirty-five years old.
We will defend this statement in Parts II and III below, but for now please
accept it as a premise. In effect, what we think Lessig and Sunstein have tried
to do in their article is analogous to someone trying to prove that a very
mature thirty-four-year-old could legally serve as President (despite the
53. To appreciate the different compositions of the First Congress and the r-atliing con% entions. one
need only observe that there were 355 delegates to the Massachusetts ratifying consention alonc. ir" 2 TIlE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION DF TIlE FEDL-RAI COs-.TM-nO, 181
(photo. reprint 1987) (Jonathan Elliot ed.. New York. Burt Franklin. 2d ed 1888) Ihercinattcr ELitalr's
DEBATES], a size far in excess of the number of Rcpresentatises and Senators in the First Congrcss
54. See Harmelin v. Michigan. 501 U.S. 957. 980 (1991) (examining actions of First Congres,, in
analyzing Eighth Amendment); Marsh v. Chambers. 463 U.S 783. 788-90 (19831 (examining actions of
First Congress in analyzing Establishment Clause).
55. Obviously, many members of the First Congress were delegates to state rataf)ing consentions (or
to the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 that proposed the Constitution) It is for Ihis reason that statements
often appear about how the actions of the First Congress deserve special weight in analyses of the onginal.
structural Constitution. But we must remember that all that is meant by those statements is that the
constitutional understandings of the First Congress deserve more seight than those of the 100th Congress
As noted earlier, the First Congress did not approach representing all the Conscntion delegates .Moreoser.
total deference to the first few Congresses would be highly inappropnate given their underieprescntation
of key proponents of the Constitution. For example, three of the most significant Philadelphia contrbutor-
to the creation of the American presidency-James Wilson. Gouvemeur Morms, and Alexander
Hamilton-were not even part of the First Congress. See Akhil Reed Amar. Jurisdi ction Stripping and the
Judiciary Act of 1789, in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 40. 62 (Mac% a Marcus ed. , 992)
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contrary language of the constitutional text), simply because some members of
the First Congress may have thought that could happen some of the time. Our
main response to such a claim is to say that the members of the First Congress
were not infallible interpreters of the constitutional text. Is this really a claim
with which Lessig and Sunstein want to disagree?
B. The Source of Confusion Regarding Originalism
Our second methodological point concerns how Lessig and Sunstein could
come to think that their "distinctive interpretive strategy" would be received
favorably by originalists. Here, we must say that we have some sympathy with
what we perceive to be their plight.
The fact is that most originalist scholarship to date has addressed the
problem of how to find the original meanings of constitutional provisions that
everyone agrees are to some extent textually ambiguous, even after one has
consulted a dictionary and a grammar book. For example, originalists have
spent a lot of time trying to explain the original meaning of Section I of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the original meaning of the various clauses in the
First Amendment.56 This effort has been necessary because there is a range
of genuine textual ambiguity about the original meaning of such phrases as
"due process of law," "privileges or immunities of citizenship," "equal
protection of the laws," "the freedom of speech, or of the press," "respecting
an establishment of religion," and "prohibiting the free exercise thereof."57
Thus, the provisions that originalists have tended to write about in recent
times have happened to be almost without exception the ones where the
constitutional text, read alone, can give only incomplete answers as to the
original understanding. The originalist inquiry, then, has usually been pushed
back from purely textual arguments to arguments based on evidence from the
Constitution's enactment and postenactment history. Sometimes the main
historical evidence available has been only evidence of the least persuasive
sort. We have in mind, of course, the often-unreliable evidence provided by
postenactment legislative history.
From this, it is easy to understand how Lessig and Sunstein would come
to think originalism was at least often about history, making their nontextual
56. For two exceptionally thoughtful originalist analyses of Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment,
see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992); John
Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992). For superb
originalist analyses of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by two authors who disagree, see
Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision,
57 U. Cm. L. REV. 1109 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990).
57. Thus, to pick an example from among authors cited in the previous footnote, Professors McConnell




"distinctive interpretive strategy" methodologically justifiable at least some of
the time. The difficulty for them is that the provisions of the structural
Constitution that underlie the theory of the unitary Executive are not as open-
ended as the key clauses of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. As a result,
originalist methodology works differently (and more simply) in the Article II
context.
58
It is important to note, moreover, that the methodology of originalism that
Lessig and Sunstein embrace would lead to perverse results in the First and
Fourteenth Amendment contexts as well. If one were to focus on
postenactment history, or evidence of practice, to the exclusion of all else, it
would wrongly lead one to conclude that Plessv v. Ferguson was correctly
decided and that the Alien and Sedition Acts were constitutional. In each of
these instances, examination solely of post-ratification legislative history, or
practices, would show the presence of at least some behavior by Congress that
we have since come to understand was in violation of the law of the newly
enacted constitutional provisions.:
This is unsurprising, of course, because it is unlikely that law-breaking
administrators and legislators would instantly stop all of their misconduct
simply because the law of the Constitution (as expressed in its text) had
changed. It is possible that because the bodies that ratify constitutional text and
the institutions that must abide by it are distinct, the latter may seek to skirt
the Constitution's new limits on their power. Or, perhaps, legislators and
executives often do not immediately grasp the full consequence of some
momentous change in the fundamental law. For all of these reasons, it seems
clear that those who wish to understand the meaning of a new constitutional
text must start with the words of the text and then see what their public
meaning was at the time they were ratified into law. It also explains why
prominent originalists-including Justice Antonin Scalia, former Judge Robert
Bork, Professors Akhil Amar, John Harrison, Richard Kay. Gary Lawson,
Thomas McAffee. and Michael Perry-do not use the Lessig and Sunstein
methodology of originalism. Lessig and Sunstein have inadvertently fallen into
using what is in effect a strict intentionalist, nontextual caricature of originalism."
58. We acknowledge that Lessig and Sunstein do not agree %%ith our claim that the text of Article I
unambiguously requires a strongly unitary Executive Thus,. the) feel able to disu%% Articlc 11 as it it vcre
as open-textured as the Fourteenth Amendment In Pars II and IIl bclo%%. se ,eek to ,ho%% %%hs se bcltce
Lessig and Sunstein are wrong in this regard.
59. Examples of such congressional behas or include (I) the maintenance of ,egrzgated ,chools in
the District of Columbia, even after the adoption of the Fourteenith Amendment and the approval bN
Congress at the end of Reconstruction: and (2) the approsal b% an earl% Congress (and b% President John
Adams) of the Alien and Sedition Acts notwithstanding the unequi'ocal command of the First Amendment
60. In fairness to Lessig and Sunstem. we note that there are not man% clear explanations of ongnalist
methodology. In addition. originalists disagree somewhat amongst thenselses on this question. % ith Raoul
Berger advocating a form of extreme intentionalism. not unlike Lessig and Sunstei's. %% hle Justice Scalia
and Professor Harrison essentially advocate a form of nearls pure textualisin Foumner Judge Bork and
Professor McConnell follow a middle course, in our vtes%. bctmaeen the intentionalst and textualist
extremes. Thus, while they are both textualists. neither %%holl% endorses the Scalia crusade against all foroas
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C. More on Whose Original Understanding Counts and Why
Our final criticism of Lessig and Sunstein's form of originalism is their
decision to give almost dispositive weight to the views of one party in the
debate-Congress. Congress has obvious institutional reasons for wanting to
limit the power of the President. Whatever the merits in other contexts of
looking at the views of the First Congress (or succeeding Congresses), there
is reason for special care here. The premises of originalism suggest that we
should determine what the Constitution originally meant to the people, as
represented in the state ratifying conventions, when it was enacted into law and
not what it meant later on to one party to an institutional dispute.
Yet Lessig and Sunstein have not done this because they consistently ask
us to embrace their renditions of congressional understandings of executive
power. Lessig and Sunstein thus seem mistakenly to believe that the First
Congress' enactments accurately reflect the Framers' views, and indeed, they
repeatedly equate the "First Congress" with the "Framers," sometimes even
using the terms interchangeably. The premise underlying Lessig and Sunstein's
approach is that relatively contemporaneous congressional actions are
dispositive in interpreting new constitutional texts. A more appropriate survey
of the postenactment history would include President Washington's views of
his own power rather than the First Congress' views on the same subject. Yet
even then had Washington declared himself to be King, we would not hesitate
to say that the ex post views of an interested beneficiary (the President or
Congress) of a contract (the Constitution) do not necessarily reflect "We the
People's" original understanding of the meaning of that contract when it was
enacted into law by the state ratifying conventions.
Our conclusion is that any sensible legislative history of executive power
must begin by thoroughly addressing the original understanding during the
framing and ratification periods, and only then must take up the postenactment
views of President Washington (and his first few successors), the First
Congress (and its successors), and the related views of any and all other
constitutional interpreters who might have expressed an opinion. No preparer
of legislative history would ever presume to rely solely on a partial account of
the postenactment legislative history as derived from an interested source.
Lessig and Sunstein's methodology of originalism leads them to misconstrue
the constitutional text so that it can be made to fit their rendition of the
of legislative history.
Lessig and Sunstein, while not falling readily into any of these camps, seem to be closest to Berger.
Berger's past writings, however, suggest that he would pay more attention to pre-ratification statements of
the Framers and ratifiers and would put less emphasis on post-ratification congressional enactments. For
an explanation of the difference between the "moderate intentionalism" originalism of a Scalia and the
"strict intentionalism" originalism of a Berger, see PERRY, supra note 3 1. at 42-47.
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postenactment legislative history.6' The end result is not originalism but
"congressionalism"-a wholly new interpretive theory based on the supremacy
of after-the-fact congressional interpretations of the Constitution.
In Parts IV through VI, we present a more complete legislative history.
But we stress that we do all of this quite grudgingly, and solely for the benefit
of those not moved by our textualist arguments. We believe that the original
meaning of the constitutional text unambiguously supports the unitary
Executive, making such a historical excursion unnecessary. Originalism is first
and foremost about the constitutional law that has been made by "We the
People" and not about their history or practices or customs. As Judge Bork
once said (in another context): "Laws made by [people now dead and buried
may] bind us, but it is preposterous to say that their unenacted opinions do."' 2
II. THE TEXTUAL CASE FOR A TRINITY OF POWERS AND OF PERSONNEL
We said above that the textual case for the theory of the unitary Executive
is as free of ambiguity as the textual case that the President must be at least
thirty-five years old. Our proof of this statement rests on the textual
proposition that the Constitution recognizes the existence of only three kinds
of federal governmental power and creates only three institutions of
government.63 Our thesis that there exists only a trinity of powers (and of
personnel) is essential to our conclusion that the executive department is
strongly unitary.
We start by demonstrating that the Constitution creates only three types of
governmental powers. We thus establish that Lessig and Sunstein cannot
succeed in arguing for the constitutionality of an unvested, unenumerated,
61. Lessig and Sunstein concede that "Inlo doubt there are important question, that can be raised about
the usefulness of post-enactment practice for interpreting the meaning of the Constitution " Lcssig &
Sunstein, supra note I, at 13 n.47. Lessig and Sunstein go on to say that %%here "Congress's self-interest
appears to be at stake,' as it was with the Alien and Sedition Acts. "we may discount its conclusions "
Id Surprisingly, Lessig and Sunstein then claim'that their armtcle is really "not using practice to prove
a particular theory; [but] rather ... to raise doubts about a reigning. strongly unitarian theor) - Id Thus.
they claim that all they really seek is "not the final history of the founding" but only to "jar current
understandings by emphasizing the inconsistencies they produce." Id.
But the Lessig and Sunstein article is not merely a legal history piece. it is by its o%%n terms an article
about what the Framers did or did not constitutionahze. Incidentally. it is also about whether se (and other
originalist-unitarians) have propagated "myths." To assert in a lone footnote that their article is really only
about "using ... practice to raise doubts" or "to jar current understandings" about legal histor). td. is
confusing at best.
62. BORK. supra note 31, at 235.
63. We thus dispute Lessig and Sunstein's claim that the Framers did not understand "the terms
.executive' or 'legislative' or 'judicial' as describing fully developed categories that care up the ssorld of
governmental power without remainder, as if governmental power were the genus, and executivec.
legislative, or judicial were the only species." Lessig & Sunstein. supra note I. at 41 We shall argue that
the Framers were "budding constitutional formalists." id, and that the) srotc a tevt hat cares up the
world of government power into legislative, executive, and judicial power v% ithout remainder Other types
of governmental power may well exist, but our federal governmnent does not possess them
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fourth "administrative" power of government. 4 In Section B, we make clear
that Lessig and Sunstein's case for unenumerated governmental powers is far
less plausible than is the (very controversial) case for unenumerated individual
rights. In Section C, we attempt to show that the Oaths Clause and other
provisions of the constitutional text make it clear that our Constitution
contemplates only a trinity of governmental powers and institutions staffed by
a trinity of types of personnel. Finally, in Section D, we show that any
apparent residuum of powers or of types of personnel falls under the
President's domain. We believe that the text of the Constitution unambiguously
forecloses Lessig and Sunstein's historical argument for an unvested,
unenumerated, fourth "administrative" power of government, to be apportioned
by Congress, and to be exercised by "administrative" officers.
A. The Constitutional Text: An Exclusive Trinity of Powers
We begin by noting that Lessig and Sunstein do not agree with us that the
relevant provisions of the constitutional text are unambiguous. They implicitly
endorse two propositions. First, the constitutional text is ambiguous in its
recognition of only a trinity of governmental powers (legislative, executive,
and judicial). Thus, they think it permissible to make a historical argument that
the Framers believed in the existence of a fourth administrative power of
government-which Congress could vest in various entities pursuant to the
Necessary and Proper Clause.65 Second, the text is ambiguous as to whether
the President's "executive power" necessarily includes the whole universe of
federal governmental powers that are not congressional or judicial. Thus, they
deny that the President has a strong power of command and control over
"administrative" entities that Congress chooses to set up. 66
Is it really clear that the constitutional text is unambiguous in its
recognition of only three types of governmental power? Remember that our
burden of proof here is arguably very high. If there is any textual ambiguity
whatsoever, Lessig and Sunstein could plausibly claim that they are justified
in at least consulting the constitutional legislative history.67 It is not enough,
therefore, to note that the constitutional text begins with three articles that list
three, and only three, powers of government. We must prove as well that this
64. By administrative power, Lessig and Sunstein mean the power to carry into execution (or to
administer) those powers of Congress found in Article I and elsewhere. See id. at 45-46. Thus, when
Congress vests administrative power over postal affairs in an officer, that officer then has the authority to
execute the nation's postal laws.
65. Recall that an analysis of text and structure alone would lead Lessig and Sunstein to endorse the
unitary Executive thesis. Id. at 12. Their analysis of history, however, leads them to endorse an
administrative/executive distinction. Accordingly, it is their reliance on history that causes them to think
a textual ambiguity exists where we see none.
66. Id. at 12.
67. For the only work on standards of proof for questions of legal interpretation, see Gary Lawson,
Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 859 (1992).
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list of three is an exclusive list. Put another way, we must prove that the
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies.
How can we possibly know (unambiguously) whether the maxim applies?
First, consider what the constitutional text itself says explicitly about this
question. There is, after all, a provision that addresses the matter. The Tenth
Amendment provides:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.68
This means (among other things) that if the Constitution delegates to the
federal government certain enumerated legislative powers, and the executive
and judicial powers, but does not delegate the "administrative power," that
power, if it exists, is reserved to the states or to the people.' The message
of the Tenth Amendment is that expressio unius esi exclusio alterius applies
to lists of governmental powers. All powers not delegated to the federal
68. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
69. A thoughtful but critical reader might at this point interject that the Tenth Amendment on its face
appears to apply not to types of power (the Framers obviously conceived of only three-the document does
not contemplate other types) but rather to specific enumnerated powers (the power to create a Post Office.
for example).
Such a claim, however, creates a false dichotomy between types of power and specifically enumerated
powers and also misunderstands the nature of the executive and judicial power grants First. the idea that
there is an inherent typology of governmental powers is false, since each of the three traditional categories
of powers derives virtually all of its content either from histoncal experience or from other more specific
powers that our Constitution assigns to each of the three branches. Put more simply. "the executive Po, er."
for example, is probably not so much a type of power as it is a grab bag of many specifically enumerated
powers, all of which we think of as belonging to the Executive. either because they alssays did so belong
in English and American history, or because the Constitution specifically assigns them to the President
Similarly, "the judicial Power" and the "legislattve Power" are also probably collections of specifically
enumerated powers assigned by history or by the constitutional text to one branch or another.
This is illustrated by the extent to which our government is one of constitutionally shared as well as
separated powers. Remember that our Chief Executive Officer. the President. possesses the "'legislative"
prerogative of the veto. while one of our two legislati'e bodies, the Senate. shares in the "executive"
powers of appointment and treatymaking and in the "judicial" powser of trying impeachment cases The
point is that there is no meaningful distinction between typologies of power and specifically enumerated
powers: All of the three apparent typologies of power turn out to be histoncal and textual bundles of
specifically enumerated powers, once one studies them closely enough.
Key members of the founding generation recognized and explained publicly the truth of these points
For example, James Madison, in his defense in The Federalist of our system of constitutionally separated
and shared powers, made it clear that he did not believe that the political science of his day had succeeded
in identifying the "platonic" content of the three types of governmental power T)IE FEDERALIST No 37,
at 228 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). He thus defended the Constitution against the charge
that it intermingled "types" of power in violation of Montesquieu's teachings by arguing that this was both
inevitable, given the lack of inherent content to the "types," and a good thing because of the wsisdom of
checks and balances. Madison's defense of these points in The Federalist was widely read and is part of
the very core of his contribution to that justly celebrated collection of essays.
Moreover, for purposes of our argument here the language of the Tenth Amendment refers to "The
powers not delegated by this Constitution." It makes no distinction between types of poser and specifically
enumerated grants of power. This is because no such distinction can be made. as will become esident in
Part III below when we set forth our argument that the Vesting Clauses of Articles 11 and Ill must be
understood as being power grants. See infra part III.A.
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government by the Constitution are reserved to the states or to the people. The
amended text expressly precludes the existence of unenumerated, or inherent,
powers of government.
70
At this point, a critical reader might ask why we place so much weight on
the Tenth Amendment when we know, as many distinguished scholars and
jurists have taught us, that the Amendment states only a "truism"'71 that is
now, once again, "happily" nonjusticiable" Can the Tenth Amendment be
relied upon alone to prove that the trinity of governmental powers is an
exclusive list?
The answer is that while the Amendment adds nothing to what is already
in the Constitution, and is thus a "truism," the truth that it restates is itself fatal
to the Lessig and Sunstein thesis. Put more simply, we do not need the Tenth
Amendment alone to tell us that the listing of governmental powers in the text
of the Constitution is an exclusive list. This fact is self-evident from even a
cursory examination of the unamended document itself. Several aspects of that
unamended document make it clear that the governmental powers it lists are
subject to the expressio unius est exclusio alterius maxim.
First, it is noteworthy that the various lists of governmental powers in the
Constitution are long and detailed. The very length and detail of these lists
make it far more likely that they were intended to be exclusive lists rather than
exemplary ones. After all, why else would the Framers have carefully listed
and set forth eighteen powers of Congress in Article I, Section 8, eleven
powers of the President in Article HI,74 and nine categories of federal court
jurisdiction in Article III, 75 if those lists were not meant to be exclusive ones
subject to the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius? It would make
no sense for governmental powers to be so carefully enumerated and cabined
wherever they were mentioned in the constitutional text unless the lists of
governmental powers set forth were meant to be exclusive. Why would any
reasonable drafter bother to mention that Congress had the "Power ... To
70. Richard Kay points out that in Madison's original draft of the Bill of Rights, the Tenth
Amendment did not immediately follow the Ninth. Rather, an amendment explicitly constitutionalizing the
separation of powers came between them. That amendment was ultimately not adopted. Professor Kay
speculates that the Tenth Amendment was thus not originally duplicative of the Ninth (even though he
reads them as redundant today) because the Tenth was needed to reiterate the principle that no
unenumerated powers exist notwithstanding the failed separation-of-powers amendment's references to the
existence of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions, supra
note 31, at 271-72. This supports the point made in the previous footnote that the Framers understood the
Tenth Amendment to apply to types of powers as well as to specific grants of powers.
71. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
72. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-57 (1985). But see New York v.
United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2419-25 (1992).
73. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 1-18.
74. Id. art. II, § 2.
75. Id. art. III, § 2.
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establish Post Offices and post Roads,"76 while neglecting to mention
something as important as a fourth type of government power?'
Second, there are some additional signals in the original text that strongly
suggest the applicability of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Consider three
arguably exclusive constitutional lists. The first is the list of legislative powers
"herein granted" to Congress, described in Article I (and elsewhere in the
document). The second is the list of executive powers conferred on the
President, described in Sections 1, 2, and 3 of Article II. And the third is the
list of nine categories of cases or controversies to which the "judicial Power
[of the United States] shall extend," described in Section 2 of Article III.
What, if anything, can be said about the applicability to these three lists of the
expressio unius est exclusio alterius maxim?
The maxim most clearly seems to apply to lists one and three. " We
know that the list of legislative powers conferred on Congress is an exclusive
list because the Vesting Clause of Article I expressly tells us that Congress
possesses only those legislative powers that are "herein granted."79 Similarly,
we know that the list of cases or controversies in Article III is an exclusive list
because those are the only ones (according to the Article) to which the
"judicial Power shall extend."" The hard question then is whether the list (in
Article II) of presidential powers is or is not exclusive. Commentators from
Alexander Hamilton8' to Charles Thach 2 to William Howard Taft" to
Professor Stephen Carter" have all observed that the difference in language
used to introduce the various lists strongly suggests that the Article II list is
less obviously an exclusive list than its Article I counterpart. Those who agree
may well believe that there exists a textual warrant for inherent, unenumerated
executive powers.85
Our point here is not to prove or disprove the applicability of expressio
unius est excIusio alterius to the Article II list but rather to emphasize that the
maxim self-evidently applies at least to the lists in Articles I and III. It
76. Id. art. I, § 8. cl. 7.
77. This point holds true even if one rejects the argument that the T'nth Amendment applies both to
types of governmental powers and to specifically enumerated grants of go'crnmental po%%ers If such a
distinction existed, it would be unimaginable that the Framers uould carefully descnbe three types of
powers and all the specific grants that they encompassed. while neglecting to mention sorctihing as
important as the existence of a fourth type.
78. See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 6. at 1194-99
79. U.S. CONsT. art. I. § I. cl. 1.
80. Id. art. Ill, § 2, cl. I.
81. 7 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 80-81 (John C Hamilton ed. New York. John F Troy,
1851).
82. CHARLES C. THACH JR., THE CREATON OF THE. PRESIDENCY 1775-1789. at 138 (1923)
83. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52. 118 (1926)
84. Carter, supra note 4, at 115 n.37.
85. We personally do not believe in the existence of an inherent. unenumeratd cxccutivc poscr to
act contra legem by seizing steel mills. For a descnption of what it means to act contra legesi. se
Monaghan, supra note 6, at 10-1I1.
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arguably may also apply to the list in Article 11.86 Given all of this, what, if
anything, can we deduce about whether the maxim applies to another and even
more basic list? Does it apply to the list of three kinds of governmental powers
implicit in the Vesting Clauses of Articles I, II, and III?
We think the answer is plainly yes. Assume the Article I and Article III
lists are exclusive lists by their own terms, as we have argued above. Would
it not then be bizarre for someone to argue that the (trinity of powers) Vesting
Clause list was not also an exclusive list? What could move anyone to draft
a document that carefully constrained federal legislative and federal judicial
powers (and arguably constrained federal executive power as well), but that
left unenumerated and unchecked something as important as a fourth power of
government, i.e., a federal administrative power? The text of the Constitution
simply cannot be construed to recognize more than the three traditional powers
of government. The listed trinity of governmental powers is unambiguously an
exclusive list.87
B. The Textual Case for Unenumerated Powers of Government Is Much
Harder To Make than the Case for Unenumerated Individual Rights
At this point, a critical reader might legitimately ask, "Why should we
read the Constitution as precluding the existence of unenumerated, or inherent,
powers of government when many (if not most) of us do read the Constitution
to recognize the existence of unenumerated, or inherent, individual rights?"88
The answer is found in an express constitutional provision. The Ninth
Amendment may send a very different message than the Tenth about the
applicability of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to the list of rights found
in the Bill of Rights. The Ninth Amendment provides that:
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.89
It seems possible that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, when read together,
may send conflicting (but philosophically harmonious) messages about the
applicability of the maxim expressio unius to constitutional lists. Taken
together, they say that there are no unenumerated, inherent powers of
government, but there may be unenumerated, inherent individual rights. In
86. For a concise and powerful explanation of why the Article II list is probably not airtight and
exclusive, see id. at 20-24.
87. A substantial body of pre- 1787 historical materials and documents provides support for the textual
argument in this Section. See infra part V.
88. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
89. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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other words, apply the maxim to lists of governmental powers, but do not
apply it to lists of individual rights. 9'
For those who believe that the Framers endorsed a Lockean, individualistic
philosophy of government,9' this message should not seem surprising. Belief
in unenumerated individual rights would likely coexist with a jealous
skepticism about (and hostility to) the existence of unenumerated, inherent
powers of government. Thus it would make sense for a written Constitution to
come loaded with unenumerated rights, while denying the existence of
unenumerated governmental powers. But Lessig and Sunstein's written
Constitution comes loaded (presumably) with both unenumerated rights and
unenumerated governmental powers. Any such document was badly drafted
indeed.
In our judgment, these considerations may help shed light on why
American constitutionalism has historically been skeptical of various claims
arguing for unenumerated (or inherent) governmental powers.- Certainly,
such skepticism has always greeted the claims made by several of our
Presidents that there exist unenumerated and inherent "executive powers" to
act contra legem.93 Indeed, Lessig and Sunstein make clear that they are
themselves skeptical of such claims of unenumerated "inherent" executive
power.94 At the same time, they argue for the existence of a fourth
unenumerated power of government. We do not see how Lessig and Sunstein
can deny the existence of one while recognizing the existence of the other.
90. We use the qualifier "may" in this paragraph because we do not wish in this already lengthy
Article to get dragged into the great debate over the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment. Compare
Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions, supra note 3 I. at 269-73 (arguing that "Itlhe ninth amendment's
protection of retained rights.., implies only a limited reading of federal powers") and Thomas B.
McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment. 90 COLUst. L REv. 1215 (1990) (arguing that
Ninth Amendment protects "residual rights" and is "designed to preserve the scheme of limited powers for
securing interests that include, but are not necessarily limited to. traditional sorts of individual nghts") with
Randy E. Barnett. Foreword: The Ninth Amendment and Constitutional Legitimacy. 64 Ci0.-KE:%'T L REv.
37 (1988) (questioning "whether the power constraints conception is the best of the available interpretations
of the Ninth Amendment"). See generally Gary Uawson & Patricia B. Granger. The "Proper" Scope of
Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause. 43 DUKE L. 267. 326-30 (1993)
(showing how Necessary and Proper Clause bears on Ninth Amendment debate). Suffice it to say that even
if there are judicially enforceable unenumeratd rights, per the Ninth Amendment. the Tenth Amendment
makes clear that there are no unenumerated powers of government.
91. See. e.g., Suzanna Sherry. The Founders' Unwritten Constituton. 54 U. C111. L REv. 1127 (1987),
92. Consider the wise rejection by our federal courts of the notion that they might have an inherent
power to enforce common law crimes, United States v. Coolidge. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 415 (1816); United
States v. Hudson & Goodwin. II U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). or to "make" federal common law. Swift v.
Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I (1842). overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
93. See, e.g., Train v. City of New York. 420 US. 35, 46-49 (1975) (rejecting inherent executive
power to impound funds in contravention of appropriations statute); see also Calabresi & Rhodes. supra
note 6, at 1177 n. 119 (rejecting claims of inherent executive power to act contra legem); Monaghan. supra
note 6, at 24-32 (explaining and rejecting notion that President has power to act contra legem). Redish &
Cisar, supra note 6, at 983-85 (rejecting presidential claims of "inherent" powers).
94. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at 2. 118-19.
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C. Three Types of Institutions and Personnel
We have seen that the constitutional text does not permit historical
arguments for the existence of a fourth inherent, unenumerated administrative
power of government. We shall now demonstrate that it also contemplates only
three types of institutions of government staffed by three types of personnel.
The Tenth Amendment will not help us here since it speaks only to the
nonexistence of unenumerated powers and does not address the existence of
a "fourth branch" or a fourth type of personnel. But the expressio unius est
exclusio alterius maxim does apply and unambiguously rules out such
arguments.
The question that Lessig and Sunstein's analysis implicitly raises is
whether the existence of a fourth, administrative branch of government is
foreclosed by the Constitution's textually explicit creation of the Congress, the
presidency, and the federal judiciary. A cursory glance at the seven articles of
the structural Constitution suggests an answer: Only the three specifically
named branches are allowed. Indeed, each of the first three articles ordains and
establishes one branch or institution and then very carefully describes how its
officers are to be selected and what powers they are to have. After those first
three articles, we find one article dealing with the states (Article IV), one
concerning the procedures for amending the Constitution (Article V), one
regarding adoption of the Constitution itself (Article VII), and one article
pertaining to important but unrelated items like assumption of Confederation
debts, the supremacy of federal law, and an obligation that state and federal
officers take an oath of allegiance to the federal Constitution (Article VI). The
specificity of these articles forecloses the argument that expressio unius est
exclusio alterius might not apply, at least to the listing of the three branches.
We see no textual clues that suggest the listing of the three branches was
meant to be an "exemplary" rather than an exclusive list.95
Lessig and Sunstein claim, however, that the text of the Constitution does
contemplate a distinction between executive departments that are under the
President's direction and administrative departments that are not. They note
that the Constitution only permits the President to command opinions from the
principal officers of the executive departments.9 6 At the same time, they
observe that the Inferior Officers Appointments Clause gives Congress the
power to vest appointment authority in officers described only as "Heads of
Departments. 97 The lack of the adjective "executive" before the word
95. We do, however, note two institutions outside the three branches that were designed to channel
popular participation in government: the electoral college established in Article 11, U.S. CONs'r. art. II, § I,
cl. 2, and the constitutional convention envisioned in Article V. These two institutions appear to be the only
other federal institutions contemplated by the Constitution.
96. Id. art. 11, § 2, cl. I.
97. Id. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
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"Departments" in the latter Clause suggests to Lessig and Sunstein that the
Constitution might distinguish between at least two types of departments, one
executive, the other not.
While we favor close attention to the constitutional text, this argument
elevates a trivial textual distinction and builds a whole theory of American
government upon it in a way that is utterly implausible. The Framers' text
carefully describes the mode of selection, the term of office, and the salary
guarantees of the President, the members of Congress, and all federal judges,
as well as enumerating the powers that would appertain to each of these
officers and their institutions. When questions were punted to Congress and to
future generations, such as the question of whether to set up inferior federal
courts, the text was likewise explicit about the "punting." Accordingly, we
think it is highly unlikely that the Framers intended to permit Congress to
conjure up an independent administrative branch of government in so elliptical
a way. The differences in wording to which Lessig and Sunstein point are of
no significance, just as the slight variations in wording between the two
clauses that vest Congress with the power to create inferior courts to the
Supreme Court have no significance.9" It should therefore come as no surprise
that after pointing out the existence of these distinctions, Lessig and Sunstein
admit that they "do not want to make too much of [them]."'
But there are other reasons why we think that the constitutional text does
not permit the creation of nonexecutive, administrative departments. Consider
first the Oaths or Affirmations Clause of Article VI, which explicitly refers to,
and clearly contemplates, only three types of federal officers or personnel. Let
us begin with the plain language of the Clause: "The Senators and
Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State
Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States
and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support
this Constitution . . . ."" This Clause suggests that, contrary to Lessig and
Sunstein's core thesis, no independent federal administrative officers were ever
contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution. That document only
contemplates and describes three types of federal officials: members of
Congress, executive officers, and judicial officers. If Congress could vest
administrative power in individuals who were neither members of Congress
nor executive or judicial officers, the Oaths or Affirmations Clause would not
apply to these administrative officers. Yet, it is absurd to conclude that the
Constitution requires oaths of members of Congress and of executive and
judicial officers, but that it does not require oaths from federal administrative
98. Compare id. art. I, § 8. cl. 9 (Congress has power "tlo constitute Tribunals infcnor to the supreme
Court") (emphasis added) with id. art. II1. § I ("judicial Power" vested "in such infenor Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish") (emphasis added).
99. Lessig & Sunstein. supra note I. at 38.
100. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (emphasis added)
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officers. Lessig and Sunstein apparently would have us believe that the
Framers meant to require Secretary of State Jefferson and Representative
Madison to take an oath to support the Constitution while absolving Alexander
Hamilton of the same obligation.101
Consider second that the Constitution repeatedly refers to federal and state
executive0 2 and judicial officers,0 3 and to federal and state legislators (or
to state legislatures more generally)." But the hard fact is that the
constitutional text nowhere mentions administrative officers, or any other
categories of personnel beyond the legislative, executive, and judicial types.
Add to this the fact that the Constitution implicitly assumes that state
governments are also staffed by only these three types of personnel and the
point seems proved.
The Constitution makes no reference to any administrative branch of
government, nor to any administrative officers, even though it is filled with
references to legislative, executive, and judicial institutions and officers,
because the people who wrote the Constitution did not envision a separate
category of "administrative" institutions or officers. Once again, that category
is revealed to be "a creation of the twentieth century, not the eighteenth."'0 5
D. Why the Constitutional Trinity Leads to a Strongly Unitary Executive
We have now seen that the constitutional text unambiguously creates an
exclusive trinity of powers, of institutions, and of personnel. It remains for us
to consider the implications of this for the second of the two questions put
forth in Section A of this Part: Does Article II's vesting of the President with
101. Recall that under Lessig and Sunstein's theory, the Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander
Hamilton, was not an executive officer but was instead an administrative officer. Their theory seems also
to run counter to the logical implications of the first statute passed by the First Congress, which construed
the Oaths or Affirmation Clause of Article VI to require "[t]hat all officers appointed ... under the
authority of the United States" take an oath or affirmation of allegiance to the Constitution. Act of June
I, 1789, ch. I, § 4, 1 Stat. 23, 23-24.
102. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4 (noting that when vacancy in representation of state arises,
"Executive Authority" may issue "Writs of Election" to fill such vacancies); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (noting
Executive's ability temporarily to appoint Senators where vacancies exist); id. art. IV, § 2, el. 2 (noting that
"executive Authority" of each state is bound to deliver up fugitives of justice from other states); id. art. IV,
§ 4 (stating that Executive can apply for federal protection against domestic violence affecting state).
103. See id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (establishing that Chief Justice will preside over presidential impeachment
trials); id. art. VI, cl. 2 (binding state judges to supreme law of land). We think that the term "judicial
officers" in the Oaths Clause not only includes federal and state judges, but refers to all those statutorily
charged with helping those judges discharge their powers and duties (such as clerks and other support
personnel). If the Framers had only meant for the Clause to cover judges, that term, rather than "judicial
officers," could have been used. Moreover, we think the existence of such inferior judicial officers is
confirmed by the Constitution's vesting in Congress the ability to grant federal judges the power to appoint
inferior judicial officers. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
104. See, e.g., id. art. I, § 3, cI. 2 (stating that when state legislature is in session, it appoints Senators
to vacant Senate seats); id. art. II, § I, cl. 2 (granting state legislatures right to choose Electors for
presidential electoral college); id. art. IV, § 4 (permitting state legislatures to apply for federal intervention
against domestic violence).
105. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at 2.
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all of the "executive Power" give him control over all federal governmental
powers that are neither legislative nor judicial?
The answer is unambiguously yes. The text makes clear that there will be
three and only three types of powers, of institutions, and of personnel.
Accordingly, the scattered allusions that Lessig and Sunstein have found to the
existence of an "administrative power," or to the existence of administrative
personnel, must somehow be made to fit subordinately into the Constitution's
trinitarian framework. We think we know where in that framework the
"administrative power" and the administrative personnel must fit.
Any administrative power or personnel that exists cannot be derivative of
or subordinate to the legislative power or the judicial power. Those powers
cannot be delegated, even to administrative officers, and administration
requires the delegation of power to numerous officials."' Moreover,
administration cannot be conducted through the procedural hoops that the
Constitution imposes on all exercises of legislative and judicial power. It
would be impractical to "administer" anything subject to procedural constraints
of bicameralism, presentment, or the existence of a case or controversy."
If the mechanisms for the use of the legislative and judicial powers are simply
unsuitable for employment of the administrative power, only one other
constitutional actor remains. The administrative power, if it exists, must be a
subset of the President's "executive Power" and not of one of the other two
traditional powers of government.'08
The important point here is that once history's grab bag of assorted
enumerated powers is run through the Constitution's trinitarian "funnel," the
106. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 424-25 (1989) (Scalia. I.. dissenting). 2 A'.rALS OF
CONG. 712 (1792) (statement of Rep. Findley) ("lilt is of the nature of Executive power to be transferable
to subordinate officers; but legislative authority is incommunicable, and cannot be transferred.-). Lawson.
supra note 6, at 1243 n.72.
107. See Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L
REv. 1253 (1988); Merrill, supra note 6.
One might argue that Congress does not need bicameralism and presentment in certain exercises of
legislative power. See. e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 5 & § 3. cl. 5 (stating that House and Senate have
authority to appoint congressional officers); itd. art. I. § 5 (permitting each chamber to judge elections of
its own members, to adopt rules, and to keep journals of proceedings). Similarly. one could also contend
that federal judges do not need a case or controversy to act, since Congress can vest them with appointment
authority. See id. art. 11, § 2. cl. 2. We view these exercises of powers as limited, textual exceptions to the
general rule that Congress acts through bicameralismlpresentment and the judiciary through cases or
controversies.
108. Professor Calabresi believes that it may be relevant in this regard that our analysis in Section A
of this Part suggests that the President's enumerated list of constitutional powers is the least likely of the
three enumerated listings to have been meant to be exclusive. This is why Professor Henry Monaghan. after
a thoughtful analysis. awards "the palm" to those who believe thai any very limited residuum of
governmental powers that may exist must belong of necessity to the President and to no one else. and must
be encompassed textually within the Executive Power Clause. Monaghan. supra note 6. at 20-24 Professor
Monaghan explains powerfully that any executive residuum could not possibly include a power to act
contra legem in violation of constitutionally valid statutes. Professor Calabresi agrees with this point and
emphasizes that any constitutional residuum that exists is very limited in scope and reflects the fact that
the President's powers are necessarily something of a historical grab bag of anomalies that could not be
given to anyone else.
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President must end up with any administrative powers that otherwise cannot
be accounted for. This is why we began this Part by saying that constitutional
trinitarianism underlies our belief in strong executive unitarianism. By now, we
believe we have shown that the textual case for a trinity of powers and of
personnel is ironclad. It is as free of ambiguity as the textual case for the
proposition that the President must be at least thirty-five years old.
IIl. THE TEXTUAL CASE FOR THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE
In this Part, we seek to prove that the Constitution unambiguously gives
the President the power to control the execution of all federal laws. We begin
by showing in Section A that the Executive Power Clause is not a mere
designation of office but is a grant of power to the President. In Section B, we
continue the argument by showing that the Clause's grant of power to the
President is exclusive, not concurrent, and that it thus prevents Congress from
ever making the administration independent of presidential control. In Section
C, we argue that the Take Care and the Opinions in Writing Clauses support
rather than undermine the unitary Executive thesis. In Section D, we contend
that hitherto-unnoticed provisions of the Constitution (namely the Militia
Clauses) provide further evidence of the President's central role in federal law
execution. In Section E, we attempt to show that the Necessary and Proper
Clause does not vest Congress with any power to alter constitutional structure
by statute. Congress may only use that Clause to assist itself and the other
branches by providing the means for carrying into execution a power already
possessed by a branch of the federal government. In Section F, we examine the
means available to the President for controlling his subordinate executive
officers. We sum up the textual analysis of Parts II and III in Section G. We
conclude that the administrative power so emphasized by Lessig and Sunstein
is nothing more than a part of the President's "executive Power" to execute
federal law.
A. The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants
1. The Analogy Between the Vesting Clauses of Article 11 and Article 111
There are many reasons why the Vesting Clause of Article II must be read
as conferring a general grant of the "executive Power"e-a grant that is in turn
defined and limited by the later enumerations in Article II, Section 2."° To
begin with, the Clause is linguistically and structurally similar to the Vesting
Clause of Article III (and different from the Vesting Clause of Article I). The
109. For a lengthier treatment of this point, see Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 6, at 1175-85, and
the superb analysis in Monaghan, supra note 6, at 20-24, with which we heartily concur.
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Vesting Clauses of Articles II and III contain nearly identical language in
parallel grammatical formulations. Both omit the "herein granted" qualification
that appears in the Vesting Clause of Article I, and both confer general grants
of power (executive or judicial) on federal governmental entities that are then
defined and limited by later provisions of Articles II and III.
The Vesting Clause of Article III is widely conceded to be a general grant
of power to the federal judiciary; indeed, it is conceded to be the only textual
constitutional source of the federal judiciary's authority to act."' There are
no other clauses that grant power to the federal judiciary in Article III, and
there are not even any clauses that really define or constrain the Vesting
Clause's general grant of the judicial power in the subsequent sections of that
Article (with the vital and much-discussed exception of those clauses that grant
Congress broad authority to withdraw the jurisdiction of the inferior courts and
of the Supreme Court)." Accordingly, it makes sense to read the
analogously worded Vesting Clause of Article II to be a general grant of
power given that its Article III counterpart must be so read. This construction
is all the more compelled because both Vesting Clauses state that the
respective powers they confer "shall be vested" rather than merely that those
powers "may be vested." Substantial evidence exists that the Constitution is
deliberate in its use of the mandatory word "shall" instead of the permissive
word "may," and that it almost always uses "shall" when it means to impose
a mandatory duty."
2
110. The only sustained argument in the legal academic literature of which we are aware is a recent
article by Professor Michael Froomkin to which Professor Calabresi has written a response. Compare
Froomkin, New Vestments, supra note 5 with Steven G. Calabresi. The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants.
88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1377 (1994).
Il1. We make this claim because although Article Ill. Section 2 explains with great specificity which
cases or controversies may be reached by the "judicial Power." it does not even begin to attempt to answer
the question of what the "judicial Power" is. Does it include an "inherent" power to issue equitable relief'?
To award money damages? To render declaratory judgments? To declare federal common law" Article Ill.
Section 2 simply does not say. All we can discern from the text is that Article Ill. Section I confers a
general grant of power, the exact extent of which is unclear.
It is vital to note, however, that Article Ill, Section 2 does grant Congress two important powers that
have been said to allow that body to constrain greatly the judicial power that is granted in general terms
by the Article Itl Vesting Clause. 'Tus, Congress' power to create (or not to create) infenor federal courts
has been said to include very broad power to regulate their jurisdiction and remedial authonty. Furthermore.
Congress' (arguably broad) power to make exceptions to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction has
similarly been said to give it power to constrain the appellate jurisdiction and the remedial authority of the
Supreme Court. Whatever the scope of Congress' jurisdiction-stripping powers. it seems to us that the
general grant of the "executive Power" in Article It. Section I is broader and less qualified by other grants
of power to Congress than is the general grant of the "judicial Power" in Article Ill. Section I.
112. See, e.g., Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article Ill. supra note 42. at 231-33 (arguing that
"shall" means "must" as used in Vesting Clause of Article 11): Calabresi & Rhodes. supra note 6. at
1186-94 (arguing that "shall" means "must" as used in Vesting Clause of Article I if it means "must" as
used in Vesting Clause of Article Ill); Robert N. Clinton. A Mandator
' 
eVie of Federal Court Juritsdictton:
A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article Ill. 132 U. PA. L RE. 741. 748-49 (1984)
(same).
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Moreover, as Professor Calabresi explains in his recent article, The Vesting
Clauses as Power Grants,'t3 it is a truism under our Constitution that no
government actor can take any action that affects the rights of private parties
unless that action is somehow ultimately authorized by a grant of "power"
from "We the People" that appears in the text of the Constitution. Thus we can
presume that there must somewhere be a constitutional source of both the
federal judiciary's and the President's authority to act. Many scholars to date
have purported to find such a source for the President's power only in the
specifically enumerated executive powers listed in Article II, Section 2."'
And, as we shall see below, Lessig and Sunstein reach essentially the same
outcome through more clever means. But the important point for now is that
this option is simply not available for the federal judiciary using the nine
enumerated heads of jurisdiction in Article III, Section 2. For a variety of
reasons, it is very difficult to maintain that the federal judiciary's constitutional
power grant could somehow come from a Clause that reads, the "judicial
Power shall extend to all Cases," rather than from a Clause that reads, the
"judicial Power... shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts."" 5
2. The Plain Meanings of the Verbs "Vest" and "Extend"
Let us closely examine, then, the plain meanings of these two verbs. In its
verb form, vest means "[t]o place in possession of' an individual or entity."6
It derives from the Latin word "vestis" for outer garment and is related to the
word "vestments" (as in ecclesiastical vestments, the robes of church office).
The word signifies the "clothing" of an official or of an institution with the
113. Calabresi, supra note 110. at 1378-79.
114. Ledewitz, supra note 5, at 797; Rosenberg, supra note 5, at 634; Froomkin. Agency Autonoiny,
supra note 5. at 799-800 (arguing that if Vesting Clause alone were sufficient to confer executive power,
Article II would be only one sentence long); see also Charles L. Black, Jr., The Working Balance of the
American Political Departments, I HASTNGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 14-15 (1974) (acknowledging some very
limited power-grant role for Article II Vesting Clause but concluding that in truth President possesses only
five or so significant constitutional powers).
115. Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ('"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases. ) with id.
art. III, § I ('The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.").
There is a second reason to think that only the Vesting Clause of Article III can serve as the
constitutional source of the federal judiciary's authority to act. See Calabresi, supra note I 10, at 1382-83.
Any clause that is going to serve as a power grant simply must indicate who is being empowered. Put
another way, there is both a "who" and a "what" to any constitutional provision that grants power. Such
clauses must say both what power is being granted and to whom it is being granted.
This in turn dictates the conclusion that only the Article III Vesting Clause can serve as a
constitutional power grant to the federal judiciary because only that Clause indicates who is being
empowered. The nine heads of jurisdiction and the other subsequent provisions of Article II do not by
themselves make clear who gets to exercise exclusively the powers and jurisdictions of which they speak.
Only the Vesting Clause of Article III can play that role. Id.
116. 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2102 (Libraire du Liban cd.
1978) (4th ed. 1773) [hereinafter JOHNSON'S DiCnONARY].
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general trappings and realities of power. It survives today in this sense in the
word "investiture," the ceremony whereby a judge (or a bishop) assumes both
the robes and the powers of his office. The verb "to extend," however, has no
such meaning. It derives from the Latin "extendere." meaning "to stretch
[tendere] out [ex]" an already existing thing or, in this case. a power."' The
etymology and plain dictionary meaning of these words make clear that it is
the verb "vest" in the Article III Vesting Clause that empowers the federal
judiciary to act whereas the verb "extend" can carry no empowering meaning
or connotation.
This plain dictionary meaning is confirmed by the use of the verb "vest"
in other constitutional provisions to connote placing a power in the hands of
a named actor. Thus, the Necessary and Proper Clause provides:
The Congress shall have Power ... To make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." '
The word "vest" as it is used here clearly refers to the empowerment of an
institution. This use confirms our intuition that the Article II and Article III
Vesting Clauses must be in some sense grants of "the executive" and "the
judicial" power and not "inkblots" or mere designations of a title.
Consider what would happen if we applied the usual academic reading of
the word "vest" as "inkblot"" 9 to the Necessary and Proper Clause. The
Clause would then read as follows:
The Congress shall have Power ... To make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers
and all other Powers !@#$%^&* by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.
The Inferior Officers Appointments Clause, which also uses the word
"vest, '  would be a nullity as well. The point is that if the word "vest"
means !@#$%A&* as many Article II scholars suggest, 2 ' instead of meaning
"to clothe with the trappings and powers of office" as we contend, both the
Necessary and Proper Clause and the Inferior Officers Appointments Clause
117. l id. at 696.
118. U.S. CONS'T. art. I, § 8. cl. 18 (emphasis added).
119. See BORK, supra note 31. at 166 (discussing how judges should decide cases %%hcn confronting
ambiguous language).
120. "[Tlhe Congress may by law vest the Appoilment of such infenor Officers. as they think proper.
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." U.S. Cosr art. II. § 2. cl
2.
121. This is, in effect, the view of the scholars cited supra note 114
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must be virtually read out of the Constitution. This conclusion, however,
devastates the core thesis of those who would attack the theory of the unitary
Executive because it is precisely those Clauses upon which most anti-unitarian
scholars rely to justify their assertion that as an original matter Congress could
create independent officers and entities. Erase the word "vest" in the Vesting
Clauses and you must erase it in the other two Clauses as well. In that case,
the constitutional text would empower no one to act in these areas: not the
Congress, not the President, and not the courts. This is an absurd, and, happily,
incorrect interpretation.
3. There Is No Implicit "Herein Granted" in Article i's Vesting Clause
Lessig and Sunstein attempt to escape this interpretive quandary by
arguing that there is an implicit "herein granted" provision in the Vesting
Clause of Article II. Thus, they claim that
the framers intended the Vesting Clause to vest constitutionally little
more than the enumerated executive powers. It says who has the
executive power; not what that power is, just as the Vesting Clause of
Article I says who has the legislative power (a Congress), while
section 8 says what that power is, and the Vesting Clause of Article
III says who has the judicial power (one Supreme Court at least)
while section 2 specifies to what that power "extend[s]."' 122
Quoting Daniel Webster, they go on to say that "'[it is true, that the
Constitution declares that the executive power shall be vested in the President;
but the first question which then arises is, What is executive power?' 3
There are, however, numerous problems with this response. First, consider
what happens if one reads an implicit "herein granted" provision into the
Vesting Clause of Article III. Since Section 2 of that Article only tells us to
which categories of cases or controversies the general grant of "the judicial
Power" extends, the entire Article fails to make sense if there is an implicit
"herein granted" limitation in Article III, Section 1. Put more simply, there are
no other powers "herein granted" in Article III once we get beyond the Vesting
Clause. Thus, it makes little sense to read an implicit "herein granted"
limitation into the Article I Vesting Clause. Reasoning by analogy, it makes
little sense to try to read such an implicit limitation into the analogous Article
II Vesting Clause.
Second, as was explained above, a comparison of the constitutional lists
in Article I, Section 8; Article II, Section 2; and Article III, Section 2, clearly
122. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 47-48 (footnotes omitted).
123. Id. at 48 (quoting Daniel Webster, Speech in the Senate (Feb. 16, 1835), in 7 WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES OF DANIEL WEBSTER 186 (nat'l ed. 1903)).
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reveals that the Article II list is the least likely candidate for application of the
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.'24 Examination of the length of
the lists, the language that introduces them, and the interrelationship of the
subject matters listed suggests that the Article II list is the least likely to have
been meant to be exclusive and the most likely to have been meant to be
exemplary. In part because of these considerations, Professor Henry Monaghan
has endorsed the notion that there is a very limited residuum of executive
powers that the President possesses, which is reflected in the constitutional text
by the incompleteness of the Article II, Section 2 enumeration. '2
Lessig and Sunstein reject the concept of an executive residuum and
simply declare the Article II list to be exclusive, without ever addressing the
possibility that this list might instead be exemplary, and without
acknowledging Professor Monaghan's recent article. t ' This move of
implying "herein granted" language into a Vesting Clause that lacks it is clever
but wrong. The analogy to Article III, the possible exemplary nature of the
Article II enumeration, and the much-remarked-upon 27 plain language of the
Article II Vesting Clause itself' 28 all make clear that the Clause confers a
general grant of "the executive Power"' 2'9 that then obtains much of its
definition and content from the exemplary enumerations that follow."'
Lessig and Sunstein have crossed the line from interpreting text to creating it.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 78-85.
125. Monaghan, supra note 6. at 20-24. Professor Monaghan argues persuasively that the President
possesses a "Protective Power."
126. Oddly, Lessig and Sunstein at one point almost seem to acknowledge the existence of an
executive residuum when they say, "As we conceive it. the framers intended the Vesting Clause to vest
constitutionally little more than the enumerated executive powers." Lessig & Sunstein. supra note I. at 47
(emphasis added).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 81-84.
128. As Professor Peter Strauss has observed in quoting Charles Thach:
Both the legislative and the judicial powers are enumerated in the Constitution. the former by
a reference to "Powers herein granted," the latter by a statement of what it "shall extend to."
"[Wihether intentional or not, [the absence of any similar language from the Vesting Clause of
Article II] admitted an interpretation of executive power which would give to the president a
field of action much wider than that outlined by the enumerated powers."
Strauss, supra note 3, at 598 n.88 (quoting THACi. supra note 82. at 138-39). We agree with Professor
Thach.
129. Lessig and Sunstein assert that the President has the constitutional authority to direct our nation's
foreign affairs, yet it seems to us that the textual source of that authority can only be the Executive Power
Clause. The President's power to receive ambassadors clearly does not encompass a general power to
superintend foreign affairs. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. The only other plausible textual source would have
to be Article I, Section I. In rejecting our plain-meaning reading of the Vesting Clause, Lessig and
Sunstein generate severe textual problems for their own executive/administrative theory. Though lssig and
Sunstein never say what part of the Constitution grants the President the authority to direct foreign affairs.
it appears that their view of his foreign affairs power is driven by their goal of explaining the First
Congress' creation of a Foreign Affairs Department under the exclusive control of the President. If the First
Congress placed the Foreign Affairs Department under the President's direction, it must have done so
because of its construction of the Constitution itself. It is a defect of the Lssig and Sunstein thesis that it
provides no textual "hook" for a presidential foreign affairs power.
130. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 6, at 1195-97.
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Finally, Lessig and Sunstein maintain that it is inappropriate to attach
much importance to the presence of a "herein granted" provision in the Vesting
Clause of Article I compared with its absence from the Vesting Clauses of
Articles II and HI. As they correctly point out, this phrase was added to the
Constitution by the Committee on Style late in the Convention and without
debate. These circumstances, they assert, suggest that the phrase had little
effect.' 3' The short response to this is that the people who ratified the
Constitution were not aware of this secret legislative history. Indeed, it did not
become available until many years after the Constitution had been ratified into
law. Since originalists maintain that it is the meaning of the text to the ratifiers
that counts, they should give little weight to an antitextual argument derived
from legislative history. Moreover, even if legislative history has some weight,
the Committee on Style's insertion of the "herein granted" language actually
supports our argument. Presumably, the change induced no debate or
discussion precisely because it so thoroughly conformed to the Convention's
understanding about the difference between the Article I and the Article II and
III Vesting Clauses. In the face of clear text, Lessig and Sunstein's argument
here from the absence of legislative history does not persuade.'32
4. Reading the Vesting Clause of Article II To Be a Power Grant Does
Not Make the Rest of Article H Superfluous
Lessig and Sunstein attempt to rebut the power-grant conception of the
Article II Vesting Clause by claiming that such a construction would have "the
effect of rendering superfluous much of the balance of Article II,"", since
much of the remainder simply reiterates powers that are arguably granted by
the Vesting Clause. To begin with, this critique applies with equal force to
their theory of Article II. Lessig and Sunstein say that the Article II Vesting
Clause is needed only to specify the Chief Executive's title (the "President")
and to make clear that we have only one President. But we do not need the
Article II Vesting Clause to tell us these things. They are self-evident from the
remainder of the text of Section 2 of Article II, which repeatedly uses the
words "[t]he President" and "he" to refer to what is obviously going to be one
131. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 48-49.
132. See id. at 49 n.204 ("'We are here to apply the statute, not legislative history, and certainly not
the absence of legislative history."' (emphasis added) (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 406
(1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting))); id. ("'In ascertaining the meaning of a statute, a court cannot, in the manner
of Sherlock Holmes, pursue the theory of the dog that did not bark."' (quoting Harrison v. PPG Indus., 446
U.S. 578, 592 (1980))).
Lessig and Sunstein cite other cases that do give weight to lacunae in statutory legislative histories
and then argue that this Doyle canon of construction (so named for the inference drawn from Sherlock
Holmes' famous dog that did not bark) is more applicable "in the context of the Constitution" because "so
much is at stake." Id. at 49 n.204. We, of course, believe that the fact that so much is at stake counsels
even more heavily against reliance on the absence of legislative history.
133. Id. at 48.
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Chief Executive Officer with the title of President." Thus, if avoidance of
redundancy is the key to constitutional interpretation, the "title and number"
theory of Article II, Section I is as spurious as the power-grant theory we
advance.
We do not believe, however, that avoiding redundancy should be a prime
goal in interpreting the Constitution or other legal texts.' 35 This is because,
as Justice Scalia has written, repetition is sometimes effective and deliberate.
It may be used to add emphasis, or it may be employed out of an abundance
of caution, lest anyone miss the significance of the message-"ex abundanti
cautela."'' 36 In our view, Lessig and Sunstein worry too much (and too one-
sidedly) about potential redundancy in setting forth their construction of
Article II.
But even if the avoidance of redundancy is really the key to constitutional
interpretation, we still do not think that our power-grant theory makes the
balance of that Article superfluous. As Professor Calabresi and Kevin Rhodes
said two years ago in The Structural Constitution, "Articles II and III resemble
each other and differ from Article I in that the first sections of both Articles
confer somewhat nebulous grants of power on the executive and judicial
departments, which the second sections of both Articles explicate and
substantially qualify.""' Calabresi and Rhodes explained that Section 2 of
Article III does this by (1) limiting the range of cases that can be heard in
federal rather than in state court to nine categories of cases or controversies;
and by (2) giving Congress broad discretion over the existence, structure, and
jurisdiction of the inferior courts and (arguably) over the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court.
By the same token, Section 2 of Article II explicates and substantially
qualifies the Vesting Clause's broad general grant of "the executive Power" by
giving vital content to two extremely important constitutional boundaries: first,
the boundary between the "executive Power" of the President and the "regal
Power" of King George III; and, second, the boundary between the federal
134. If the Vesting Clause were a mere designation of office. as Lessig and Sunstcu believe. Article
II would probably read as follows:
Section I: All executive Powers of the United States herein granted shall be vsted in a
President of the United States.
Section 2: The erecurive Power shall extend to: the President*% power to be Commander in
Chief ....
Altematively, a Vesting Clause that merely conferred a title might read like Article I of the Articles
of Confederation, which provided: "The stile of this confederacy shall be. "riE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA."' ARTS. OF CONFED. art. I. This does not sound much like Article I1. Section 2 Interestingly.
an early draft at the Philadelphia Convention had a naming clause for the chief executive magistrate that
provided that his "stile shall be 'The President of the United States of America' and his title shall be 'His
Excellency.'" 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787. at 185 (Max Farrand ed.. 191 I)
[hereinafter FEDERAL CONVENTION]. Real title-conferring clauses did not use the empowenng verb "vest.-
135. See infra text accompanying note 171.
136. See. e.g.. Fort Stewart Sch. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth.. 495 U.S. 641, 646 (1990) (Scalia.
137. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 6. at 1195 (emphasis added).
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executive power of the President and the executive powers of various state
officials. In particular, Section 2 of Article II imposes six key restraints on the
executive power granted to the President by the Article II Vesting Clause. As
was said in The Structural Constitution:
The text of Article II, Section 2 first explains that the President's
power to be Commander in Chief extends to "the Militia of the
several States," but only "when [they are] called into actual Service
of the United States." It then explains that the President's power to
require "Opinion[s], in writing" extends only to "the principal Officer
in each of the executive Departments" and may concern only
"Subject[s] relating to the Duties of their respective Offices." Third,
it explains that the President's pardon power reaches only "Offenses
against the United States" and does not reach "Cases of
Impeachment." Fourth, the President's power "to make Treaties"
depends on the "Advice and Consent of the Senate" and requires that
"two thirds of the Senators present concur." Fifth, the President's
appointment power is subject to senatorial "Advice and Consent," and
"Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of ... inferior
Officers ... in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."
Finally, the President's power to make appointments during
congressional recess is limited to "granting Commissions which shall
expire at the End of [the Senate's] next Session."'38
These six provisions of Article II, Section 2 all help to limit and give content
to the otherwise potentially vast grant of power that the Vesting Clause of
Article II confers on the President. Thus, Article II, Section 2, when read in
conjunction with Article I, Section 8, makes clear that the President will not
have many of the arguably "executive" powers of King George I., 39 Section
2 thus ensures that the President was not to be an elective "Monarch" (like the
then King of Poland) as Thomas Jefferson, for one, feared. 4' The President
was not to have an unchecked treaty-making or appointment power, an
unlimited pardon power, or the authority to serve as Commander in Chief of
the state militias even when they had not been federalized. We know that the
President does not have any of these regal powers because of the restraints that
Sections 2 and 3 of Article II impose. Hence, construing the Executive Power
Clause as a power grant hardly renders the rest of that Article superfluous. 4'
138. Id. at 1196 n.216 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
139. See Monaghan, supra note 6, at 13 (describing executive powers of monarchs as including right
unilaterally to make treaties, war and peace, and offices); see also FORREST MCDONALD, TilE AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 171 (1994) [hereinafter MCDONALD. AMERICAN PRESIDENCY]
(noting that Congress possesses many powers traditionally considered executive).
140. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Nov. 13, 1787). in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 81 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1993) [hereinafter JEFFERSON].
141. The executive power grant is also limited by the exemplary nature of the Article 11, Section 2
list. While that list does not purport to define executive powers exclusively, it does serve as an example
of the kinds of power that it was thought the Executive would have. Perhaps something of relevance might
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Rather, Sections 2 and 3 of Article II become all the more vital to limit and
define the otherwise immense power that Section 1 of Article II grants.4 2
5. The Minimalist Plain Meaning of Executive Power
Throughout this Section, we have argued for the proposition that the
Executive Power Clause is an actual grant of power to the President, and that
it does not merely tell the People that under the Constitution there will be only
one Chief Executive Officer with the title of "President" who will exercise the
enumerated powers granted in the rest of Article II. Before turning to the
remaining textual provisions that bear on the unitary Executive debate, we
think it is incumbent upon us to provide a minimal definition.
Justice Scalia has rightly said that a thorough scholarly treatment of this
subject could take thirty years to complete and fill 7000 pages.'" For now,
therefore, we wish only to advance an argument for the quite narrow claim that
the vesting of "the executive Power" in the President grants him the power to
"Execut[e]" the laws passed by Congress.'" In other words, the "Executive
Power Clause" informs the people that the President is constitutionally
empowered to carry federal law into effect.
To begin to understand why this is the case, consider that the verb
"executive" comes from the verb "to execute," which means to perform, to put
into action. 4 5 One can thus execute a plan, an instruction, an intention, or
be drawn from the canon of construction ejusdemn generts. which usually applies %%hen general words follow
an enumeration of persons or things. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 517 (6th cd. 1990). Here. of course. there
is the difference that the general words precede the specific enumeration. instead of following it.
142. Lessig and Sunstein assert that our construction of the Executive Power Clause leads to the
conclusion "that the judicial branch has a wide range of inherent and (legislatively) unregulable judicial
authority beyond that enumerated and granted by Congress." Lessig & Sunstein. supra note I. at 50. They
claim that since we read the Executive Power Clause to be a power grant, we must also beliese that the
Constitution gives the federal courts a broadly unregulable inherent power to decide certain kinds of cases.
We disagree. Our theory does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that broad and unregulable
"inherent" judicial powers must exist, such as. for example, an unregulable power to issue structural
injunctions. We do believe that, whatever the content of the judicial power, it must be vested in a Supreme
Court and any inferior federal courts created by Congress. But. as Professor Calabrsi and Kevin Rhodes
suggest in The Structural Constitution, Article III differs from Article 11 in that the former contains very
broad grants of power to Congress to regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Calabresi & Rhodes.
supra note 6, at 1181-83, 1192-93, 1204-06. Congress' power to limit the junisdiction of the federal courts
(coupled with the fact that the federal courts possess only limited grants of jurisdiction in the first place)
means that the text of Article III lets Congress regulate when the judicial power can be exercised. No
comparable authority exists whereby Congress might regulate the circumstances in which the President may
exercise his executive power.
Moreover, even if Article Ill did not grant Congress power over the junsdiction of the federal courts.
it is still the case that the Article 111. Section 2 jurisdictional grants are introduced by a phrase that makes
clear that the judicial power shall "extend to" only the nine categories of cases or controversies set forth
in the Article.
143. Scalia, supra note II. at 852.
144. Even arguing for this narrow claim fully and adequately would take more time and fill more
pages than is permissible here. Nonetheless. we feel obliged to start the task. even if %%e cannot complete
it in this Article.
145. See I JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY. supra note 116. at 683; see also 5 OXFORD ENGusii DICTIONARY
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a law. When we examine the plain dictionary meaning of "executive," we note
that it means "active; not deliberative; not legislative; having the power to put
in act the laws."'' 46 It is especially used as a "distinctive epithet of that
branch of the government which is concerned or charged with carrying out the
laws, decrees, and judicial sentences."'' 47 Therefore, we think it is clear that
the Executive Power Clause vests the President with at least the power to put
federal law into effect.
Section I might grant more than just that literal power. It might also grant
all those rights and authorities that normally belong to the Executive, that is,
"that branch of the government which is charged with the execution of the
laws,' 48 e.g., the powers of appointment and removal, the veto power, the
power to control the armed forces, the foreign affairs power, etc.' 49 But for
now, we need not take a position on this broader, historically based
understanding of executive power. Presently, it is enough to declare that the
Clause does what it says: It vests the power to execute the law with the
President.' 50 We shall return to the broader conception in Section E of this
Part.
It is time now to sum up the case that the Executive Power Clause of
Article II, Section 1 is actually a power grant and not a naming and numbering
provision. As we said above, the Vesting Clause of Article III must be a
general grant of the judicial power (that is later qualified by Section 2 of
Article III), or the federal courts lack a constitutional source of their power to
act. And if the Judicial Power Clause is a power grant, the analogous
520 (2d ed. 1989) ("Execute" comes from Latin "ex(s)ecut," past participle stem of "cx(s)cqui," meaning
"to follow out.").
146. I JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY, supra note 116, at 684.
147. 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 145, at 522.
148. Id.
149. Lessig and Sunstein claim that to unitary executivists, the "'Executive power' means . all
power not legislative and not judicial." Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at 12. That understanding of
executive power is not the one we embrace, nor do we know anyone other than Lessig and Sunstein who
has such an understanding. There are many powers that are neither legislative nor judicial that we do not
believe belong to the President, to wit the power to enact ex post facto laws. Clearly Congress may not pass
such laws, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, nor may judges make such laws, for they lack the authority
to legislate. No one believes that the fact that neither Congress nor the judiciary can pass ex post facto laws
indicates that the President may. Thankfully, there are some powers not granted by "We the People" to any
branch of the federal government.
150. Lest the reader be confused, we have not abandoned the notion that no branch of the federal
government can lay claim to "inherent powers." Our reading of the Clause is not based on any notion of
authority or power that is "inherently" executive. Instead, we are saying it actually grants a certain
authority: the power to execute the law. This contention is no more based on claims of inherent authority
than is the assertion that the House can establish its own internal rules. See U.S. CONST. art. I. § 2, cl. 5.
Neither claim is based on some ill-defined, amorphous notion about the nature of congressional or executive
authority. Rather, both are solidly grounded in constitutional text. One may legitimately disagree with the
interpretations, but one cannot fairly assert that either is an example of a claim of inherent authority. Our
later claim that removal authority is part of the executive power, see infra part IlI.F, is entirely consistent
with our aversion to inherent powers as well. When we assert that executive power includes the authority
to remove executive officers, we are making a claim based on the text and thus not resorting to arguments
of inherency.
The President's Power
Executive Power Clause must be a power grant as well. t ' The plain
dictionary meaning of the Executive Power Clause suggests that the power the
Clause grants the President includes at least the power to execute all federal
laws.' 52
B. The President's Constitutional Grant of the Executive Power Is Erclusive:
It Is Not Concurrently Shared with the Congress
The Executive Power Clause grants "the executive Power" solely and
exclusively to the President; it gives Congress no power whatsoever to create
subordinate entities that may exercise "the executive Power" until and unless
the President delegates that power in some fashion. The Clause thus should not
be read the way most opponents of the unitary Executive would read it:
Section 1. The executive Power of the United States shall be vested
in one President, and in such inferior entities as the Congress may
from tine to time ordain and establish.
Thus, the constitutional text suggests that administrative entities inferior to the
President must get their executive power to act by presidential delegation,
whereas inferior entities subordinate to the Supreme Court (although they are
created by Congress, as are Cabinet departments) get their judicial power to
act directly from the Constitution itself. From this, we deduce that Congress
has the power to create inferior entities that will be constitutionally empowered
to exercise the judicial power without the assent of the Supreme Court, but it
may not create inferior entities that will be constitutionally empowered to
exercise the executive power without the acquiesence of the President.'
5 3
Once created, these agencies and officers executing federal law must retain the
President's approval and be subject to presidential superintendence if they are
to continue to exercise "the executive Power." Accordingly, we think that anti-
unitarians are wrong to assert that the Executive Power Clause does not
preclude Congress from interfering with the President's power to control the
administration. By granting "the executive Power" exclusively'5 to the
151. The use of the mandatory word "shall" in the Executive Power Clause supports our thesis because
Congress has no power grant that trumps the Executive Power Clausc's empowerment of the President;
neither congressional nor judicial action can deprive the President of his power to execute the laws nor is
such action necessary for him to be able to execute the laws. See Calabresi & Rhodes. supra note 6. at
1175-79, 1181-84.
152. We thus disagree with Professor Strauss' interpretation of the meaning of executive power.
Strauss believes that the grant of executive power clearly has resonance in foreign affairs but has less clear
meaning in domestic affairs. See Strauss. supra note 3. at 598. We think Professor Strauss has it backwards.
The executive power, though it encompasses some foreign affairs or military authority. is quintessentially
about executing the law. a function most would describe as domestic.
153. See also Lawson. supra note 67. at 1242-44 & n.72
154. The exclusivity of the power grant to the President is emphasized by the fact that the Judicial
Power Clause grants power concurrently to both the Supreme Court and inferior federal courts.
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President, the Clause forecloses Congress from creating "independent"
executive entities.
If the Executive Power Clause did not exist as an exclusive power grant,
and if there were no other provisions (like the Take Care Clause) that
confirmed the grant to the President of "the executive Power," then perhaps
Congress could create executive entities by statute as the Continental Congress
did under the Articles of Confederation. 155 Independent agencies and
counsels might then be defended as being both necessary and proper means for
Congress to use "for carrying into Execution" its other enumerated powers,
such as the commerce power. The Necessary and Proper Clause might then
serve as the constitutional fount of all federal executive power and authority
to act.
But the Executive Power Clause does exist, and it does constitute an
exclusive grant of "the executive Power" to the President. It can no more be
overridden or supplemented by Congress than can the First Amendment. The
exclusivity of the power granted by the Executive Power Clause confirms our
view that Congress cannot create independent entities under the Constitution
as it could under the Articles of Confederation. Only one officer in the U.S.
government (and his delegees) may exercise "the executive Power." '56
C. The Take Care and the Opinions Clauses
Contrary to what Lessig and Sunstein appear to believe, the Take Care
Clause and the Opinions in Writing Clause actually bolster our case. Both
Clauses contemplate a role for the President, and for no one else, in the
administration of the government. This "no one else" most emphatically
includes the Congress, whose members are actually precluded elsewhere in the
text of the Constitution from being able to serve as "[o]fficers of the United
States."'157 It is hard to imagine that a document that forbids members of
Congress from serving as executive officers would nonetheless allow such
members to control indirectly the administration of the laws that they were
155. See infra part IV.
156. Professor Calabresi believes that an analogy may be helpful here. Congress has the exclusive
power "Itlo declare War," but only a concurrent power to "regulate Commerce ... among the several
states." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. cis. II, 3. This means of course that the several states cannot declare war
when Congress fails to do so, but they may regulate interstate commerce (for the most part) when Congress
prefers to remain silent. Since the Executive Power Clause confers an exclusive power on the President,
just as the War Power Clause confers an exclusive power on the federal government, Congress cannot fill
any presidential silences by acting to create independent executive structures that will in essence exercise
the executive power. The President does not share his executive power with anyone, although he may
delegate it, just as Congress does not share its war power with anyone, although it may enlist others in
various military tasks.
157. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 6, cl. 2 ("[N]o Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be
a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office."). For a detailed historical and normative
discussion of the Clause, see Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation
of Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1994).
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disabled from controlling more directly.'58 Such indirect political control will
necessarily exist with any so-called "independent" agency or officer because
absent presidential control, congressional oversight and appropriations powers
become the only concern for the officers of the allegedly "independent"
agencies. There is no such thing in Washington as a politically "independent"
agency.
59
The very language of the Take Care Clause confirms that the President
possesses unique powers with respect to the execution of the law. Thus the
Clause is phrased somewhat peculiarly, as if it imposed a duty on the President
rather than granting a power. As Professor Calabresi and Kevin Rhodes said
in The Structural Constitution, if the Take Care Clause were
a grant of power, one would expect it to read: "[The President] shall
have power to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." Instead,
the Clause reads: "[The President] shall take care that the Laws be
faithfully executed." The italicized language suggests an obligation of
watchfulness, not a grant of power. This obligation could not be
fulfilled unless the Article II Vesting Clause was, in fact, already a
substantive grant of executive power to the President. Accordingly,.
the use of the verb "take care" in the Take Care Clause bolsters the
power-grant reading of the Vesting Clause of Article II.'6
The point here is that the duty-imposing language of the Take Care Clause
makes sense if the President has already been given a grant of the executive
power by the Executive Power Clause. Otherwise, how could the President
possibly live up to the duty that the Take Care Clause imposes? The Take Care
Clause perhaps limits and defines the Executive Power Clause's grant of
executive power by making it clear that the President has no royal prerogative
158. Congress, of course, can legitimately control the administration of federal law, to some degree.
by statutorily placing certain functions in some executive departments and agencies. rather than in other
executive departments and agencies. Moreover, whenever Congress passes a constitutionally valid law the
President is, of course, bound by the Take Care Clause faithfully to execute that law. The point here is that
Congress, in controlling agencies, must act through laws. Unlike the President. Congress could not legally
command that an agency do something or desist from taking an action without passing a law. See tnfra part
[I.E.
159. See Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments. supra note 9.
160. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 6, at 1198 n.221 (citations omitted). Professor Calabresi is
indebted to his colleague Gary Lawson for this construction of the Take Came Clause.
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to suspend statutes.' 6 1 It does not, however, eviscerate his powers of control
and supervision over the administration of the federal law. 62
Similarly, the Opinions Clause empowers the President to obtain
information in writing on government matters precisely so he will be able to
issue binding orders to his subordinates. 63 We can see this if we contrast the
Clause with the State of the Union Clause, another textual provision that is
obviously concerned with exchanges of information. As was explained in The
Structural Constitution:
The State of the Union Clause ... imposes an obligation on the
President only "from time to time" and only on general matters such
as the circumstances of the whole country. This Clause gives
Congress no power to require presidential opinions in writing upon
any subject relating to the President's duties, because the Clause
governs information exchanges between two independent and co-equal
departments of the national government. In contrast, the Opinions in
Writing Clause enables the President to get information whenever he
wants it, in writing, on any subject relating to official duties; this
Clause does not seem to contemplate an information exchange
'between independent and co-equal entities.1
64
Notions of hierarchy and of the unitary Executive are thus implicit in the
Opinions Clause, as is illustrated by this comparison. Rather than sending the
President reports of the officers' activities, the President obtains opinions and
he makes the decisions. 65
Lessig and Sunstein maintain that if the Executive Power Clause is a
power grant, as we contend, then surely the Opinions Clause is redundant. But
this overlooks the fact that the Opinions Clause might actually limit the
161. One can well imagine why the Framers might have wanted to forbid the President from exercising
the ancient English royal power to suspend laws. Such a power is much more potent than even an absolute
veto over laws recently passed by Congress. An absolute veto, i.e., one incapable of being overridden,
provides only the sitting President the opportunity to block legislation from becoming law. A suspending
power, on the other hand, permits any President to nullify laws enacted during and prior to his taking
office. The Clause's requirement to "faithfully" execute thus might preclude general suspending authority.
We note, however, the Take Care Clause's tension with the President's ability to pardon offenses.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. cf. I. If the President pardons in an extremely broad and generous manner, say
by pardoning all those who have been found to violate a particular environmental statute, that might seem
to violate his Take Care responsibilities. We will discuss this tension at greater length in Part VI, when we
recount President Washington's offer of a blanket pardon to rebellious Westerners. See infra part VI.A.2.
162. Originalist constitutional scholars, who have endorsed the concept of "departmental" three-branch
review for unconstitutionality, would deny that the President is (legally, as opposed to prudentially) bound
to honor statutes that purport to take away any of his constitutional authorities or duties, particularly his
authority to execute federal law (part of his executive power) or his responsibility to see that the laws are
duly executed (derived from the Take Care Clause). Steven G. Calabresi, Thayer's Clear Mistake, 88 Nw.
U. L. REV. 269, 272-76 (1993); Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905
(1990); John Harrison, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting the Constitution,
73 CORNELL L. REV. 386 (1988).
163. Prakash, supra note 6, at 1004-07.
164. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 6, at 1207 n.262.
165. Prakash, supra note 6, at 1007.
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President's general executive power to request opinions in writing. Note that
the Clause only empowers the President to command that principal executive
officers submit opinions "upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their
respective Offices." Accordingly, the President may not command that an
executive officer draft an opinion concerning the President's personal legal
problems. Instead, the President can only command those officers to advise
him on governmental matters.166
But what if we grant Lessig and Sunstein their assertion that our
construction renders the Opinions in Writing Clause redundant, as Alexander
Hamilton said that it was in The Federalist?67 So what? The Constitution
is full of redundancies. Hamilton and Madison both said that the Necessary
and Proper Clause was redundant.' United States v. Darb' 9 said. in
effect, that the Tenth Amendment was redundant, insofar as it expresses a
truism. Incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment could be said to make the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause in some sense redundant. 70 But no one is troubled by these
redundancies because everyone understands why they are there. Redundancy,
as noted earlier, is built in to reiterate an important point-to make sure that
the point does not get lost. 7 ' Certainly, redundancy does not exist to defeat
the first iteration of the point that is being emphasized.
D. The Militia Clauses and Execution
Consider the Militia Clauses, hitherto ignored in the debate. Clause 15 of
Article I, Section 8 says that Congress may call forth the state militias to
"execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions."'' 72 This Clause, read in conjunction with the Article II, Section 2
designation of the President as Commander in Chief of any "federalized" state
militias, plainly contemplates presidential supervision of law execution during
times of crisis. But that, in turn, makes it even clearer that the President is in
charge of law execution during times of peace as well. If the President can
"execute the Laws of the Union" through the barrel of a gun, is it really
plausible to conclude that he lacked the constitutional authority to tell Treasury
Secretary Hamilton what to do?
Or suppose that Congress decides to give the President the statutory power
to call out the state militias whenever he thinks that law execution will benefit,
166. See infra part V.C for further discussion.
167. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rosstter ed.. 1961).
168. THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 202 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossitcr cd.. 1961); THE
FEDERALIST No. 44, at 284 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.. 1961).
169. 312 U.S. 100. 124 (1941).
170. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 66 (1947) (Frankfurter. J.. concumng).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 135-36.
172. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 15.
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or whenever he thinks an insurrection or invasion is imminent. 73 Can the
President thwart the administrative/executive distinction that Lessig and
Sunstein find in the Constitution merely by calling forth the militias on a
permanent basis? He could then control the execution of Treasury statutes,
claiming that those laws are not being adequately enforced. We think these
examples and others show the implausibility of reading in an
executive/administrative distinction where none exists. Like the Take Care and
Opinions Clauses, the Militia Clauses bolster unitary executivism by showing
that the President must control the execution of federal law in times of peace,
as well as during periods of crisis.
E. The Relevance of the Necessary and Proper Clause
The Necessary and Proper Clause does not confer any powers upon
Congress that call into question our textual analysis. The Clause gives
Congress the power only "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof."' 74 Lessig and Sunstein nonetheless claim that
the Clause grants Congress the power "to determine the means for specifying
how powers-and again, all powers-in the federal government are to be
exercised."' 75 With respect to administration, "Congress ... is vested with
the power to determine how to structure the administration and how it is to
function,"'' 76 and, more important, who will superintend the administration
of particular laws.
Yet Lessig and Sunstein do not deny that the President must be able to
control the execution of some laws. They acknowledge that the President must
be able to direct execution of "executive" laws; that is, those laws passed
pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause that are enacted to carry into
execution the President's specifically enumerated Article II, Section 2 powers
(e.g., to control the military and foreign affairs).'77 But with respect to those
laws that help carry into execution Congress' powers enumerated in Article I
and elsewhere (so-called "administrative" laws such as those that establish
departments for the collection and disbursement of revenues), they argue that
less presidential direction is constitutionally necessary.'78 Such laws help
173. Note that Congress cannot itself call forth the militias but may only "provide for calling forth the
Militia." Id. Someone else (i.e., the President) must call forth the militia.
174. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added).
175. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at 67 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
176. Id. at 68.
177. Id. at 46. Officers and departments created to help carry into execution Article 11 powers must
be subject to presidential superintendence because, after all, these institutions exist to help effectuate the
President's Article II powers.
178. Id.
[Vol. 1 04: 541
The President's Power
carry into effect congressional powers, not presidential ones. Hence, Lessig and
Sunstein say the President has no constitutionally fixed role in carrying such
laws into execution. We disagree for a host of reasons.
1. The Relevance of the Word "Proper"
To begin with, a recent major article by Gary Lawson and Patricia
Granger 79 makes clear that the use of the words "proper" and "for carrying
into Execution" was deliberate and that these words have real substantive bite.
Put simply, they prevent Congress from using the Necessary and Proper Clause
as a textual basis for a congressional power to alter the basic tripartite structure
of our government, the federal structure of the Union, or the individual-rights
guarantees of the original (Article I, Sections 9 and 10) Bill of Rights."
We will not rehearse Lawson and Granger's detailed arguments here, but
a few basic points are almost self-evident. Congress may only pass laws under
the Sweeping Clause that are "proper" as well as necessary. As Lawson and
Granger admirably demonstrate, the word "proper" is used in the Clause in an
almost jurisdictional sense, precluding Congress from passing laws that would
violate the constitutional structure established in the text of the Constitution
itself. Thus, the Sweeping Clause may be used by Congress "to carry[] into
execution" one of the enumerated powers that the Congress is granted
elsewhere in the document or "to carry[] into execution" the power of another
department of the government, such as the executive power or the judicial
power. But the Clause may not be used improperly by Congress to alter'the
basic tripartite structure of the Constitution by, for example, creating
independent agencies or legislative courts."'
179. Lawson & Granger, supra note 90.
180. Id. at 333-34 (discussing theory's implications for separation of powers)
181. Lessig and Sunstein recognize that "propriety" serves as a constraint on congressional power. See
Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 67 n.278. Their discussion of propriety does not. however, come to
grips with the possibility that their version of the Clause might improperly let Congress take away the
President's powers.
First, they invoke the Clause for the proposition that Congress determines who executes certain
administrative laws. Such a use, we are told, is proper because the Clause itself tells us "tiln as clear a
textual commitment as possible ... [that] Congress ... is granted the power to determine the means for
specifying how powers... are to be exercised." Id. at 67. Thus, their interpretation of congressional power
is proper because the very clause that requires propriety lets Congress determine who will execute.
It would seem to follow that under their interpretation of the Clause. Congress can tell federal judges
how to decide cases (that is, how to use their judicial power). It could even mandate the use of coin tosses.
Lessig and Sunstein cannot claim that such a law is improper by noting that Congress lacks the authority
to so instruct the Court because, they assert, the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the authority
to "determine the means for specifying how powers--and again. all powers" are to be employed. Id.
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2. The Relevance of "Carrying into Execution"
The Necessary and Proper Clause provides that it can only be used "for
carrying into execution" those powers "vested by this Constitution." This
makes clear that Congress cannot use the Clause to carry into execution any
unenumerated powers of government. Only powers "vested by this
Constitution" can be carried into execution. The "for carrying into execution"
language, in particular, does not authorize alteration of the basic tripartite
structure of the government through the creation of independent agencies. This
is because that language has to be read holistically against the backdrop of a
Constitution that: (1) creates only a trinity of governmental powers; (2) gives
an exclusive grant of all of the executive power to the President alone; (3)
requires all exercises of legislative power to be conducted through the onerous
procedural hoops of bicameralism and presentment; and (4) commands that all
judicial power be exercised only where a case or controversy exists. When one
puts these requirements together, one must ask which of the three traditional
powers of government administrative officers may exercise.
It is clear that no independent agency or officer could exercise an
unenumerated power of government because no such unenumerated powers
exist. It is just as apparent that such an agency or officer could not exercise
executive power because the President (and his delegees) are the only officers
vested with the executive power and authorized to exercise that power. Nor
could such an agency or officer exercise judicial power, because the strictures
of the case or controversy requirement would not be present. And, finally, it
is obvious that such an agency or officer could not exercise legislative power
because that can be done only if the requirements of bicameralism and
presentment have been satisfied.
It follows, then, that Congress could not "carry[] into execution" any
constitutional power by creating an independent officer or agency because such
an officer or agency would be unable to exercise executive, legislative, or
judicial power under the text of the Constitution, and there are no other powers
of government available to be exercised. And it is not enough under our
Constitution for an officer to be statutorily empowered to act; she must be
constitutionally empowered to act as well. Put another way, Congress can no
more use the Necessary and Proper Clause to override the constitutional trinity
of powers and the vesting of all executive power with the President than it
could use the Clause to override the First Amendment to "carry[] into
execution" the Alien and Sedition Acts.
Finally, even if an administrative officer could somehow be said to be
exercising executive (or legislative or judicial) power, one must ask if the
power to establish independent administrative officers is granted elsewhere in
the Constitution. As was said in Hail to the Chief Administrator, if Congress
is to invoke the Necessary and Proper Clause as a basis for legislation, it must
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first identify an independent grant of power that it is attempting to "carry [] into
execution."' 2 The "for carrying into execution" language empowers
Congress only to take subsidiary actions in aid of, or to further, the already
enumerated powers that Congress itself or another department or officer
possesses. A perusal of the Constitution quickly confirms that there is no
congressional, executive, or judicial authority for making execution of federal
law independent of the President. Hence, the Clause may not be employed to
do so. "'83
3. There Is No Special Relationship Between the Take Care and
the Necessary and Proper Clauses
Lessig and Sunstein attempt to establish a "special relationship" between
the Take Care and Necessary and Proper Clauses by pointing out that a
variation of the word "execute" is found in both of them." Because the
Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the power to make laws "for
carrying into execution" its own powers, perhaps Congress has authority to
determine who will execute congressional laws. Does not the Clause
straightforwardly permit Congress to determine who ought to "carry[] into
execution" its statutes? And does not the Take Care Clause compel the
President faithfully to respect such decisions?
Such an argument, however, overlooks the different ways in which
derivations of the word "execute" are used in the Take Care Clause and the
Necessary and Proper Clause. We know the President has both the duty to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed and "the executive Power," i.e., the
constitutional power to enforce, administer, and implement federal laws. On
the other hand, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not grant Congress "the
executive Power" nor does it ask that Congress "take care that the laws be
faithfully executed." The Clause does not grant Congress the power to
determine who will "carry[] into execution" its laws. Instead, it gives Congress
the power to implement its Article I powers, and other federal governmental
powers, by passing laws in aid of implementation. Thus, while the President's
Executive Power Clause and Take Care Clause are quintessentially about law
execution, Congress' Necessary and Proper Clause is quintessentially about
ensuring the means of implementing other enumerated powers.
If one thought that the mere presence of the same root word in both
Clauses created a special congressional claim to determine who would execute
federal law, one would also have to believe that the Necessary and Proper
Clause created a nexus with the Militia and the Presidential Oaths Clauses.
182. See generally Prakash, supra note 6. at 1010-11.
183. Id. at 1011.
184. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at 69.
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After all, the Militia Clause contains the word "execute,"'85 and the
President, before beginning the "Execution of his Office," must take an oath
affirming that he "will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United
States."'186 May Congress determine who takes the Presidential Oath or who
may execute the Office of the President? Surely not. The Constitution
establishes procedures for determining who may take the Presidential Oath and
execute the Office of the President. Why would we then interpret the Clause
to let Congress choose who can execute federal law? The Constitution already
establishes who is responsible for execution of federal law.
If the Article II Executive Power Clause did not exist as an exclusive
power grant, and if there was no other provision (like the Take Care, Opinions,
and Militia Clauses) that confirmed that grant to the President of the authority
to superintend the administration of federal law, then perhaps Congress could
create executive entities by statute. Independent agencies might then be
defended as being both the necessary and proper means for Congress to ensure
that the laws it enacted would be executed. But the Article II Executive Power
Clause does exist, and it does constitute an exclusive grant of "the executive
Power" to the President. It can no more be trumped by Congress under the
Necessary and Proper Clause than under any other provision of the
Constitution.'"
4. The Real Purpose of the Clause
Thus far, we have focused on what the Necessary and Proper Clause does
not permit Congress to do. We turn now to a consideration of what the Clause
was actually meant to accomplish. Textually, the Clause is only about means,
not ends.'88 It takes the powers of the federal government as given ("vested
by this Constitution") and permits Congress to help all three of the branches
in implementing their respective constitutionally enumerated powers. As
Lawson and Granger observe, "[t]he enumerations of power in the other
seventeen clauses of Article I, Section 8 and elsewhere in the Constitution
essentially provide the subject matter for the exercise of [the Necessary and
185. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 15.
186. Id. art. II, § I, ci. 8.
187. We think it unlikely that a sensible drafter would mention a fundamental power of Congress in
so obscure a way in a document that carefully enumerates and cabins all governmental powers. A holistic
and contextual examination of the text reveals other more plausible ways to read the "for carrying into
execution" language and makes clear that Lessig and Sunstein read too much into it.
188. In claiming the Clause has nothing to do with ends, we only mean that the Clause does not
permit Congress to determine who will exercise federal governmental powers. As noted above, the
Constitution already establishes who will exercise federal governmental powers.
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Proper Clause]." 1 89 When the Clause authorizes the means, it quite obviously
helps "carry[] into Execution" a power of the federal government."
The Necessary and Proper Clause, then, is centrally concerned with means
and takes the Constitution's vesting of powers as a given. What kinds of laws
does it authorize that might be of aid to each of the three branches? With
respect to Congress, the Clause might provide a basis for laws that allow the
Senate and the House to use effectively their enumerated powers, such as the
power to legislate generally, the impeachment power, and the power to
establish internal congressional rules. Thus the Clause allows Congress to
provide funding in aid of carrying out these powers and to create congressional
institutions that would help assist in the exercise of these powers. With respect
to the courts, the Clause allows Congress to help the federal judiciary carry
into execution the judicial power by providing for law clerks and secretarial
support. And, with respect to the executive branch, the Clause would allow
Congress to institute an agency to help the President wisely employ his
pardoning power, or to establish a department to assist the President in
selecting officers for nomination. Most important, the Clause allows Congress
to establish officers to assist the President in exercising his "executive Power."
We thus agree with Lessig and Sunstein insofar as they acknowledge that
the Clause enables Congress to provide the means of implementing the powers
of the three branches. But when they insist that Congress can determine how
all federal powers will be implemented, they are on shaky ground.'
Congress does have the power to help carry into execution all of the federal
government's powers including those of the other branches. But, it does not
have the power to enact laws telling the other branches "how they ought to
carry into execution" one of their powers. Thus, for example, Congress could
not require that the President consult with the leadership of Congress before
he vetoes a bill.' 92 The President may veto bills at his nondelegable and
unreviewable discretion.
Simply put, the Clause has nothing to do with altering constitutionally
granted powers and prerogatives; nor does it allow Congress to tell
constitutionally empowered actors how they can implement their exclusive
powers. The Clause has everything to do, however, with permitting Congress
189. Lawson & Granger, supra note 90, at 324.
190. Hence, there is a connection between the Take Care and the Necessary and Proper Clauses. See
Prakash, supra note 6. at 1010-11. But the relationship between the two is the same as between the
Necessary and Proper Clause and any power of the federal government.
191. Lessig and Sunstein insist that "[tlhe choice over who gets to specify the how of federal execution
was made by the framers when they drafted the Necessary and Proper Clause.- Lessig & Sunstein. supra
note 1, at 69 (emphasis added). While it is true that Congress may assist the other branches and itself in
the "how" of carrying their respective powers into effect, the choice of who may specify who gets to
execute the law is not part of the power conferred to Congress by the Necessary and Proper Clause. The
choice of who will execute is decided elsewhere in the Constitution: The Executive will execute all federal
law.
192. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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to help itself, the President, and the federal judiciary exercise their own
respective powers.'
93
5. Creating Offices and Cabinet Departments
Although the Necessary and Proper Clause does not permit Congress to
tell the President how he ought to implement his own constitutional powers,
it does enable Congress to structure the administration of federal law. Thus,
Lawson and Granger are right to note that "virtually all federal laws" are
enacted pursuant to the Clause. 94 Most congressional powers really only
allow Congress to legislate in a minimal sense: that is, to state what is
illegal. 95 The Necessary and Proper Clause, however, allows Congress to
legislate beyond this bare minimum, permitting Congress to provide the means
by which it and the other branches can implement their constitutionally vested
powers.
Thus, the Necessary and Proper Clause provides the constitutional source
of Congress' power to create "executive offices." To help effectuate the
President's "executive Power," Congress may create officers and departments
whose job it is to assist the President in administering federal law. Unlike the
specific congressional power to establish inferior tribunals, which is mentioned
twice in the Constitution,' no source of authority other than the Necessary
and Proper Clause exists that would permit Congress to establish inferior
executive officers and offices. The power conferred by the Clause is vital
indeed.
Now, when Congress provides the President with "assistants and officers"
and with Cabinet departments, it has broad latitude to tell these mere creatures
of statutory law how, and on what matters, they will be available to help the
President in executing federal law. This is so because the Necessary and
Proper Clause does empower Congress to create the entire superstructure of
law execution. The President is the Chief Executive, but without the
congressional enactment of laws creating departments and officers, he would
be the only executive.'97 Statutory officers can be limited to carrying out
certain statutorily specified tasks.
It is thus of course permissible for Congress to decide to have separate
Departments of State and Defense or to have one department covering both
subjects. Congress can set terms of office that last indefinitely (subject to
193. Prakash, supra note 6, at 1010.
194. Lawson & Granger, supra note 90, at 324.
195. Id.
196. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; id. art. III, § 1.
197. Of course, the Vice President might be considered another executive officer. Yet his functions
are, ordinarily, largely legislative, namely sitting as President of the Senate and breaking tics in Senatc
votes. Id. art. t, § 3, cl. 4. The Constitution contemplates that he will become an executive only upon the
President's resignation, death, or inability to discharge the powers or duties of office. Id. art. II, § I, cl. 6.
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presidential removal"' s and congressional impeachment, of course), or it can
grant officers limited one-year terms, thus requiring yearly congressional
review of an officer's performance if that officer is to continue in office.
Congress may structure the administration of the government in a whole host
of other ways as well. But it must do so in a manner that comports with the
President's exclusive power to control all instances where the power to execute
the laws is exercised. The Constitution requires no less. We turn in the next
Section to a discussion of three minimal, constitutionally necessary
mechanisms of presidential control. No organizational structure constructed by
Congress can interfere with any of these control mechanisms without violating
the Constitution.
F. The President's Power To Execute the Laws: Three Constitutionally
Necessary Mechanisms To Control Inferior Executive Officers
As discussed above, the Executive Power Clause grants "the executive
Power" solely and exclusively to the President. Congress may not exercise "the
executive Power" itself, nor may it give that power to other subordinate
entities. Until and unless the President delegates "the executive Power" to
those entities or officers, they are constitutionally disempowered from
acting. 99 The Necessary and Proper Clause does not change this analysis
because it does not grant Congress the power to strip the President of his
constitutional authority and obligation to supervise and control the executive
branch. Thus, the text of the Constitution confers on the President the
exclusive power to superintend the execution of all federal laws, and Congress
can neither add to nor diminish the scope of this power.
We saw in the previous Section that the Necessary and Proper Clause
permits Congress to assist the other branches in the exercise of their powers.
We saw as well that Congress frequently assists the President in the exercise
of his "executive Power" by creating inferior executive officers and
departments because, without them, the vast majority of federal laws would go
unexecuted and the President would be without advice and help as he sought
to carry out his constitutional powers and duties. Although the President has
the exclusive power to execute federal law, he cannot even begin to fulfill that
task acting alone. Happily, the Constitution does not contemplate that the
President single-handedly will deliver all the mail, collect the tariffs on all
imported goods, or coin personally all the money that is to be coined. Instead,
the Constitution mentions (and thus contemplates) that there will be other
198. See infra part 1II.F.
199. Again, the Executive Power Clause of Article 11 does not provide:
Section I. The executive Power of the United States shall be vested in one Presidenit. and in
such inferior entities as the Congress may from tunt to time ordain and establish.
Cf U.S. CONST. art. 111.
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"executive" officers. We consider here the relationship between these executive
officers, statutorily charged with assisting in law execution, and the President,
who is constitutionally charged with the power and responsibility of law
execution.
Terms similar to "executive officer" appear in various places in the text
of the Constitution.2" The terms imply a subordinate/superior relationship
with the President-the Constitution's Chief Executive Officer-by use of the
word "executive," by their position in Article II, or by similarities to terms
used in Article II. Such officers are clearly of the executive variety and thus
presumably subservient to the officer who already possesses the executive
power. They can be used to execute federal law or to help the Executive carry
out his other powers and responsibilities, such as the appointment and veto
powers.2"' We might also pause for a moment and remark upon what the
Constitution does not say about these "executive officers." Though the
Constitution refers to duties202 and powers0 3 of officers, it nowhere grants
any executive officer other than the President any duty or power.2 '4 Nor does
200. See, e.g., id. art. II, § 2, cl. I ("principal Officer"); id. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2 & §§ 3-4 ("Officerf of
the United States"); id. art. VI, cl. 3 ("executive... Officers"); id. amend. XIV, § 3 ("officer of the United
States"); id. amend. XXV, § 4, cl. 2 ("principal officers of the executive department").
201. We note that although the Constitution refers to the President as "Commander in Chief," id. art.
II, § 2, cl. I. it does not refer to him as "Chief Executive." The absence of such a provision is little cause
for alarm. The grant of the executive power to the President, and only the President, establishes him as the
Chief Executive. All other executives exist merely to help him implement his authority.
202. Professor Froomkin has argued that the Inferior Officers Appointments Clause suggests that the
department heads are somehow independent of the President because otherwise there would be no reason
to give Congress the authority to vest the power to appoint inferior officers in the President or the
department heads. See Froomkin, Agency Autonomy, supra note 5, at 799. Froomkin notes that the
Constitution could have merely permitted Congress to vest authority in the President, who could then either
delegate that power to his subordinate department heads or accept their recommendations.
We think Froomkin has focused on one of the imperfections in the Constitution. See infra note 204
(discussing Strauss' claim about textual imperfections). Given the powerful textual support for the unitary
Executive, we think it very unlikely that this rather minor Clause was meant to call into question what the
rest of the document makes clear. As we show, see infra notes 394-400 and accompanying text, the
Clause's history supports our claim that the portion of the Clause permitting Congress to delegate
appointment power to the President and department heads is but an imperfection.
203. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 18.
204. Professor Peter Strauss, the modern founding father of the field in which we are now writing, has
called our attention to portions of the Constitution that seem to have contemplated that certain officers
would have constitutionally established offices and duties. See Strauss, supra note 3, at 601 n.108; see also
Letter from Professor Strauss to Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash (June 2, 1994) (on file with
authors). Professor Strauss labels these instances as examples of the imperfections and oversights that are
often found in enacted texts. id., and that is exactly how we view them.
Professor Strauss goes on, however, to claim that because the Constitution presumes that some
departments were to have constitutionally established duties, we should view any statutorily established
duties as the responsibility of the departments alone. Under this view, the President would only have the
authority to oversee these departments, pursuant to the Take Care Clause.
While we are uneasy about our partial disagreement with Professor Strauss, we nonetheless think he
puts too much emphasis on the mention of departmental duties and powers in the Constitution. These
imperfections do not detract in any way from the notion that the President is the only officer of the federal
government granted the constitutional power to execute federal law. Whatever the intent of the people who
framed the Necessary and Proper Clause, with its oblique references to hypothetical departmental and
official duties, the actual text of the Constitution simply does not contain any clauses that grant powers or
establish duties for departments or their officers. As originalists, we feel bound to follow the constitutional
The President's Power
it grant Congress the power to divest the President of any of his executive
powers and redistribute them to other "executive officers."
Thus, all "executive power" found in the Constitution is only vested in one
individual, the President. If anyone else is ever to exercise federal executive
power, it must be as a result of the explicit or tacit delegation and approval of
the President,2 5 because, as we noted earlier, no governmental actor can act
in a manner that affects the rights of private parties unless that action is
somehow ultimately authorized by the Constitution. The real question is not
whether the President will control the executive officers, because they are, after
all, helping him exercise his constitutional authority. Rather, the "important
question is what form the President's power of control must take in order to
assure a constitutionally unitary executive." 2°
Professor Calabresi and Kevin Rhodes have previously described three
possible mechanisms by which the President could control inferior executive
officers: removal, a power to act in their stead, and a power to nullify their
acts when the President disapproves.2 7 We now are prepared to sketch out
the beginnings20 8 of an argument as to why all three mechanisms of control
must be clearly encompassed within the President's grant of the executive
power. Let us consider first whether the President has a constitutional right to
take action in the place of an inferior executive officer to whom a statute
purports to give discretionary executive power.
Because the President alone has the constitutional power to execute federal
law, it would seem to follow that, notwithstanding the text of any given
statute, the President must be able to execute that statute, interpreting it and
applying it in concrete circumstances. 2' It is a grave mistake to
conceptualize the President's ability to execute federal law as a power to act
in an executive officer's stead. Under the Constitution, executive officers can
act only in the President's stead, since it is the President and the President
alone who can delegate to them the constitutional power that they must have
if they are to execute laws. For example, if Congress establishes by statute a
Treasury Secretary with the power and responsibility to expend appropriations
and also provides a degree of discretion in an appropriations act, it is a mistake
to view that statute as creating any duty or authority that belongs to the
Secretary, even if the statute is written that way. Rather, it is the President,
text.
205. We think it obvious from the text of the Constitution that the President may delegate his authority
to execute federal law to executive officers. Of all the President's powers, this one necessarly requires the
assistance of other officers and was traditionally delegable. Whether he may delegate any of his other
powers (like the veto) poses questions beyond the scope of our inquiry,
206. Lawson, supra note 6, at 1243.
207. See Calabresi & Rhodes. supra note 6. at 1166; see also Lawson. supra note 6. at 1243-45;
Liberman, supra note 6. at 353-54.
208. We recognize that the argument we sketch out in this Section needs an enormous amount of
additional elaboration and support.
209. More likely, the President may tell his executive officers how he would like a law to be executed.
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under our Constitution, who must always be the ultimate empowered and
responsible actor. This is because the Constitution establishes that the President
exclusively controls the power to execute all federal laws, and therefore it must
be the case that all inferior executive officers act in his stead. A statute stating
that the Secretary of the Treasury and other Treasury personnel will execute
appropriation and tax laws only establishes that these particular officers will
assist the President in carrying those laws into execution."' Congress lacks
constitutional power to do anything more.
If the President may make a decision that a statute purports to reserve for
an inferior executive officer, by the same logic, the President must be able to
nullify an action taken by an inferior executive officer. Once again, only the
President has the constitutional power to execute federal law, and no
governmental power may be exercised, including the law-execution power,
without a basis in the Constitution for the exercise of the power. To give a
nullification-power example, suppose the Secretary of the Treasury, in the
exercise of her purportedly exclusive statutory discretion, decided to fine a
bank for violation of certain banking laws. Because the Treasury Secretary
would be ultimately exercising the President's "executive power," the President
must be able, in effect, to reverse or nullify the Secretary's decision by
withdrawing his delegation of the executive power, which the Constitution
gives to him alone.2 '
Finally, consider whether the President's executive power allows him to
remove inferior executive officers, either by firing them altogether, or by
removing permanently their ability to exercise implicitly delegated executive
power. On a cramped reading, the Constitution would seem to provide only
one means of removing inferior executive officers: impeachment."' While
210. Ve thus agree with Professor Gary Lawson when he says that the President may not empower
another actor to direct the Secretary of the Treasury. See Lawson, supra note 6, at 1243 n.72. That is so
because the President, subject to the three control minimums, takes the officers "as is." In other words. if
the President wishes help in implementing appropriations, he may use only Treasury personnel, because
those are the only people Congress, through the Necessary and Proper Clause, has statutorily authorized
to assist him. We disagree, however, with the statement that "if a statute vests power to promulgate
workplace standards in the Secretary of Labor, the President cannot personally promulgate safety
standards." Id. Other members of the executive branch are there to assist the President in executing the
laws, they may not take away his authority to do so.
211. Under certain circumstances, complications will arise. Where a statute requires the issuance of
some regulations on a given date, and the President disagrees with the regulations as drafted by the
Secretary but has no opportunity to revise them prior to the issuance date, it might be the case that the
President is unable to revise the regulations. On the other hand, perhaps the President can order his
Secretary to delay issuance, revise the regulations according to his desires, and then issue the regulations.
If legal obstacles arise, the President might be able in theory to pardon the Secretary for failing to meet
the statutory deadline, although in practice political realities will probably always make that an
impossibility.
212. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 4; see Scalia, supra note II, at 857-60 (discussing extent of executive
power of removal in context of debate between originalists and non-originalists). Justice Scalia's discussion
of the strengths and weaknesses of Chief Justice Taft's opinion in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926) suggests that 30 years of research and 7000 pages of text would likely conclude that a historically
well-grounded Hamiltonian reading of the relevant provisions of the constitutional text probably supports
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Congress has the sole power of impeachment, the President seems on a
superficial reading of the Constitution to lack any textual grant of removal
power once inferior executive officers have been appointed. Accordingly, it
could be suggested that once appointed, all inferior executive officers should
remain in office for life, unless they are impeached or there are statutory term
limits that attach to the offices they hold.
Such an argument goes much too far, however, and overlooks the fact that
although judges "shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour," ' 3 that is,
until impeached, executive officers and judicial officers who are not judges
(such as law clerks and other Article III support personnel) do not have such
protection from removal. Thus, structural inference tells us that it must be the
case that the members of each House of Congress must be able to remove their
own officers, notwithstanding the lack of explicit removal authority,2t4 and
without invoking the mechanisms of impeachment. Accordingly, when we turn
to Article II, similar structural reasons and a host of historical and textual
arguments persuade us that the President must also have a removal power so
that he will be able to maintain control over the personnel of the executive
branch. The President's power over nominations and his exclusively held
executive power strongly suggest that he must be able to remove federal
officers who he feels are not executing federal law in a manner consistent with
his administrative agenda. Inferior executive officers are, after all, the
President's men and women, assisting him in the exercise of his constitutional
powers. If he decides that they are impeding his administrative program or are
simply doing a poor job in providing what Hamilton might have called an
"energetic" administration, he must be able to replace them with others.2 "t
something like the following set of propositions: (I) The "executive power" of English kings in the 18th
century included an unlimited power to remove inferior executive officers, although it no longer included
a power to remove judges or, certainly. Members of Parliament. The King retained this removal power,
even though Parliament had the power to impeach. (2) Many. if not most. of the Kng's -executive Powers"
are explicitly given by our Constitution to Congress (as in Article 1. Section 8. the power to make war or
to create offices), or are shared between the President and the Senate (as happened with the appointment
power and the treaty-making power), or. in many instances, are abolished outright (as with the power to
confer titles of nobility). (3) Those few, limited executive powers that were not abolished or reapportioned
in this fashion might be retained by the Executive and may be encompassed within the phrase "the
executive power" as it would have been understood in 1787. As Professor Monaghan's research shows, this
does not include a power to act contra legem, since the Framers plainly believed the King lacked such
power. (4) The removal power thus must be encompassed textually within the President's executive power
as the Framers understood that term. and as Chief Justice Taft said in Myers. id. at 121-22.
213. U.S. CONST. art. III. § I.
214. Id. art. l. § 2. cl. 5 & § 3, cl. 5.
215. It might be argued that since noninferior executive officers must receive Senate confirmation prior
to taking office, Senate approval of decisions to remove them is required as well. TtIE FEDERALIST No. 77.
at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.. 1961). The fact that the traditionally executive power
of appointment was divided between the President and the Senate does not compel the conclusion that the
traditionally executive power of removal was so divided as well. Consider Chief Justice Taft's argument
in Myers. 272 U.S. at 121-22 (maintaining that narrow limitation of Senate on presidential appointment
power does not imply corresponding limit on removal power).
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Appointments to executive departments determine who will help the
President implement his powers and responsibilities. It would make little sense
to force the President to deal with officers who fundamentally disagree with
his administrative or political philosophy. Suppose President Clinton could not
have removed President Bush's Environmental Protection Agency
Administrator, William Reilly. The Chief Magistrate might thus have found
himself constantly overturning a subordinate magistrate's (Reilly's)
construction and implementation of environmental statutes. Even worse, if
Cabinet members served for life, unless impeached, President Clinton
conceivably could have found himself with a Cabinet full of Republican
appointees conspiring to thwart his Administration at every turn. In the scheme
of the Constitution, which gives the President a clear and exclusive power to
control all exercises of law execution, such an outcome seems implausible,
since it would place enormous obstacles in the way of his ability to exercise
"the executive power." If the President is to have effective control of his
constitutionally granted powers, he must be able to remove those who he
believes will not follow his administrative agenda and philosophy. 2 6 We thus
reject the idea that the President lacks a textually explicit power of removal,
adopting instead the argument that the President may remove executive officers
using his Vesting Clause grant of "executive Power" that allows him to
superintend the execution of federal law.
217
But even if one disagrees with the notion that the President can discharge
an officer, the President may still revoke that officer's executive authority,
leaving such an officer with a title and salary but with no authority to exercise
executive power. Recall that if executive officers are to act, they must have a
statutory and constitutional basis for their authority. That constitutional
authority must come from the one individual constitutional actor invested with
the executive power. Just as the President may withdraw his consent to the
exercise of executive authority in particular instances, so may he completely
withdraw his authority should he feel that an officer is no longer exercising
216. We thus disagree with the claim that a presidential removal power is "either constitutionally
superfluous or constitutionally inadequate." Lawson, supra note 6, at 1244. The removal power is not
"something of relatively little constitutional significance." Without a removal power, the President could
find himself spending all his time merely overturning the decisions of those who are supposed to be his
subordinates or attempting to preempt these putative subordinates by reaching out and making final
discretionary decisions before these officials have a chance to decide.
217. We disagree with Professor Lawson's assertion that since "even the strongest removal power does
not ensure compliance with the Article II Vesting Clause, any such inference of a constitutionally based
presidential removal power seems hard to justify." Id. at 1245 n.74. To us, this statement reflects too
narrow a construction of the power that the Executive Power Clause grants the President. We agree with
Professor Lawson that the Clause grants the President the power to control the execution of federal law.
That removal authority, by itself, might not be an entirely satisfactory mechanism to achieve that control
does not mean that it is not encompassed within the grant of "the executive Power." See supra notes 212,
215. Rather, recognizing the limitations of the removal authority only bolsters the notion that there must
be other means of control as well, such as the President's ability to make statutory decisions himself and
the ability to countermand. Each of these mechanisms, taken in isolation, does not satisfy the Executive
Power Clause. That surely does not mean that none of the mechanisms is derivable from this Clause.
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authority consistent with his views."" Once his authority is withdrawn, the
President must make all those decisions previously vested by statute in the now
constitutionally disempowered officer, at least until the officer leaves office
(and a new officer is appointed) or Congress, by statute, allows some other
executive officer to act as the President's agent over those matters. The point
is that even if the President cannot dismiss the officer, he can totally retract his
executive power, thus rendering the officer a mere cipher in our constitutional
scheme.
G. Summary of the Textual Argument of Parts II and III
We have now completed our originalist, textual case for the unitary
Executive, and we summarize here the conclusions reached in Parts II and III.
First, we have shown that the Constitution creates only a trinity of types of
governmental powers, officers, and institutions. Second, we have argued that
the Executive Power Clause is a grant of exclusive power to the President that
allows him to control the execution of all federal laws. Third, this fact is
confirmed by many other provisions of the constitutional text, including the
Necessary and Proper Clause. Finally, the President must be able to control
subordinate executive officers through the mechanisms of removal,
nullification, and execution of the discretion "assigned" to them himself.
As we have said, we believe the textual case set out above is solid enough
to stand on its own. Indeed, if one is convinced by our textual arguments, the
historical case that follows is in a sense superfluous. Nevertheless, the
historical discussion remains important for the light it sheds on the history
behind the constitutional provisions that are the subject of this Article.
IV. SOME PRE-FRAMING HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS' EXECUTIVE POWER
Taking Lessig and Sunstein's contextual admonition to heart,2 '9 let us
begin our historical inquiry by examining the period preceding the
Constitution's drafting. As we noted above, when assembling the legislative
history of a statute, one normally begins by analyzing the interval before the
statute's enactment, rather than the period after.2" This principle has even
more force where the statute amends, or supersedes, a prior statute. Contrasting
218. If one only believes in this minimalist view of the power to remove an executive officer, the
question remains whether Congress can continue to fund an officer of the United States whose sole function
is to collect a salary. Though we are skeptical of the existence of such a congressional power, we take no
position on the question.
219. We refer to their warning that we should construe ancient text in its historical context. See Lessig
& Sunstein, supra note I, at 13.
220. See supra part I.C.
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the old and new statutes enables us to note differences in text and possibly to
draw some conclusions. Similarly, in surveying constitutional legislative
history, it behooves us to begin with the prior "Constitution" and garner some
rudimentary understandings about its design. This quick synopsis of the
structure of federal administration before and during the Articles-of-
Confederation period will disclose that the rather dismal experience with
congressionally controlled administration led to the establishment of a Chief
Executive independent of the legislative branch.
As many have noted, the Continental Congress resembled a gathering of
ambassadors from the thirteen sovereign states rather than a -legislative
assembly.2 21 Indeed, in the early years, Congress lacked a firm legal basis
for its "legislation." With the adoption of the Articles in 1781 by the states, it
acquired some legislative authority. Nonetheless, because states wished to
preserve most of their respective powers and sovereignty, the Articles granted
Congress very little authority. Congress had the war power, dealt with foreign
affairs, directed the country's finances, and possessed other incidental
22powers. 22 So far, these powers seem familiar. The Constitution grants many
of them to the modern Congress.
Yet the Articles differed in at least one major and relevant respect from
the Constitution: The Continental Congress also possessed the country's
executive power.223 Congress could "appoint such other committees and civil
officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United
States under their [Congress'] direction., 24 Though there was no formal
grant of the executive power to Congress, the ability to direct the committees
and officers who would administer federal law undeniably gave Congress such
authority.22
221. ALLAN NEVINS, THE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION 1775-1789, at
660 (1924); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1446-48 (1987).
222. ARTS. OF CONFED. art. IX, §§ 4-5.
223. To be sure, there was a "President" of the Continental Congress. Id. art. IX, § 5. Yet this
President did not possess most of the constitutional powers that we associate with our President. See
JENNINGS B. SANDERS, THE PRESIDENCY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-89: A STUDY IN
AMERICAN INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 42 (1930). Sanders notes that the former President was "given no
executive authority." Rather, he primarily "presided" over the sessions of the Continental Congress. HENRY
BARRETT LEARNED, THE PRESIDENT'S CABINET 48 (1912).
224. ARTS. OF CONFED. art. IX, § 5.
225. Many have acknowledged that the Articles created a congressional executive. For instance, the
Virginia Plan, put forth before the Philadelphia Convention, proposed that a "National Executive" possess
"the Executive rights vested in Congress by the Confederation." I FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 134,
at 21. Edmund Randolph commented that under the Articles, "legislative and executive are concentrated
in the same persons." 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 128 (John
P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1984) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION]. Historian
Jennings Sanders similarly noted that under the Articles, "[Iegislative and executive powers were assumed
by Congress." JENNINGS B. SANDERS, EVOLUTION OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 3 (1935). Charles Thach likewise affirmed that the Continental Congress was
"primarily itself the executive, the administrator." THACH, supra note 82, at 57.
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Since Congress possessed very little authority to regulate individuals, -6
there was no need for the vast administrative bureaucracy all too familiar to
us. Executive tasks primarily consisted of carrying out congressional
instructions in the areas of war, foreign affairs, finance, and the post. To
handle these duties, Congress in 1775 (even before the Articles' adoption) set
up special administrative committees whose members directed execution under
congressional commands. 7  After experiencing difficulties with this
administrative structure, Congress in 1776 moved to a system of standing
committees, once again composed of Congressmen, who would take care that
congressional dictates were heeded.2  Yet this system also proved deficient
as members often were overburdened by their combined legislative and
executive tasks.229
By early 1781, Congress established executive departments headed by
Secretaries.230 Congress appointed General Benjamin Lincoln as Secretary
of War, with authority to inventory forces and provisions, transmit all orders
of Congress to the military, commission officers, and inform Congress when
more soldiers were necessary.2  Congress also appointed Robert Livingston
as Secretary for Foreign Affairs. He was directed to correspond with foreign
ministers and American ambassadors located overseas, to receive all
applications of foreigners sent to Congress, and to provide information to
Congress whenever Congress required. 32 Robert Morris, selected for the new
post of Superintendent of Finance, was both the chief disburser and collector
of funds. He collected requisitions from states, 33 provided funds to support
federal officers, paid the interest owed on federal debt, and supplied the army
and navy.23 Even after these officers were appointed, however, Congress
continued to experiment with the administrative structure.235 The era before
226. See Saikrishna B. Prakash. Field Office Federalism. 79 VA. L REv. 1957. 1964 n.37 (1993).
227. See SANDERS, supra note 225, at 4; see also id. at 6 (describing special committee activities of
Continental Congress). The Congress did, however, establish a separate Postmaster General with authority
to deliver letters and intelligence throughout the states. See 2 JOURNALS OF CONTINENrTAL CONGRESS
1774-1789, at 208-09 (Worthington Ford ed., 1905) (hereinafter JOURNALS OF CO.nNEN%'TAL CONGRESSI;
SANDERS, supra note 225, at 153.
228. See SANDERS, supra note 225, at 4. Special committees continued to play a role. Id. at 10.
229. See id. at 4.
230. Some members "seeing the unwieldiness of so large a body and witnessing every day its inability
to perform with efficiency and dispatch the executive functions, insisted that departments be created of men
not of Congress. to discharge such duties." Id. at 3. Others resisted these "monarchical tendencies." Id. at
4.
231. See 19 JOURNALS OF CONTiNENTAL CONGRESS. supra note 227. at 236-37. LEARNED. supra note
223, at 54.
232. See 22 JOURNALS OF CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 227. at 87-92; see also SANDERS.
supra note 225, at 109, 114.
233. ARTS. OF CONFED. art. VIII. For a discussion of the Articles' requisitioning system. see Prakash.
supra note 226, at 1963-66.
234. See SANDERS, supra note 225, at 134. Congress also created a Comptroller. a Treasurer. and
numerous other Treasury officials who. though they had statutory duties, were statutonly subordinate to
the Superintendent. Id. at 133.
235. Thach asserts that there was no possibility of preventing Congress "from continuing to busy itself
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the Constitution's ratification was thus one of constant experimentation and
flux in administrative structure.
Many grumbled that, notwithstanding congressional efforts to perfect
administration, execution was still rather feeble. Alexander Hamilton, for one,
characterized the administration as lacking "method and energy.'236 Because
the Articles lacked a proper Executive, Congress meddled too much with
administrative details. 237 "Congress is, properly, a deliberative corps, and it
forgets itself when it attempts to play the executive. ',238 Thomas Jefferson
thought executive and legislative powers ought to be kept distinct, as Congress
had immersed itself in trifling executive details while neglecting more
important legislative matters.239 Others thought that Secretaries were not
sufficiently independent of Congress, requiring congressional sanction at every
turn.240
Some not only criticized congressional superintendence of administration,
but actually proposed a familiar remedy: the creation of a single, independent
Executive. For instance, as early as 1780, a group of New England delegates
meeting in Boston urged that "national Concerns of the United States be under
the Superintendency and Direction of one supreme Head. 24' One
commentator echoed Jefferson's observation that execution and legislation
ought to be kept distinct, remarking that execution should be entrusted to one
"great and fearful executive officer. '242 Noah Webster argued that if the
"power of the whole" was vested in a single person, "the execution of laws
will be vigorous and decisive. 243 Others thought that George Washington
"might wisely be made king."2'
We glean three vital lessons from the period immediately preceding the
Constitution's ratification. First, Congress effectively possessed the "executive
with details, to take up departmental matters that came before it from any source and to assign their
consideration to special committees without consultation with the departmental head." THACtI. supra note
82, at 70. According to Thach, members of Congress, until the end of the Articles period, acted as the real
administrative heads of the various departments. Id.
236. I WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 209 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904) [hereinafter HAMILTON,
WORKS]; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 112 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(decrying that "the measures of the Union have not been executed"); THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 174
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that "federal administration [was] ... hitherto very
defective in comparison with what may be hoped under a better system"). Historian Leonard White
observes that the "government of the Confederation had steadily run down until its movements had almost
ceased." LEONARD D. WHrrE, THE FEDERALISTS I (1948).
237. 1 HAMILTON, WORKS, supra note 236, at 209.
238. Id. at 209-10.
239. LEARNED, supra note 223, at 49; THACH, supra note 82, at 70-71.
240. See SANDERS, supra note 225. at 95.
241. LEARNED, supra note 223, at 50.
242. Id. at 51.
243. Id. at 51-52.
244. Id. at 51: FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 181 (1985) [hereinafter MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM] (discussing feelings of
delegates to Philadelphia Convention toward monarchy); see also THACH, supra note 82, at 80 (noting
monarchic sentiment was present at Philadelphia Convention).
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power" enabling it to superintend the administration of federal law. 45
Second, under this authority Congress continually experimented with
administration, moving from special committees to standing committees, and
finally to Secretaries, all the while retaining and wielding ultimate control. -4
Finally, in response to the inadequacies of congressional control of
administration, some individuals sought the creation of an independent Chief
Executive who would be responsible for administration of federal law.
The Philadelphia Convention presented the opportunity to establish an
energetic, independent Executive. Congress could be freed from executive
details and concentrate on legislating, the proper function of a legislative body.
As we shall see in the next Part, the Constitution's clauses relating to the
President were drafted and ratified to energize the federal government's
administration and to establish one individual accountable for the
administration of federal law.
V. THE PRE-RATIFICATION UNDERSTANDING OF THE PRESIDENT'S ROLE
IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL LAW
With this background understanding in mind, we turn to the pre-ratification
historical context of the constitutional provisions discussed.in Parts II and Ill.
In keeping with the originalist methodology laid out in Part I, we start with the
pre-ratification understanding of the Constitution, saving the post-ratification
interpretations for Part VI. The pre-ratification history reveals that the textual
understandings advanced in Part III were widely held at the time the
Constitution was being debated and ratified. The background of the Executive
Power Clause indicates that, at a minimum, the Clause was understood to grant
the President the power to administer federal law. The Take Care Clause
underscores the President's preeminent role in the execution of federal law; the
Clause may also command "faithful" presidential execution and thus preclude
any imagined presidential authority to suspend laws. The Necessary and Proper
Clause detracts not a whit from these interpretations as nothing in its history
suggests that it permits Congress to determine who will possess powers already
granted in the Constitution. The Clause only permits Congress to enact laws
to help itself and other branches implement their respective authorities. Given
that the President has the constitutional authority to execute federal law, the
Opinions Clause is probably superfluous, as the Executive Power Clause
encompasses the authority to demand opinions of those statutorily charged with
executing federal law. But if one considers redundancy an interpretational sin,
245. Indeed, Jerrilyn Marston has argued that Congress was originally an cxccutive body that only
gradually developed legislative attributes. The King's powers went to Congress. while the states wielded
the powers of Parliament (like taxation). See JERRILYN MARSTON. KI NG & CONGRESS 297-309 (1987).
246. See Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some EarlY Versions and Practices. 30
WM. & MARY L. REv. 211, 219 (1989).
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the Clause can be understood as restricting the President's power to demand
opinions to those subjects relating to the statutory responsibilities of the
officer.
In the course of examining the original understandings of these provisions,
we will revisit two interesting textual puzzles posed by Lessig and Sunstein.
First, they focus on who may exercise the nation's "administrative power."
May Congress determine who shall exercise such power, as they contend, or
does the Constitution already confer administrative authority to one of the three
branches? The evidence adduced below affirms our textual claim that the
Constitution's grant of the executive power includes the authority to administer
federal law and thus that the President already possesses the "administrative
power."
Second, Lessig and Sunstein consider whether the Constitution
distinguishes between "Heads of Departments" and "principal officers in the
Executive Departments." In other words, does the Constitution implicitly
recognize that there are two types of departments-executive departments with
principal officers, and nonexecutive, administrative departments led by
department heads? As we surmised earlier,247 none of the Framers or ratifiers
regarded the differences between the terms "Heads of Departments" and
"principal officers",as meaningful at all. In fact, none seemed cognizant of this
difference. Instead, individuals in charge of departments were variously
identified as heads, principal officers, ministers, and, of course, secretaries.
Whatever they were called, however, they were understood to be the
President's subordinates. Anyone statutorily required to execute federal law
(i.e., executive officers) was to be an assistant to the Chief Executive. And,
prior to ratification, no one distinguished between executive departments and
administrative departments. All departments that would be charged with
administration of federal law would be executive ones.
A. The Executive Power Clause and the Administrative Power
As noted earlier, Lessig and Sunstein claim that the Executive Power
Clause merely indicates that one individual, rather than three, possesses the
prerogatives granted in Article 11.24" Yet their view fails to account
adequately for the prevalent understanding of what it meant to vest "the
executive power." An examination of history both before and during the
Constitution's framing and ratification will demonstrate that it was well
understood at the time of the Constitution's ratification that the executive
power, at a minimum, consisted of the power to control law execution. And
although Lessig and Sunstein attempt to unearth historical support for their
247. See supra part II.C.
248. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at 54.
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notion that the founding generation believed in an administrative power to be
allocated by Congress, we remain unconvinced. To our knowledge, no one
ever mentioned anything resembling the administrative power. Indeed, as
expected, whenever administration is mentioned, it is discussed in the context
of the President's superintending role.
1. Political Theorists: Locke, Blackstone, and Montesquieu
To frame the historical context of the Constitution's Executive Power
Clause, let us commence with an extremely brief examination of the familiar
theorists John Locke, Sir William Blackstone, and Montesquieu, all of whom
understood the executive power to be the authority to execute laws. In his
Second Treatise of Civil Government, John Locke confirmed this elementary
point:
[B]ecause the Laws ... have a constant and lasting force, and need
a perpetual Execution, or an attendance thereunto: Therefore 'tis
necessary there should be a Power always in being, which should see
to the Execution of the Laws that are made, and remain in force. And
thus the Legislative and Executive Power come often to be
separated.249
Blackstone, writing more than a hundred years later in 1765, held the same
understanding of the executive power. In tyrannical governments, the absolute
monarch ("the supreme magistracy") possessed the rights "of making and of
enforcing the laws." Yet where the legislative and executive authority are
separated, "the former will take care not to entrust the latter with so large a
power, as may tend to the subversion of it's [sic] own independence."-5
Montesquieu similarly claimed that "[wihen the legislative and executive
powers are united in the same person ... there can be no liberty; because
apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact
tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner."' ' All three confirm
that the executive power is principally about executing the law." 
2
249. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 144 (J.W. Gough cd.. 1948) (4th
ed. 1764).
250. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 142. Though Lessig and Sunstem cite Arthur Bestor's
understanding of Blackstone's conception of executive power, see Lessig & Sunstem. supra note I. at 53.
they omit any of Blackstone's own words regarding the meaning of the executive power.
251. CHARLES DESECONDAT. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU. THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 185 (photo. repnnt
1984) (1751). Montesquieu also noted that "[mliserable indeed would be the case" if one man or group of
men were "to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions.
and that of judging the crimes ... of individuals." Id. at 186.
252. It is ironic that Lessig and Sunstein cite Jefferson's proposed Virginia Constitution for the
proposition that there is an administrative power of government, Lcssig & Sunstein. supra note I. at 65.
without recognizing that Jefferson, when he presented his draft in 1783. clearly contemplated that execution
of the laws would be part of the Executive's functions. "'By executive powers .... Iwle give [the
executives] those powers only, which are necessary to execute the laws (and administer the
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The Yale Law Journal
We also note that a separate administrative power has no basis in the
political philosophers that so influenced the founding generation. Though he
discusses at great length the powers of the British government, Blackstone fails
to mention any administrative power to be allocated by Parliament. We also
know that both Lockes 3 and Montesquieu 254 divided the universe of
governmental powers into lists of three, although the content of Locke's list
differed from that of the Framers. 55 Neither of their lists mentioned an
administrative power. This is significant because we also know, as Forrest
McDonald has said, that "American republicans regarded selected doctrines of
Montesquieu's as being virtually on a par with Holy Writ.
' 256
McDonald goes on to say something more about the history and depth of
the American attachment to a trinitarian taxonomy:
To appreciate Montesquieu's influence in America, it is useful to
begin with the observation that in thinking of government, Americans
followed a practice that was deep-seated in the Western world,
namely, the almost mystical habit of thinking in threes. In part that
habit may have stemmed from the concept of the Holy Trinity; in part
it doubtless stemmed from Aristotle's division of forms of government
into monarchy, aristocracy, and polity or constitutional democracy
(with their counterpart evils-tyranny, oligarchy, and ochloc-
racy .. .257
The point that should be taken away from all of this is that the founding
generation firmly believed that, like Julius Caesar's Gaul, all of government
came divided into three parts. Lessig and Sunstein's concept of a separate
administrative power, to be parceled out by the legislature, simply did not fit
into this framework.
government) .... ' Monaghan, supra note 6, at 15 (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Proposed Constitution for
Virginia, in 3 THE WRMNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 320, 326 (Paul L. Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam's
Sons 1894)). Jefferson would have labeled his executive the "Administrator" who, of course, had the power
to execute. I THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 341 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950). We are indebted to John
Yoo for this last point.
253. See generally LOCKE, supra note 249.
254. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 251, at 185.
255. Locke believed that the three powers of government were the legislative, executive, and federative
powers. In his view, the executive power encompassed what we think of as the judicial power. The
federative power, however, by which Locke meant the government's international relations power, was
separate and distinct. Lessig and Sunstein, by oddly insisting that the President has the power to control
foreign affairs but not execution, seem to want to resurrect this Lockean typology and claim that the
Framers really meant to give the President only the federative power and not the executive power, as the
text of the Constitution says. See LOCKE, supra note 249, § 146.
256. McDONALD, NovUs ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 244, at 80.
257. Id.
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2. Evidence from State Constitutions
We are unaware of a single reference in any pre- 1787 state constitution to
the existence of administrative power not already vested with the executive
authority. There are, however, numerous texts from that era reaffirming that
the universe of governmental powers is limited to three types-legislative,
executive, and judicial. Consider, for example, the famous separation-of-powers
clauses in many of the original state constitutions. Those clauses typically
described the traditional three powers of government: legislative, executive,
and judicial. The Virginia Constitution of 1776, for example, provided that
"[t]he legislative, executive, and judiciary departments shall be separate and
distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other:
nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than one of them, at the
same time. '' sss The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 similarly provided:
[T]he legislative department shall never exercise the executive and
judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise
the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall
never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them;
to the end it may be a government of laws, and not of men." 9
Four other state constitutions contained analogous provisions: those of Georgia,
Maryland, New Hampshire, and North Carolina.2 ' With this background of
historical understanding, we believe that a separate category of administrative
power to be apportioned by the legislature did not exist in the Framer's world:
The Executive alone was empowered to execute all laws.
3. The Philadelphia Convention
In 1787, the orthodox understanding of executive power held by Locke,
Blackstone, and Monstesquieu remained supreme, as the various constitutional
blueprints presented to the Philadelphia Convention and discussed in the
ensuing debates reveal continued use of the trinity of powers."' The Virginia
Plan, for example, envisioned a "National Executive," to be chosen by the
legislature, who "besides [possessing] a general authority to execute the
National laws," would "enjoy the Executive rights vested in Congress by the
258. VA. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENrS OF UNrTED STATES
CONsTrrntONs 51 (William F. Swindler ed., 1979).
259. MASS. CONST. of 1780, reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND DocumErS OF UNITED STATES
CONSITrumONS, supra note 258, at 92, 96.
260. MCDONALD. Novus ORDO SECLORUM. supra note 244, at 84.
261. Indeed, one notes the striking similarity between our Executive Power Clase. U.S. CO,sr. art.
II, § 1, cl. 1, and Blackstone's assertion that "[t]he supreme executive power of these kingdoms is vested
by our laws in a single person, the king or queen," I WilIAM BLACKSTONF. COMMENTARIES *183.
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Confederation., 26 2 The use of the word "besides" in the plan indicated that
executing national laws was implicit in the duties of any Executive. Indeed,
every plan put forth before the Convention recognized that execution of laws
was a duty of the Executive, whether the Executive be unitary or ternary.
2 63
Madison affirmed that "certain powers were in their nature Executive, and
must be given to that departm[ent] whether administered by one or more
persons." Accordingly, Madison proposed that the Executive(s) be authorized
"to carry into effect[] the national laws. ' 2 4 Pennsylvania delegate James
Wilson, perhaps the intellectual father of Article II's vigorous, independent
Executive, 265 similarly observed that the "only powers he conceived strictly
Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing the officers.
266
In other words, the executive power was quintessentially about executing laws.
Delegates also echoed the separation-of-powers convictions of Locke,
Blackstone, and Montesquieu.267 Madison observed that a legislatively
appointed Chief Executive would be "dependen[t] ... on the Legislature, [and]
would render [the Legislature] the Executor as well as the maker of laws; &
then according to the observation of Montesquieu, tyrannical laws may be
made that they may be executed in a tyrannical manner., 268 Obviously, the
"Executor," i.e., the one who possessed the executive power, executed the
laws.269
Philadelphia support for the existence of an "administrative power" is
rather meager. Lessig and Sunstein focus on one James Madison-Charles
Pinckney colloquy.270 Madison would have vested in the Executive(s) the
power to "carry into effect the national laws ... [and] such other powers not
legislative nor judiciary in their nature as may from time to time be delegated
by the national Legislature., 271 To Lessig and Sunstein, this proposal
suggests that there is a fourth power of government, the administrative power.
If only three powers were contemplated, and the President had the executive
power, what nonlegislative and nonjudicial powers could Congress vest with
262. 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 134, at 21. Note that the Virginia Plan illustrates that the
Continental Congress possessed executive "rights." The Plan thus marked a radical departure from the
Articles as it sought to grant those executive rights, formerly vested in Congress. to an independent
Executive.
263. See generally Prakash, supra note 6, at 991, 1000-04.
264. 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 134, at 67 (emphasis added).
265. See Prakash, supra note 6, at 998 n.42.
266. 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 134, at 66. But see 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 53,
at 119-20 (William R. Davie arguing that power of making treaties is executive).
267. See I FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 134, at 86 (Dickenson commenting on importance of
keeping legislative, executive, and judiciary independent); 2 id. at 34 (Madison arguing same).
268. 2 id. at 34; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 302-03 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter cd.,
1961) (making same point).
269. See Monaghan, supra note 6, at 16 (noting that although Philadelphia delegates were concerned
with assertions of executive prerogative, they nevertheless constructed a "strong, legally and politically
independent chief executive who could enforce national law").
270. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 64-65.
271. 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 134, at 67 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
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the President? Lessig and Sunstein argue that those powers must be something
like the administrative power.272
Unfortunately, this syllogism has a faulty premise because it exaggerates
the scope of the President's authority under Madison's proposal. Had
Madison's plan vested the President with the executive power and then
empowered Congress statutorily to vest authorities neither legislative nor
judicial, Lessig and Sunstein's argument would be sound. But Madison's
proposal did not envision a grant of the executive power. Instead, it would
have granted only two authorities to the President: the power to execute federal
law, and the appointment power.273 Madison's Executive(s) would have
lacked many powers that belong to our President: the veto power, the pardon
power, etc., many of which were historically understood to be authorities that
Chief Executives possessed.
Far from contemplating administrative power, then, Madison's proposal
envisioned situations in which Congress might elect to grant the President
authority beyond the two powers specifically mentioned in his motion. Perhaps
Madison wished to grant Congress the ability to furnish the Executive a veto,
a power that was neither legislative nor judicial and thus could be properly
granted to the Executive. Had Madison's clause become part of the
Constitution, the provision would have sanctioned the granting of a line-item
veto to the President.
274
The point not to be lost, however, is that Madison's proposal did not grant
the "executive power" to the President; consequently, Lessig and Sunstein's
contention that Madison contemplated an "administrative power" in
Philadelphia is simply based on a false premise. The argument is particularly
suspect once one recognizes that Lessig and Sunstein's administrative power
was already subsumed by Madison's grant to the Executive(s) of the authority
to "carry into effect the national laws."
Even if one believed that Madison's proposal somehow implicitly
contemplated something called an "administrative power" not vested by the
Constitution in either Congress, the Executive, or the judiciary, an isolated
statement in a summer-long convention is a slender reed upon which to rest
the existence of a separate fourth administrative power of government to be
allocated by Congress. 275 Throughout the Philadelphia Convention, only three
powers of the federal government were ever discussed: legislative, executive,
272. Lessig & Sunstein. supra note I, at 65.
273. James Wilson. at the Philadelphia Convention at least, thought that these two powers,
appointments and execution, were the only ones "strictly executive." See I FEDERAL CONVED,"roN. supra
note 134, at 65-66.
274. Currently, Congress appears to lack the authority to grant a line-item veto to the President.
Neither the Necessary and Proper Clause nor any other congressional power allows Congress to grant such
authority. See supra part III.E.2.
275. We shall analyze Lessig and Sunstein's interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause in the
next Subsection.
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and judicial.276 Neither the Virginia, New Jersey, Pinckney, nor Hamilton
plans mentioned an "administrative power." Nor did anyone suggest that
Congress would have the authority to lodge the "administrative" power where
Congress saw fit. The Constitution only identifies three types of federal powers
because the delegates only recognized three powers.
4. The Public Ratification Debates
Moving from Philadelphia to the public ratification debates, we find
confirmation, from both supporters and opponents of the Constitution, that the
executive power includes the authority to execute the laws. The Anti-Federalist
Brutus approvingly cited Montesquieu's influence on the constitutions of
Massachusetts and Virginia, noting that they had heeded Montesquieu's
admonition that the executive and legislative powers ought to be in distinct
hands.277 Similarly, the Anti-Federalist William Symmes acknowledged that
"there must be an Executive Power, independent of the legislature." Symmes,
however, would have preferred an executive council. "The execution of the law
requires as much prudence as any other department .... Yet [the President]
has no council or assistant, no restraint" in exercising the executive power."'
Symmes quite clearly recognized that the essence of the executive power is the
execution of law.279
James Wilson, speaking at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, disagreed
with Symmes about the desirability of an executive council. One of the best
qualities of the Constitution was that "the executive authority is one .... The
executive power is better to be trusted when it has no screen .... [W]e well
276. On May 30, the Convention adopted a resolution stating that the "national government ought to
be established consisting of a supreme legislative, judiciary and executive." I FEDERAL CONVENTION. supra
note 134, at 30. After the Convention accepted this language on June 20, see I id. at 335. the provision
was sent to the Committee of Detail. The Committee reported the following language: "rho Government
shall consist of supreme legislative, executive, and judicial powers." 2 id. at 177. On August 7, the
Convention approved the Committee's changes without debate. 2 id. at 209. This language was sent to the
Committee of Style and Arrangement, 2 id. at 565, which eliminated it, probably because the beginning
of the first three Articles already mentioned legislative, executive, and judicial powers and there was no
need for a separate provision.
277. 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIsT 202 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) [hereinafter ANTI-
FEDERALIST]. Brutus objected to the Constitution in part because the Senate had the power to confirm
individuals and to pass treaties. He thought these powers properly belonged completely with the President.
5 id. at 203; see also 3 id. at 63 (Democratic Federalist observing that executive and legislative powers
ought to be kept separate). But see 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 225, at
526 (citizen of New Haven asserting that legislative and executive powers should be kept separate in
execution of laws but not in framing of laws).
278. 4 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 277, at 60. Symmes thus understood that the Chief Executive,
unlike many state executives of that era, did not need to receive the concurrence of a council before
deciding how to execute federal law. See Casper, supra note 246, at 217. In light of the exclusive grant
of "the Executive Power" to the President, Symmes' understanding makes perfect sense.
279. Apart from this minimal understanding of the executive power, many Anti-Federalists viewed the
Executive Power Clause as a grant of broad authority. See McDONALD, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note
139, at 193.
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know what numerous executives are. We know there is neither vigor, decision,
nor responsibility in them."' 0 Wilson's discussion of executive authority is
an examination of who ought to superintend federal law execution. Who
should be responsible for execution of the laws? Three executives, an
executive encumbered by a committee, or a solitary executive? Wilson's
answer was that one person, the President, was quite sensibly given the power
to execute federal law. Likewise, Cincinnatus, drawing upon the political
theorist De Lolme, urged that the "executive power should be in one," as a
unitary Executive would be "indispensably necessary to effective
execution. 28 '
In the context of discussing the treaty power, Hamilton noted that "Itihe
essence of the legislative authority is to enact laws."' 82 At the same time,
"the execution of the laws and the employment of the common strength, either
for this purpose or for the common defense, seem to comprise all the functions
of the executive magistrate. '28' 3  The Anti-Federalist Impartial Examiner
observed that the President possessed the "supreme executive power," thus
signifying that the term "executive power" had meaning other than as a
shorthand for the powers listed in Article II.' The founding generation
therefore understood that the grant of the executive power included the
authority to execute laws.285
280. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION. supra note 225. at 495. Indeed. when Wilson
later addresses the salutary effects of having a "single magistrate." namely "strength. vigor. energy. and
responsibility in the executive department," he refers again to the execution of federal law. 2 id. at 579
Note the interesting similarities between Wilson's comments at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention
(and his earlier comments at the Philadelphia Convention. see I FEDERAL CONVE.nTIO.. supra note 134.
at 65-66) and Blackstone's comments on the unitary Executive:
[The executive power] is wisely placed in a single hand by the British constitution. for the sake
of unanimity, strength, and dispatch. Were it placed in many hands. it would be subject to many
wills: many wills, if disunited and drawing different ways. create weakness in government, and
to unite those several wills, and reduce them to one, is a work of more time and delay than the
exigencies of state will afford. The king of England is therefore not only the chief, but properly
the sole, magistrate of the nation: all others acting by commission from. and in due
subordination to him ....
I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *242-43.
281. 6 ANTI-FEDERALIST. supra note 277. at 22.
282. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 450 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.. 1961).
283. Id.
284. 5 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 277, at 194. It makes little sense to contend that when the
Impartial Examiner was referring to the "supreme executive Power." he was refernng to the supreme
powers to veto, negotiate treaties. etc. These are not "supreme" powers. In contrast, since the President is
the only individual granted the executive power, he controls those individuals statutonly authorized to
execute and is thus "supreme" with respect to them. He is the Supreme or Chief Executive. See also 5 id.
at 167 (Republicus noting that Article I. Section I vested "the supreme continental executive power in a
president").
285. Once again, we have come across no comments either from supporters or opponents of the
Constitution that recognize the existence of an administrative power to be apportioned by Congress.
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5. Lessig and Sunstein's Historical Arguments for Not Treating the
Vesting Clause of Article II as a Vesting Clause
Lessig and Sunstein make three arguments against the notion that the
Executive Power Clause actually vests a power. First, they assert that although
"he was.., quite eager to define a strong executive," Alexander Hamilton did
not so describe the Clause in his famous Article II essays in The
Federalist,86 In Hamilton's "catalog of the executive powers, contrasting the
American executive with the British monarch, nowhere does he discuss a
general executive power arising from the Vesting Clause." '87 This claim
suffers from several flaws.
It is at least debatable whether or not Hamilton's Federalist essays offered
a broad view of the Executive Power Clause. Forrest McDonald, for instance,
has argued that when Hamilton listed those functions that are within the
purview of the executive department,288 Hamilton embraced the idea that the
Executive Power Clause actually vests a power.289 But suppose Lessig and
Sunstein's reading of The Federalist is correct. That reading ignores the fact
that Hamilton wrote his Federalist essays on the presidency in order to quiet
the concern of the Anti-Federalists, 29° who were worried that the Chief
Executive would become a king. Given the urgency of obtaining New York's
assent to the Constitution, is it really so surprising, in light of what Hamilton
believed to be vicious "misrepresentation[s]" by the "writers against the
Constitution,"'29' that he might have downplayed the importance of the
Executive Power Clause?292 Hamilton was eager to define a strong Executive
at Philadelphia, but when it came to the ratification debate, he did his best to
downplay the aspects of presidential power that might jeopardize
ratification.293
286. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at 49.
287. Id.
288. See THE FEDERALIST No. 72, at 435-36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
289. McDONALD, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 139. at 206.
290. Consider, for example, Hamilton's colorful description of the Anti-Federalist view of the
presidency recounted in No. 67:
He has been decorated with attributes superior in dignity and splendor to those of a king of
Great Britain. He has been shown to us with the diadem sparkling on his brow and the imperial
purple flowing in his train. He has been seated on a throne surrounded with minions and
mistresses, giving audience to the envoys of foreign potentates in all the supercilious pomp of
majesty. The images of Asiatic despotism and voluptuousness have scarcely been wanting to
crown the exaggerated scene. We have been almost taught to tremble at the terrific visages of
murdering janizaries, and to blush at the unveiled mysteries of a future seraglio.
THE FEDERALIST No. 67, at 407-08 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
291. Id. at 407.
292. McDonald notes that many Federalists belittled federal power, especially the President's. See
MCDONALD, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 139, at 184.
293. Finally, it might be of some relevance to note that Hamilton, in his now-famous defense of
President George Washington's Neutrality Proclamation, explicitly contended that the Executive Power
Clause is a grant of "the executive Power" that is further defined by the subsequent provisions of Article I1.
See Monaghan, supra note 6, at 21. It is thus ironic that Lessig and Sunstein would claim that "not even
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Second, Lessig and Sunstein attempt to draw on state constitutions to prop
up their theory that the Executive Power Clause vests no power. Pointing to
an Illinois Supreme Court decision, they claim that "the same language vesting
executive power in state constitutions had been understood at the time of the
framing not to mark an inherent power."294 There are several difficulties with
relying upon Field v. People ex rel. McClernand.295 Illinois was not even in
existence at the time of ratification and any opinion regarding a state
constitution that was issued more than fifty years after ratification of the
federal Constitution necessarily has little bearing on the original understanding
of that document. Virtually everyone who participated in ratifying the
Constitution was dead by the time the Illinois Supreme Court decided that
case.296 If the founding generation acknowledged that vesting clauses lacked
any substantive content, surely more relevant and contemporaneous evidence
would exist. Dubious reliance on an Illinois Supreme Court opinion from 1839
construing "a similar vesting clause" simply cannot overcome the mountain of
contrary textual and historical evidence. 297
Third, the Virginia Declaration of Rights does not help Lessig and
Sunstein's case either. They rightly note that the 1776 Virginia Declaration
weighs against claims of "inherent [governmental] powers by anyone."2'  But
that is not an argument against the notion that the Executive Power Clause
vests power with the President. As noted earlier, our claim is not that Article
II, Section 1 vests "inherent power" in the President.299 We only assert that
it vests the authority to control the administration of federal law. This is not
a claim of inherency; it is an assertion linked to the Constitution's text. We
maintain that the executive power means, at a minimum, the power to control
execution of the laws. If this amounts to an argument for inherent executive
powers, so is the claim that the President enjoys a pardon power. But that is
nonsense. In either case, there is a textual basis for the assertion, and thus no
inherency claim is being made at all. Accordingly, the Virginia Declaration is
simply inapposite to a discussion of the meaning of Article II, Section 1.
Hamilton described the Vesting Clause as an independent source of substantive cxecutive power." Lcsag
& Sunstein, supra note I, at 49.
294. Id. at 49-50.
295. 3 II1. (2 Scam.) 79 (1839).
296. Moreover. in the wake of "King" Andrew Jackson's highly controversial Administration.
conceptions about the desirability of powerful Executives may have shifted markedly from what they had
been in 1787. These new views and not the original understanding may have motivated the Illinois Supreme
Court.
297. Lessig & Sunstein. supra note 1. at 119 n.206.
298. Id. at 119 nn. 206-07.
299. See supra note 93.
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6. Administration and the Chief Administrator
Throughout this Section, we have presented evidence that the executive
power is the power to execute the law. We have maintained that there is no
administrative power to be apportioned by Congress. Yet one must be careful
not to conclude mistakenly that the founding generation never discussed the
concept of "administration." In fact, that notion was extensively
addressed-but only in the context of the President's preeminent administrative
role. "Administration" was used interchangeably with the term execution, both
tied to the Executive. For instance, James Wilson objected to a plan creating
three executives, declaring that it would produce "uncontrouled, continued, &
violent animosities; which would ... interrupt the public administration." 3"
Similarly, South Carolinian John Rutledge thought a single man would
"administer the public affairs best." 30'
The President's preeminent administrative role is also highlighted in The
Federalist. Hamilton affirmed that "energy in the Executive is a leading
character in the definition of good government ... [and] is not less essential
to the steady administration of the laws."302 Referring later to steady
administration, Hamilton noted that "[d]uration in office" relates to "the
personal firmness of the executive magistrate ... and to the stability of the
system of administration which may have been adopted under his
auspices. 30 3 Hence, allowing the President more than one term would
''secure . . . the advantage of permanency in a wise system of
administration."" Arguing against annexing a council to the President,
Hamilton maintained that an "artful cabal" within the council would, by
making the Executive sluggish and confused, "enervate the whole system of
administration. 3 5
300. 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 134, at 96. Wilson's statement indicates that the Executive
would occupy a critical role in "administration." Note that Wilson recognized that the Executive would
execute the laws, see I id. at 66, so when he speaks of the public administration, he refers to the
Executive's administration of laws.
301. 1 id. at 65. James Monroe also commented that the "Executive is that upon which ... we should
rest our hopes, for an equal, a federal, and a wise administration." 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF Tile
RATIFICATION, supra note 225, at 863-64. Not everyone agreed with these sentiments. The Anti-Federalist
essayist, Philadelphiensis, complained that "our laws are to be administered by this tyrant," referring to the
President. 16 id. at 58.
302. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis
added); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.. 1961) (noting
that President would have important role "in the administration of the govemment"); id. at 414
(commenting on critical role "the executive in every government must necessarily have in its good or ill
administration").
303. THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 431 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
304. THE FEDERALIST No. 72, at 436 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also id.
at 439 (claiming that an "ill effect of the exclusion would be that it would operate as a constitutional
interdiction of stability in the administration").
305. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 427 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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Though Lessig and Sunstein cite Hamilton's most forceful statement on the
President's relationship to administration, they fail to draw the fairly obvious
conclusions: "The administration of government .. is limited to executive
details, and falls peculiarly within the province of the executive
department. ' '3°6 What constitutes "administration?" Hamilton sketched briefly:
command of foreign negotiations, preparation of a budget, spending
appropriations, direction of the army and navy, direction of a war, "and other
matters of a like nature. '307 Hamilton drew no distinction between what
Lessig and Sunstein label "executive" functions, such as foreign affairs and
military matters, and "administrative" functions, such as spending
appropriations. Rather, these functions were thrown together in a long list, all
of them granted to the "executive department." If any doubts remain, Hamilton
unequivocally lays them to rest: "The persons, therefore, to whose immediate
management these different matters are committed ought to be considered as
assistants or deputies of the Chief Magistrate, and on this account they ought
to derive their offices from his appointment ... and ought to be subject to his
superintendence. ' 308 Administrative assistants (executive officers if you will)
are mere deputies of the Executive Magistrate and are subject to his
"superintendence."
Lessig and Sunstein observe that to "modem readers 'administrative' and
'executive' are just the same idea." 3 9 Though they insist that this "modem
sense of 'administration' is quite new,"3 ' they also acknowledge that
Hamilton used the term in the same sense they used it."1' As the above
evidence establishes, the modem reader who considers administration and
execution to be one and the same treats those words in the exact manner that
the founding generation used them. The "modem" sense of administration is
identical to its eighteenth-century counterpart.1 2
306. THE FEDERALIST No. 72, at 435 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossier cd.. 1961).
307. Id. at 435-36.
308. Id. at 436 (emphasis added).
309. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I. at 44.
310. Id. at 41 n.177.
311. Id. at 53 n.216.
312. Lessig and Sunstein spend a good deal of time examining "nineteenth-century- views on the
differences between administrative and executive power. Id. at 43-61. Most of their sources, however, were
authored in the early 20th century, reflecting the progressive ideology of placing execution -above politics.-
Rather than expending so much energy to make sense of these 20th century constitutional theorists, they
should have attempted to discern the founding generation's actual understanding of administration and who
would control it. After all, Lessig and Sunstein identify their task as determining the original understanding
of constitutional text at the time of ratification, not the understanding of theorists over 130 years
later--theorists who were reading the text with decidedly modem presuppositions and sensibilities.
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B. The Take Care Clause
There was a remarkable consensus at the Philadelphia Convention that the
President would be empowered to execute all federal law.3" 3 Lessig and
Sunstein, while acknowledging that such a consensus originally existed,
contend that the Convention's adoption of the Necessary and Proper Clause
marked a departure from that consensus. In their account, Philadelphia
delegates initially agreed that the President would have "a broad claim for
implied power to 'carry into execution' the laws of the Nation, which power
must include something like what we would today conceive of as
administrative power., 314 Indeed, the Committee of Detail received language
stating that the President was to have the power "to carry into execution the
national laws. 315 What emerged from the Committee, however, were
variants of the Take Care and Necessary and Proper Clauses we recognize
today. The Necessary and Proper Clause, Lessig and Sunstein assert, represents
a rejection of the claim that the President has the constitutional authority to
execute all federal law. The Take Care Clause, on their reading, compels the
President to respect the manner in which Congress has, pursuant to the
Necessary and Proper Clause, apportioned the power to administer laws that
Congress enacts. 3 6 Thus, should Congress create an independent Treasury,
the President must take care to respect its autonomy.
As Lessig and Sunstein's argument about the relationship between the
Take Care and the Necessary and Proper Clauses is premised on a supposed
last-minute rejection by the Philadelphia Convention of granting to the
President the oonstitutional authority to administer laws, an examination of the
Philadelphia history will not prove useful.317 The more important question
to resolve is whether the ratifiers understood that the execution of all federal
law was constitutionally delegated to the President. After all, they discussed
who would administer the law in the shadow of both Clauses. Surely if the
Necessary and Proper Clause permitted Congress to vest the power to execute
the laws in whomever it saw fit, and the Take Care Clause required the
President to accede to any and all such administrative delegations, the
postframing public debate would reflect that truth. Since there is no special
relationship between the two Clauses either textually, or, as we shall see,
historically, we treat them separately, dealing with only the Take Care Clause
here. Many regarded the Clause as empowering the President to execute
313. See Prakash, supra note 6, at 1002-03.
314. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at 69. Note that Lessig and Sunstein acknowledge that their
"administrative" power is really the power to execute federal law.
315. 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 134, at 32.
316. 2 id. at 69.




federal law. A few remarked that the Clause created a duty. But no one ever
stated that the Clause would force the President to respect congressional
wishes about who ought to superintend the administration of certain
"administrative" laws. The Constitution had already decreed that all laws were
to be executed by the Chief Executive and his executive officers.
1. The State Ratification Debates
State debates uniformly demonstrate that the President was vested with the
authority to execute all federal law. At the Virginia convention, Governor
Edmund Randolph approvingly commented upon the Constitution's decision
to vest authority to administer the laws in one Executive: "All the enlightened
part of mankind agree that the superior dispatch, secrecy, and energy with
which one man can act, renders it more politic to vest the power of executing
the laws in one man."'3 18 He thus confirmed that the whole debate regarding
whether to have one or three executives revolved around whether one or three
ought to have the power to administer the law. 3'9 Randolph also criticized
those who thought the President had extraordinary and overwhelming powers.
What are the President's powers? One uncontroversial prerogative was "[t]o
see the laws executed. Every Executive in America has that power." 20
James Wilson, addressing the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, tallied up
presidential powers that could be exercised independent of the Senate. After
noting that the President was Commander in Chief and could pardon, Wilson
asserted that "[t]here is another power of no small magnitude intrusted to this
officer. 'He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed."' 32' William
McClaine, speaking at the North Carolina ratifying convention, observed that
the Take Care Clause, one of the Constitution's "best provisions," ensured a
vigorous execution of federal law.
If he takes care to see the laws faithfully executed, it will be more
than is done in any government on the continent; for I will venture to
say that our government, and those of the other states, are, with
respect to the execution of the laws, in many respects mere
ciphers.322
McClaine thus expressed his hopes for energetic presidential execution.
318. 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 225. at 1097-98.
319. See generally Prakash. supra note 6. at 998-1000.
320. 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 225. at 1098 (emphasis added).
Randolph also observed that when Congress provided the authority to call forth the militia to execute the
laws, the President would control it. 3 ELuOT's DEBATES, supra note 53, at 400-01; see U.S. Cossr. art
It. § 2, cl. 1.
321. 2 ELLIoT's DEBATES, supra note 53, at 513.
322. 4 idU at 136.
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2. The Public Debate Outside the Conventions
In The Federalist No. 77, Hamilton likewise affirms that one of the
"powers of the executive" lies in "faithfully executing the laws."323 Hamilton
also attempted to answer the criticisms of those who argued that the President
would frequently use the militia to enforce federal law by remarking that the
President could instead call upon the people to help him execute the law. Some
were worried that there was no "provision in the proposed Constitution for
requiring the aid of the Posse Comitatus to assist the magistrate in the
execution of his duty [namely executing federal laws]. 324 Yet, though there
was no specific provision authorizing the use of the posse like there was for
the militia,32 "[i]t would be absurd to doubt that a right to pass all laws
necessary and proper to execute its declared powers would include that of
requiring the assistance of the citizens to the officers who may be intrusted
with the execution of those laws." '326 In other words, Congress could utilize
the Necessary and Proper Clause to "assist" the Chief Magistrate and his
subordinate magistrates, who were "entrusted" with the execution of laws.327
Hamilton's use of the word "magistrate" in the above context is
significant. As Mr. Prakash has argued elsewhere, the authors of The
Federalist Papers employed the term magistrate to refer to individuals who
execute law.328 Repeatedly, Madison and Hamilton refer to the President as
the Magistrate, Chief Magistrate, and the Supreme Executive Magistrate.329
Thus, they recognized that because the President was the nation's Chief
Magistrate he would command all those statutorily charged (inferior
magistrates) with enforcing federal law.33
Other Federalists, writing in newspapers or authoring pamphlets, had
similar understandings. Noah Webster compared the President to the supreme
magistrates of Rome. He claimed that the "annual popular election of executive
officers" was the "source of a negligent, partial and corrupt administration,"
as a "lax execution of the laws" occurred when the Executive was dependent
323. THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 463 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
324. THE FEDERALIST No. 29. at 183 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
325. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 15.
326. THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 183 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
327. Hamilton thus confirms the proposition that the Necessary and Proper Clause can be used to assist
the President in implementation of his constitutional powers and duties.
328. See Prakash, supra note 226, at 1961 n.26. A magistrate is "an executor of laws." 2 JOHNSON'S
DICTIONARY, supra note 116, at 1186; see also 6 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 145, at 27
(magistrate is "a civil officer charged with the administration of the laws").
329. With the assistance of THE FEDERALIST CONCORDANCE (Thomas S. Engeman et al. eds., 1988),
we count at least 16 references to the President as the "Magistrate," 15 uses of "Chief Magistrate," and at
least three uses of "Supreme Executive Magistrate." This confirms The Oxford English Dictionary's claim
that the title "Chief Magistrate, first Magistrate" is used in a monarchy to refer to the sovereign; "in a
republic, usually the President." 6 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 145, at 27.
330. Contrary to Lessig and Sunstein's assertion, see Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at 63 n.258.
a reading of The Federalist indicates that Hamilton emphasized that execution of the laws is a power of
the President. See supra text accompanying note 323.
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"on the popular voice."33' In all free countries, "where laws govern, and not
men, the supreme magistrate should have it in his power to execute any law,
however unpopular, without hazarding his person or office." Fortunately, our
chief magistrate was not subject to annual election and thus the nation could
expect a more fair and even administration of federal law.
32
Like James Wilson before the Pennsylvania convention, Americanus
commented that the Senate could not interfere with the President's "mighty
powerf[" to "take care, that the laws be faithfully executed." 33 A Jerseyman
was puzzled that anyone could oppose the Constitution's establishment of an
independent Executive, arguing that it would be "highly ridiculous to send
representatives ... to make laws for us, if we did not give power to some
person or persons to see them duly executed.""' A Landholder (Oliver
Ellsworth) echoed the oft-heard assertion that one Executive was desirable:
"Secrecy, vigor, dispatch, and responsibility require that the supreme executive
should be one person and unfettered, otherwise than by the laws he is to
execute. 335
A review of Anti-Federalist writings yields still more evidence of universal
acknowledgement that the President has the authority to execute all federal
laws. The Federal Farmer shared the Landholder's belief that reason and
experience had taught nations that "making laws" belonged to "numerous
assemblies." The execution of these laws, however, was better left "to the
direction and care of one man." One man "seems to be peculiarly well
circumstanced to superintend the execution of laws with discernment and
decision, with promptitude and uniformity."3 6 Like Noah Webster and
Alexander Hamilton, the Federal Farmer also thought that the "first executive
magistrate ought to remain in office so long as to avoid instability in the
execution of the laws. 337 Yet the Federal Farmer was not an unalloyed fan
of Article II: He objected to providing the President with a veto since it
"give[s] him a share in making the laws, which he must execute. 338
331. NOAH WEBSTER, AN EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION (1787), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. PUBUISHED
DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 36 (Paul L Ford ed.. B. Franklin 1971) (1888)
[hereinafter PAMPHLETS].
332. Ud at 36-37. Webster later observed that as the "supreme executivc," the President was "invested
with power to enforce the laws of the union." Id. at 65.
333. 8 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 277, at 203.
334. 3 id. at 149.
335. 3 id. at 489.
336. 2 id. at 310. Other Anti-Federalists supported the creation of a Chief Administrator. thinking that
he could restrain avaricious office seekers and ensure that both high and low felt "the ngor of equal law."
5 id. at 21; see 5 id. at 42.
337. 2 id. at 312.
338. 2 id. at 314; see also 5 id. at 169 (Republicus complaining that President may exercise legislative
and executive power in unparalleled manner). Not suprisingly. other Anti-Federalists favored the veto. A
Federal Republican asserted that without the veto, Congress would know no limits. On the other hand, the
President would be limited by the very existence of the laws. "ITlo execute [laws] when made, is limited
by their existence." 3 id. at 83.
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Just as in The Federalist Papers, essayists referred to the President as the
"chief magistrate,, 339 the "single executive magistrate,"'' 0  and the
"Supreme Executive."'" Brutus, when addressing the use of the militia to
enforce federal law, asserted that "[t]he magistrates in every government must
be supported in the execution of the laws, either by an armed force ... or by
the people."' ' 2 The Constitution, with its provision for calling the state
militias to execute federal law subject to the direction of the Chief Magistrate,
was no different.
3. The Limits of the Take Care Clause
As noted earlier, William Symmes affirmed that the Executive Power
included the power to execute the laws. In his discussion of the Take Care
Clause, Symmes posed some truly difficult questions relevant to our
discussion:
Can we exactly say how far a faithful execution of the laws may
extend? or what may be called or comprehended in a faithful
execution? ... [S]hould the legislature direct the mode of executing
the laws, or any particular law, is he obliged to comply, if he does not
think it will amount to a faithful execution? For to suppose that the
legislature can make laws to affect the office of President, is to
destroy his independence, and in this case to supersede the very
constitution. Is there no instance in which he may reject the sense of
the legislature, and establish his own, and so far, would he not be to
all intents and purposes absolute? 3
Let us attempt to answer those questions.
The Committee of Detail added the requirement that the President "take
care" that the laws be "faithfully" executed.3" What may have motivated
them was a desire to prevent the President from declaring that his executive
power granted him the ability not only to enforce federal law, but also to
suspend federal law or suspend the execution of it. Until that time, the
President had the power to "carry into execution the national laws." 345
Recognizing that the newly created Executive Power Clause (which was
drafted by the Committee of Detail at the same time it drafted the Take Care
Clause 6) already granted the President the authority to execute federal law,
339. 5 id. at 196 (comments of Impartial Examiner).
340. 3 id at 82 (comments of A Federal Republican).
341. PAMPHLETS, supra note 331, at 329, 330 (comments of George Mason).
342. 2 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 277, at 370.
343. 4 id. at 60-61.
344. See Prakash, supra note 6, at 1002.
345. 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 134, at 32.
346. 2 id. at 171.
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the Committee must have realized that the President did not need the authority
to "carry into execution the national laws." Instead of eliminating the Clause,
however, the Committee modified it by adding that the President would have
to "take Care" that his execution of federal law would be "faithful."
But what of laws that usurp presidential power? Must the President
faithfully enforce a federal law that he believes violates his constitutional
authority? In other words, is the President obliged to comply with laws that
"destroy his independence [or] supersede the very constitution?"'' Arguably,
the President's oath to "faithfully execute the Office of the President""
grants the President special authority to resist encroachments on his
constitutional powers, as part of the duty in executing the office of the
President might be to see that its powers are not infringed.4 9
We agree with Judge Easterbrook that the President must have a means of
refusing to enforce laws that violate the supreme law of the Constitution,
particularly where those laws usurp his constitutional prerogatives. We do not
believe that the President must helplessly "take care" to execute (or abide by)
a statute that takes away his constitutionally granted authority. It makes little
sense to establish a Constitution with a President as Chief Executive and then
347. 4 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 277, at 60--61.
348. U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 7.
349. See Easterbrook, supra note 162 (asserting that President has authonty to refuse to enforce laws
that he feels are unconstitutional); see also Michael B. Rappaport. The Presidents Veto and the
Constitution, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 735 (1993) (taking no position on constitutionality of nonenforcement of
existing laws, id. at 767 n.126, but arguing that President must veto any bill presented to him that is
unconstitutional).
Moreover, perhaps pan of the duty to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution." U.S. Cosn.
art. II, § 1, cl. 8, is to preserve, protect, and defend the powers of the President established in the
Constitution. Thus the President might be constitutionally compelled to refuse to enforce or to abide by
laws that impinge upon his constitutional powers even if he views such laws as politically expedient. If the
President wanted to trade some of his constitutional powers or duties for the passage of legislation or some
other legislative favor, obedience to his oath might prevent him from entenng into such a Faustian bargain.
For a similar argument as to why federal courts must follow the Constitution rather than precedent. see
Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L & PUB. PO'Y 23 (1994).
One could also argue that laws that unconstitutionally impinge upon the President's powers are not
really laws at all. In the context of the Supremacy Clause, Hamilton even claimed that states are only
bound to recognize laws "made pursuant" to the Constitution. Laws that usurp the "residuary authorities
of the smaller societies" are not laws that states must heed. THiE FEDERAusT No. 33. at 204 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Although the President is not charged with execution only of laws
made in pursuance of the Constitution. he may nevertheless be empowered constitutionally to ignore all
laws he views as unconstitutional. Indeed, in the context of the Supremacy Clause. Hamilton noted that the
limitation, "made pursuant" to the Constitution, would have been understood even if it had not been
expressed. Id. at 205. Perhaps the President's Take Care Clause duties similarly contain an implicit
understanding-the President must take care to faithfully execute only those laws consistent with the
Constitution. More generally, whenever the Constitution speaks of laws. it might refer only to laws that are
consonant with the Constitution. Hamilton's statement thus can be seen as sanctioning departmentalism.
If a state or any branch of the federal government thinks the Congress has acted unconstitutionally, it may
refuse to accord a particular federal law "supreme" status. Along the same lines, Easterbrook correctly notes
that although the President must "take care" to execute the laws. the Constitution is itself a law, see U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (describing the Constitution as "supreme Law"). and because the Constitution
supercedes statutes, the presidential "take care" requirement applies to the Constitution first and foremost.
Easterbrook, supra note 162. at 919; see Steven G. Calabresi, Thayer's Clear Mistake. 88 Nw. U. L REV.
269 (1993) (briefly describing and defending departmentalism).
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force that Chief Executive to relinquish his powers in the face of an
unconstitutional statute. Easterbrook's reliance on James Wilson seems
most appropriate here as well: "I say, under this constitution, the legislature
may be restrained and kept within its prescribed bounds by the interposition
of the judicial department .... In the same manner the President of the United
States could shield himself and refuse to carry into effect an act that violates
the constitution." 35' Any other interpretation would leave the Executive at the
mercy of a determined, supermajority Congress or of a Congress that enacted
such laws knowing that the next Executive would not be to its liking.352
Putting these extremely interesting and perplexing matters to one side, the
important point is that everyone recognized that the President would administer
federal law. Philadelphia and state convention delegates, Hamilton and
Madison, other Federalists, and numerous Anti-Federalists understood this
simple truth. Though Lessig and Sunstein claim that the Constitution grants
Congress the authority to determine who can execute "administrative" law, no
one examining the Constitution immediately after its framing articulated this
understanding. Rather, speakers and essayists repeatedly proclaimed that the
Constitution already granted the President the authority to execute federal law,
a natural authority for one vested with "the Executive Power" and the duty to
faithfully execute federal law.
353
C. The Necessary and Proper Clause
As noted, Lessig and Sunstein assert that the Necessary and Proper Clause
indicates that "Congress ... is vested with the power to determine how to
structure the administration and how it is to function' '35 and, more
important, who will superintend the administration of particular laws. Their
support for the perceived interrelationship of the Take Care and the Necessary
and Proper Clauses rests on their reading of the Philadelphia Convention
debates. The previous Section's review of pre-ratification history shows that,
350. Were there some textual basis for the notion that the President's powers could be withdrawn
and/or allotted to someone else, it would be a different story.
351. Easterbrook, supra note 162, at 921 (citing PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTTnION
OF 1787-1788, at 304-05 (. McMaster & F. Stone eds., Lancaster, Pa., Inquirer Printing & Publishing Co.
1888)).
352. We are aware that the founding generation considered the veto as a means of defending the
President from congressional encroachments. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 442 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Nonetheless, the veto is a very imperfect defense. Should a united
Congress pass laws that infringe upon the President's powers, the veto is of no avail. Moreover, a President
who assumes office after a weak President may find many laws that unconstitutionally infringe upon his
powers. Here also, a veto provides little protection.
353. Lessig and Sunstein maintain that the claimed significance of the Take Care Clause is strikingly
modem. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 63. As the above evidence confirms, from the beginning, the
Clause was understood to be central to the President's authority. Indeed, their footnote citing Madison and
Ames, both of whom placed great significance on the Clause, vitiates the claim they make in the text. Id.
at 63 n.254.
354. Id. at 68.
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notwithstanding the Necessary and Proper Clause, opponents and supporters
of the Constitution alike understood that the Philadelphia Convention had
heeded what Lessig and Sunstein admit was the Convention's original impulse:
vesting the power to execute laws in the President. This Section aims to
highlight the historical support for our textual claims regarding the Clause .35
1. The Clause Is About Providing the Means To Effectuate Powers
of the Three Branches
As we attempted to show in our textual discussion, the Clause is
concerned with the means of effectuating the powers of the federal
government, rather than with who may exercise certain powers.' In
discussing the Clause, Madison observed that "[n]o axiom is more clearly
established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is required, the
means are authorized." In other words, the Clause merely enables Congress to
ensure that the powers of government can be effectively utilized and
implemented. 7
Indeed, the Philadelphia Convention passage that Lessig and Sunstein cite
supports the notion that the Clause is concerned with means, the how of
carrying powers into execution, not the who. Contrary to their assertion,"5
Dr. McClurg did not object to the President's authority to execute the laws. In
fact, McClurg acknowledged that the President would enforce the law: The
Convention ought "to determine ... the means by which the Executive is to
carry the laws into effect .... Is he to have a military force for the purpose
[of executing federal law], or to have the command of the Militia?"'' 9
McClurg did not express even the slightest misgivings regarding the who of
administration, namely presidential enforcement of federal law. Indeed, the
only time we have found the Clause discussed in relation to the President is
when Hamilton notes that the Clause may be used to enact laws enabling the
President to call upon the posse comitatus to help enforce federal law.?
355. See supra part III.E.
356. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 285 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Hamilton also
affirms that the Clause relates to means: "What is the ability to do a thing but the power of employing the
means necessary to its execution? What is a LEGISLATIVE power but a power of making LAws? What are
the means to execute a LEGISLATIVE power but LAws?" THE FEDERALIST No. 33. at 202 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Hamilton thus confirms that the Clause is concerned with means.
not with who exercises powers already granted by the Constitution.
357. This interpretation of the Clause may strike some as redundant. Hamilton and Madison proffered
this interpretation, and they understood the Clause to be partially redundant. See THE FEDERALIST No. 33.
at 202 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 44. at 285 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
358. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at 65-66.
359. 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 134, at 69 (emphasis added).
360. See THE FEDERALIST No. 29. at 182-83 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.. 1961).
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2. Limitations on the Use of the Clause
Hamilton's discussion of the posse in the context of the Clause highlights
an explicit limitation found in the Clause: Laws enacted pursuant to the Clause
must be supported by an independent grant of constitutional authority if they
are to be regarded as "proper" and as "carrying into execution" a federal
power. So, for instance, because the President lacks the authority to dispense
titles of nobility, the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot be used to permit the
President-to issue them. Thus Hamilton posed the following (at the time far-
fetched) hypotheticals:
Suppose, by some forced constructions of its authority... the federal
legislature should attempt to vary the law of descent in any State,
would it not be evident that in making such an attempt it had
exceeded its jurisdiction and infringed upon that of the State? Suppose
again that upon the pretence of an interference with its revenues, it
should undertake to abrogate a land tax imposed by the authority of
a State; would it not be equally evident that this was an invasion of
that concurrent jurisdiction ... [to] tax which [the] Constitution
plainly supposes to exist in the State governments?36'
Similarly, because Congress lacks an independent source of authority for
making administration of federal law autonomous of the President and because
altering the Constitution's separation of powers is improper, the Clause is of
no avail for those purposes. Congress could, however, pass laws authorizing
the President to call forth the posse to help him execute federal law, because
such laws would carry into execution a power of the federal government,
namely the President's power to execute federal law.
3. Prescient Warnings About the Possibilities of Abuse
Madison realized that Congress might misconstrue the Necessary and
Proper Clause and "exercise powers not warranted by its true meaning." '362
In such circumstances, the "success of the usurpation will depend on the
executive and judiciary departments, which are to expound and give effect to
the legislative acts., 363 The Constitution's last line of defense was the people,
who could elect more "faithful" representatives in order to "annul the acts of
the usurpers. '3 4 Legislation stripping the President of his authority to
superintend execution of law, enacted under the guise of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, is exactly the type of usurpation that worried Madison.
361. THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
362. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 285 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).




Naked attempts to alter the Constitution's delicate balance between the
three branches ought to be recognized as examples of the legislative vortex
attempting to suck up the powers of the Executive and the judiciary.'
Though Lessig and Sunstein admit that the Necessary and Proper Clause
cannot be employed to legitimate "improper" laws, they never actually
confront the question of what types of laws would be improper. Without an
open discussion of the qualification "proper," their interpretation of the Clause
appears to be a justification for constitutional authority enabling Congress to
treat the Constitution's separation-of-powers provisions as mere default rules.
4. Are We Still Under the Articles of Confederation?
Indeed, the Lessig and Sunstein reading of the Necessary and Proper
Clause effectively transforms the Constitution into a variant of the Articles of
Confederation. Recall that under the Articles, Congress directed the
administration and determined who would execute federal law; there was no
Chief Magistrate who would oversee administration of all laws.66 Under
Lessig and Sunstein's interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
Congress once again (subject only to a presidential veto) can control the
administration of federal law and decide who will execute it, notwithstanding
the grant of executive power to the President. 6 7 Their reading thus
completely disregards central lessons of the Articles period, particularly the
reaction of the unitary executivists to the Articles' failures. As we have seen,
the Articles period, characterized by ineffective execution of federal laws, was
one of the main catalysts behind the creation of a Chief Executive. Moreover,
Lessig and Sunstein's interpretation fails to account for the many statements
of the founding generation disparaging congressional control of execution. The
Framers and ratifiers wished to get Congress out of the business of executive
details and, to that end, established one individual constitutionally authorized
to superintend administration.36
365. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter cd.. 1961); THE
FEDERALIST No. 7 1. at 433 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.. 1961). Federalist Alexander Hanson
thought the Necessary and Proper Clause was entirely harmless. "I take the construction of these words to
be precisely the same, as if the clause had preceded further and said. *No act of congress shall be valid.
unless it have relation to the foregoing powers, and be necessary and proper for carrying them into
execution."' PAMPHLETS, supra note 331. at 234.
366. See supra part IV.
367. The only difference is that Lessig and Sunstein would agree that the President has the
appointment power (subject to senatorial confirmation). Under the Articles. Congress did not need to wait
for a nomination-it could appoint anyone it desired.
368. The Lessig and Sunstein rendition of the original understanding, it seems to us. ignores that one
of the Constitution's radical features was the creation of a -'strong and energetic executive authority."
FORREST MCDONALD, THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 2 (1974) Ihereinafter McDONALD.
PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON).
1994]
The Yale Law Journal
Though Lessig and Sunstein distinguish between executive laws and
administrative laws,369 we find no one of the founding generation who even
hinted at such a distinction. Instead, execution of all federal law was to be
superintended by the Supreme Executive Magistrate. Pre-ratification, no one
maintained that the Necessary and Proper Clause granted Congress the power
to determine who would administer federal law, because administration and
execution of the laws were considered to be one and the same, that is, part of
the President's executive power.
This extensive postframing, pre-ratification survey illustrates that it was
universally understood that the Constitution empowered the President to
execute all federal laws. Given the dubious textual argument and the lack of
any historical support, we ought not to embrace a reading of the Necessary and
Proper Clause that gives Congress carte blanche to create numerous executives
independent of the President, notwithstanding the Constitution's grant of
executive power to the President.17
0
D. The Opinions Clause, Principal Officers, and Department Heads
1. The Two Interpretations of the Opinions Clause
Lessig and Sunstein have one final textual argument for the notion that
"administrative power" may be vested in nonexecutive, administrative
departments: the textual differences between the Opinions and the Inferior
Officers Appointments Clauses. Driven by a desire to provide a nonredundant
interpretation of the Opinions Clause, they dismiss Hamilton's
acknowledgment of its redundancy 37' and instead offer two interpretations
of the Clause that construe it as nonsuperfluous.
Their more radical interpretation draws upon the observations of historian
James Hart and relies upon the differences between the Opinions Clause and
the Inferior Officers Appointments Clause. 72 The Opinions Clause only
permits the President to demand written opinions from a "principal Officer in
each of the executive Departments." In contrast, the Inferior Officers
369. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at 46. Recall that executive laws are those laws enacted to carry
into execution executive powers found in Article 1I. Administrative laws are laws that seek to carry into
execution administrative powers of Congress found in Article I. Id. The Lessig and Sunstein thesis boils
down to this: The President must administer "executive" laws, but has no constitutional right to superintend
the execution of "administrative" laws. Such distinctions were simply absent at the Founding.
370. Given Lessig and Sunstein's invocation of the Holmesian maxim (dogs do not bark where there
is nothing of significance happening), see id. at 49 n.204, one would think that they would be reluctant to
make claims regarding the import of the Necessary and Proper Clause, see id. at 64. There was simply very
little debate at the Philadelphia Convention regarding this Clause, thus suggesting that no one considered
this power to be of great moment. If Lessig and Sunstein want to apply this maxim to the meaning of
Executive Power, they ought to apply it with equal force to all similarly situated constitutional provisions.
371. Id. at 32.
372. See JAMES HART, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY IN ACTION: 1789, at 242-43 (1948).
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Appointments Clause permits Congress to vest appointment authority in the
"Heads of Departments." Given the differences in wording, the Constitution
might differentiate between executive departments, governed by heads, and
executive departments, led by principal officers. In fact, Lessig and Sunstein
maintain that the First Congress appreciated this distinction between "principal
officers" (found in the statutes establishing the Secretaries of War and Foreign
Affairs) and "heads of departments" (found in the Treasury Act). 3" They
contend that if all departments and officers were alike, there would be no need
for the Constitution or Congress to distinguish between department heads and
principal officers. Thus, though the President may demand opinions from
officers in executive departments, he may not do so from officers in
nonexecutive departments.
Lessig and Sunstein's limited reading posits that without the Opinions
Clause, Congress could have prevented the department heads from providing
opinions to the President.374 Lessig and Sunstein rely upon the Philadelphia
Convention's rejection of a presidential power to demand opinions from the
Chief Justice. All agree, they contend, that in the absence of constitutional
authority to demand opinions from the Chief Justice, the President would lack
such power. Analogously, if the President lacked the explicit power to demand
written opinions from department heads, he would not have implicit
constitutional authority to do so.
371
While endorsing neither the limited nor the radical interpretation, Lessig
and Sunstein entirely reject the notion that the founding generation viewed the
Clause as redundant. Building upon Hart's work, they have proffered two
elegant, plausible, and nonsuperfluous explications of the Clause. Given their
assumption of nonredundancy and the pieces before them, they supply two
possible resolutions to a puzzling dilemma.
Yet once one realizes that Lessig and Sunstein are missing crucial pieces
of the department puzzle, both of their interpretations of the Clause
collapse.376 The history of the Clause reveals that it was meant to assuage
those who felt that the President would be lacking advice about how to
exercise his constitutional powers.
2. The Flaws of the Radical Reading
The use of the words "Heads of Departments" in one Clause of the
Constitution and "principal officers of the executive departments" in another
373. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I. at 36.
374. Id. at 34.
375. Id. at 33.
376. To their credit, Lessig and Sunstein admit that the differences in phrasing might not be probative.
At the same time, they assert that a unitarian cannot satisfactorily account for the vanaton. See id. at 35.
We aim here to explain the differences.
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is entirely meaningless. A review of the pre-ratification statements of the
Framers and ratifiers reveals that no one understood these differences as having
any significance. Rather, both phrases refer to those who would be given
statutory authority to help the President administer federal law, be it law
concerning finances, the post office, or other federal matters.
The Opinions Clause was originally part of a plan to provide a Council of
State for the President to assist him "in conducting the Public affairs." '377
Introduced by Gouverneur Morris and Charles Pinckney on August 20, 1787,
the Council proposal stated that the President could demand written opinions
"of any one or more of the members" of the Council, which included the
Supreme Court's Chief Justice and the Secretaries for Domestic Affairs,
Commerce and Finance, Foreign Affairs, War, Marine, and State. He could
also "submit any matter to the discussion of the Council of State."3 8 The
plan placed responsibility squarely on the President, as he was not bound to
accept their advice. On August 22, the Clause emerged from the Committee
of Detail with a few alterations.379 Not only was the body renamed the
"Privy Council," but the Committee had also added the Senate President and
House Speaker to the Council. Moreover, the Clause no longer referred to
Secretaries but instead referred to "the principal Officer in the respective
departments of foreign affairs, domestic-affairs, War, Marine, and Finance, as
such departments of office shall from time to time be established."38
This version was subsequently sent to a Committee of Eleven
(members),38' which, without explanation, shelved the idea of a Privy
Council and instead returned the Opinions Clause to the full Convention.
382
When George Mason resubmitted a proposal for a presidential council,
Gouverneur Morris, the author of the original plan, explained that the
Committee had rejected the Council because some believed that it would serve
to shield the President from responsibility for the actions he might take.3
83
The Convention rejected the Council because it wanted to leave no room for
doubt: The President was accountable for decisions.38
Far from signaling a dichotomy between principal officers of executive
departments and department heads, the Committee of Eleven probably wanted
to make clear that the President's Opinions Clause power only extended to
institutions engaged in the execution of federal law, i.e., executive departments
and officers. Recall that the Committee had received a proposal to grant the
377. 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 134, at 342.
378. Id.
379. See 2 id. at 367.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. 2 id. at 495.
383. See 2 id. at 542; see also I id. at 97 (Wilson commenting on council's ability to "cover" rather
than prevent malfeasance).
384. See Prakash, supra note 6, at 1006-07.
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President the authority to demand opinions from the Chief Justice, the House
Speaker, and the Senate President. The alteration made clear that the President
no longer enjoyed this authority. He could only ask for opinions from
executive departments-shorthand for the previous long list of departments that
had included "Finance," "domestic-affairs," and other departments that
Congress might create. 85 Since all these departments were "executive," i.e.,
they would be under the President's control, the term "executive departments"
could be used instead of listing each department separately.3a
The discussion of the Privy Council at Philadelphia reveals that the same
individuals (persons charged with administration of departments such as
Finance, War, Foreign Affairs, etc.) were referred to as both "secretaries" and
"principal officers." Are we to believe that the Committee of Detail's alteration
of the title of these positions from secretaries to principal officers had any
significance? The radical Lessig/Sunstein thesis suggests so. Yet the change
appears to be meaningless.
Throughout the Philadelphia Convention, the delegates employed different
terms to describe heads of departments. Even prior to the Morris-Pinckney
proposal, Pinckney thought there ought to be a council to help the President
exercise a veto. He favored "joining the heads of the principal departments[:]
the Secretary at War, of foreign affairs" and others in this council."'
Hamilton's draft constitution would have granted the President the sole
appointment authority with respect to "heads or chief officers of the
departments of Finance, War and Foreign Affairs. ' '39s Gouverneur Morris
thought the President ought to appoint "ministerial officers for the
administration of public affairs." 3 9 These "great officers of State; a minister
of finance, of war, of foreign affairs &c." would exercise their functions in
subordination to the President. 390 John Rutledge noted that the President
could advise "with the officers of State, as of war, finance, &c. and avail
himself of their information and opinions. 39' Oliver Ellsworth's Privy
Council proposal stated that "Ministers" of Finance, War, Foreign Affairs, etc.
would assist the President.392 Delegates employed different titles for those
who would be statutorily charged with administration of the departments, but
they referred to the same positions.
385. 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 134, at 367.
386. The phrase also left no doubt that the President could seek opinions not only from departments
on the list, but from any executive departments that Congress might create.
387. 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 134, at 139 (emphasis added).
388. I id. at 292 (emphasis added).
389. 2 id. at 52 (emphasis added).
390. 2 id. at 53 (emphasis added). Morris later referred to these same individuals as -Secretares." See
2 id. at 342-43.
391. 2 id. at 80 (emphasis added).
392. 2 id. at 329 (emphasis added).
393. The casual interchangeable use of the terms secretary, department heads. prncipal officers, and
ministers continued after the Convention, with no one drawing the principal officerdepartmcnt head
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The history of the Inferior Officers Appointments Clause, which contains
the "Heads of Departments" provision, advances the notion that the phrase was
not meant to distinguish department heads from principal officers. The Clause
appeared to have been proposed as a means of relieving Congress and the
President of the duty of nominating and confirming every officer of the federal
government. 394 Gouverneur Morris, the floor leader of the unitary Executive
forces at the Convention, proposed the amendment the day before the last day
of the Convention.395 Madison wondered if the proposal went far enough, as
he thought "Superior Officers below Heads of Departments" ought to be able
to appoint to lower offices.396 On a vote of five in favor, five opposed, and
one state divided, the Convention rejected the Morris motion. Immediately
after its initial rejection, the motion was put to a vote for a second time, since
"some such provision [was] too necessary, to be omitted. 397 On the second
vote, it was adopted unanimously.
This debate suggests two things. First, the Convention never focused on
use of the term "Heads of Departments." Throughout the Convention,
individual participants had used any number of terms in discussing what we
today call Secretaries. In this particular proposal, they happened to be labeled
"Heads of Departments." Moreover, given that Gouverneur Morris proposed
the Clause, we should be extremely reluctant to read it as intimating that there
were nonexecutive departments. After all, it was Morris who observed that
"officers of state" such as the ministers of Finance and War would "exercise
their functions in subordination to the Executive. ' '398  As a strong
distinction. James Iredell, future Supreme Court Justice, wrote that the President would enjoy the aid "of
the principal officers of the great departments," failing to distinguish between executive and nonexecutive
departments. JAMES IREDELL, ANSWERS TO GEORGE MASON'S OBJECTIONS TO THE NEW CONSTITUTION
(1788), reprinted in PAMPHLETS, supra note 331, at 348 (emphasis added). Ellsworth, writing as The
Landholder, pointed to the Opinions Clause to assuage the fears of those who felt that the President would
be bereft of advice. "[I1f any information is wanted, the heads of the departments who are always at hand
can best give it." 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 225, at 489 (emphasis
added). Hamilton discussed "the principal departments of the administration" and referred to "a secretary
at war, a secretary for foreign affairs, a secretary for domestic affairs, [and] a board of treasury." TIlE
FEDERALIST No. 84, at 518 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis added). Federal
Farmer, when speaking of the Inferior Officers Appointments Clause, claimed that the "principal officers
in the departments ... will ... be best informed as to proper persons to fill inferior offices in them," 2
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 277, at 308 (emphasis added). At the same time, he also labeled those
individuals "heads of departments." Id. (emphasis added).
394. Without the Clause, the President would have to nominate and the Senate confirm all executive
and judicial officers of the federal government. The Clause establishes a commonsense method of
circumventing the default rule of Presidential nomination/Senate confirmation, thus saving time and
resources.
395. 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 134, at 627.
396. Id.
397. 2 id. at 627-28.
398. 2 id. at 54.
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unitarian,39 it is exceedingly unlikely that Morris promoted a Clause that
presupposed an executive/nonexecutive department dichotomy.'
Prior to the Constitution's adoption, then, no one viewed the differences
in language as at all meaningful. The radical reading of the Clause-namely
that the President only has the authority to ask for opinions of the principal
officers in executive departments, and not for those of heads of
"administrative" departments-has no pre-ratification support."0'
3. The Defects of the Less Radical Reading
Recall that Lessig and Sunstein argue that without the explicit
constitutional authority to demand written opinions of department heads, the
President would lack such power. Philadelphia delegates, however, disagreed.
Speaking well before the adoption of the Opinions Clause or even the debate
regarding the Council of State, Gouverneur Morris, the Council proposal's
coauthor, noted that "[t]here must be certain great officers of State; a minister
of finance, of war, of foreign affairs. [Morris] presumes [these officers] will
exercise their functions in subordination to the Executive .... Without these
ministers the Executive can do nothing of consequence."2'2 Obviously, the
President could call upon these officers of State to provide advice, since they
would "exercise their functions in subordination to the Executive." Similarly,
Rutledge, objecting to a council of revision that would exercise a veto power,
thought the President should have the sole power to veto, and, if necessary, he
"could advise with the officers of State, as of war, finance [etc.] and avail
himself of their information and opinions. ' 3
399. See generally Prakash, supra note 6. at 996 n.32.
400. As this history shows, the Clause is an unlikely candidate for Professor Froomkm's interpretation.
See supra note 202. Just as Gouverneur Morris did not intend to create an executivc/administrative
dichotomy, he certainly did not intend to suggest that the heads of departments would somehow be
independent of the President. His consistent position was that they were subordinate to the Chief
Magistrate. See Prakash, supra note 6. at 1008. The brief and last-minute nature of the debate on the Clause
indicates that no one focused on the wrinkle that Froomkin highlights. As with the Constitution's discussion
of unspecified duties and powers of department heads. see supra note 204. we think the Clause represents
another minor blemish in an otherwise consistent document that establishes a unitary Executive,
401. During the ratification debate, people understood that the Continental Congress* Secretaries of
War and Foreign Affairs, along with the Superintendent of Finance, were all executive officers
administering federal law. A Citizen of New Haven noted that the new federal government would not need
new "officers in the executive department." 15 DOCUMtEN"TARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION. supra note
225, at 281. He implied that the Secretaries, the Superintendent. and all their assistants were executive
officers in the Continental Congress' executive department. Hamilton made the exact same argument:
It is evident that the principal departments of the administration under Ithe Articlesl, are the
same which will be required under the new. There are now a secretary at war. a secretary for
foreign affairs, a secretary for domestic affairs, a board of treasury consisting of three persons.
a treasurer, assistants, clerks. &c.
THE FEDERALIST No. 84. at 518 (Clinton Rossiter ed.. 1961). What he did not say at this point is that these
individuals, as part of the "administration." are subordinate to the President who controls the
Administration. See THE FEDERALIST No. 72. at 435-36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.. 1961 ).
402. 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION. supra note 134, at 53-54.
403. 2 id. at 80. See generally 2 id. at 73-82 (debate over council of revision).
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Why did the Framers assume the President would have authority to
demand the advice of department heads? Because they presupposed that these
department heads were constitutionally subordinate to the President. Hamilton,
Morris, and Pinckney all affirmed that the department heads were
constitutionally subordinate to the President. In The Federalist No. 72,
Hamilton noted that the "actual conduct of foreign negotiations, the preparatory
plans of finance, the ... disbursement of public monies" would be committed
to the "immediate management" of those who "ought to be considered ... the
assistants or deputies of the Chief Magistrate" and be "subject to his
superintendence."4' 4 Similarly, as noted above, Gouverneur Morris declared
that the great officers of State, such as the "minister of finance," would
exercise their functions in subordination to the Executive.40 5 Pinckney
thought that if the President decided that an officer was failing in his duties,
he could correct the error and punish the officer."° Under any of these
understandings of the President's constitutional authority, the President
obviously could demand advice from department heads.
As for Lessig and Sunstein's argument by implication based on the
rejection of a presidential power to demand advice from the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court,407 there is an easy rejoinder. Absent a constitutional
provision that explicitly grants the President the authority to ask for opinions
of the Chief Justice, he obviously lacks such authority. This is so because the
Supreme Court lies outside the executive branch; it and the rest of the judiciary
are to be independent of and separate from the other two branches. In contrast,
department heads are part of the executive branch because they help the
President execute federal law. Hence, the fact that the Convention rejected
presidential authority to demand advice from the Chief Justice (or for that
matter the Speaker of the House and President of the Senate) has no bearing
on the question of whether the Framers would have thought that the President
had an implicit power to ask for advice from department heads in the absence
of the Opinions Clause.
Philadelphia delegates had repeatedly rejected associating the Executive
with the judiciary on a council of revision that would exercise veto authority.
Giving judges influence on legislation that would become law would be
inappropriate because they might be called upon to "expound" on these laws
at a latter date.40 8 Joining judges with the President would also enable either
404. THE FEDERALIST No. 72, at 435-36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Note that
Hamilton includes budgeting and disbursement of funds as functions that the President will control, oven
though Lessig and Sunstein assert that such administrative authority can be apportioned by Congress. See
Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I. at 46, 71.
405. 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 134, at 53-54.
406. 3 id. at I 1l.
407. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at 3-35.
408. See I FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 134, at 98 (King arguing that "[jludges ought to be able
to expound the law as it should come before them, free from the bias of having participated in its
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to influence the other improperly.' Finally, granting judges a veto would
embroil them in policy disputes, which was inappropriate for judges. "-
If these principles were accepted, why was the Chief Justice initially
included in the President's Council of State? Gouverneur Morris, the Council
proposal's coauthor, always supported connecting the judiciary with the
Executive in the exercise of the veto power.41' Not having changed his mind,
he once again suggested that a judge and the President work together, this time
on the Council of State. When this proposal went to the Committee of Eleven,
the Committee withdrew the President's ability to demand advice from the
Chief Justice, the House Speaker, and the President of the Senate. Now the
President could only seek advice from executive officers, not judicial or
legislative ones. The principles that led the Convention to repudiate associating
judges and the President in the exercise of the veto probably prompted the
Committee of Eleven to reject placing the Chief Justice on the Council of
State. Combining the Chief Executive with a member of the judiciary had
already been rejected numerous times. Rather than waiting for the Convention
to reject this relationship once again, the Committee wisely decided to amend
the plan itself, permitting the President to demand opinions from executive
officers only.
4. The True Meaning of the Clause
But if the above discussion regarding joining the Chief Executive with the
Chief Justice is correct and the Framers assumed that the President would
already have the power to demand the opinions of department heads, why was
the Clause included in the Constitution at all? Recall that Gouverneur Morris
of the Committee of Eleven supposed that the President would be able to hide
behind the Council of State and escape responsibility for decisions" t2 At the
same time, acting out of an abundance of caution, the Committee of Eleven
probably wished to forestall any suggestion that the President would be left
without advice on how he ought to exercise his various authorities. Hence, it
included the Clause. The President could get advice-no one could distort the
formation"); 2 id. at 75 (Caleb Strong arguing same); 2 id. at 79 (Nathanial Gorham arguing same). 2 id.
at 80 (John Rutledge arguing same); THE FEDERAuST No. 73, at 446-47 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (explaining why President not associated with judiciary in exercise of veto).
409. I FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 134. at 139 (Elbridge Gerry claiming that Executive would
be "seduced by the sophistry of the Judges"); THE FEDERALST No. 73. at 446 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (observing that judges who became too "often associated with the
executive ... might be induced to embark too far in the political views of that magistrate').
410. Elbridge Gerry opposed the Virginia Plan's association of the President and judges on a council
of revision. "It [is] quite foreign from the nature of [thel office to make them judges of the policy of public
measures." I FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 134, at 97-98: see also 2 id. at 74-75 (arguing that
inclusion of judges on council of revision would improperly make them both "Statesmen" and
"Legislators").
411. 2id at75.
412. See lid, at 97; 2 id. at 542.
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Constitution and assert otherwise 13 In this sense, as noted earlier,414 the
Clause is not redundant-it serves a purpose, namely making explicit what is
already implicit in the establishment of a Chief Executive, and thus leaving no
doubt about the existence of such authority.
If, however, Lessig and Sunstein insist upon an interpretation of the Clause
that goes beyond asserting that it was included out of an abundance of caution,
we provide it: The Clause limits presidential authority by implicitly forbidding
the President from demanding opinions on subjects not related to the statutory
duties of an officer. The Clause makes clear that the President may only
request opinions in writing from officers "on any subject relating to the Duties
of their respective Offices. 41 5 In sharp contrast, the King of England could
ask his Privy Councillors for generic advice "according to the best of [their]
cunning and discretion," since they were to advise "for the king's honour and
good of the public, without partiality through affection, love, need, doubt, or
dread. 4 16 Thus, the Clause might constitute a limitation on what might
otherwise be a broader executive power to request opinions pursuant to English
practice.
Ultimately, both of Lessig and Sunstein's interpretations of the Opinions
Clause are problematic. The radical reading exalts meaningless differences in
constitutional text and is contradicted by the numerous statements of the
founding generation. 7 The less radical interpretation contradicts the
statements of the Framers that department heads would be subordinate to the
President. The Clause was probably included out of an abundance of caution
to make clear that the President would not lack advice; if one insists on a non-
"redundant" reading, however, there is an interpretation more consistent with
constitutional text, structure, and history. Perhaps the Clause restricts the
President's power to demand opinions; he may only demand opinions on
subjects relating to the department heads' statutory duties. In either case, the
terms "department heads," "principal officers," "secretaries," and "ministers"
are all interchangeable; all are constitutionally subordinate to the President.
413. Nonetheless, George Mason vociferously criticized the lack of a proper council that could advise
the President. THE OBJECTIONS OF THE HON. GEORGE MASON TO THE PROPOSED FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
(1787), reprinted in PAMPHLETS, supra note 331, at 330; see also The Address and Reasons of the Dissent
of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents (1787), reprinted in 3 ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 277, at 146, 162 (advocating inclusion of independent advisory council to
President, who could not make appointments or act without approval of majority of quorum of council);
Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Governor Edmund Randolph (Oct. 16, 1787), in 5 ANTI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 277, at 112, 117 (urging addition of council of revision to advise President on appointments),
414. See supra part 1II.C.
415. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. I.
416. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223.
417. See supra part III.C.
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E. A Review of the Pre-Ratification Original Understanding
of the Constitution
Our review of the pre-ratification understanding affirms the textual
arguments made in Part III. When members of the founding generation
discussed executive power, they were considering the authority to execute the
law. Second, their references to "administration" always mentioned the
President's central administrative role; indeed, they used the terms
"administration of law" and "execution of law" interchangeably. The Take
Care Clause either makes the President's authority to execute laws even more
apparent, or alternatively, it may limit his authority, by possibly preventing
him from completely suspending laws. The Necessary and Proper Clause does
not grant Congress the authority to impinge upon a presidential power or to
weaken a presidential duty; it surely does not license Congress to wrest the
power to administer federal law away from the President. The Opinions Clause
presumes a superior-subordinate relationship between President and department
heads; it may also limit the President by restricting the advice he may demand
to opinions related to the department heads' statutory duties. Finally, the
interchangeable use of numerous terms for officers we today call Secretaries
indicates that "principal officers in the Executive Departments" and "Heads of
Departments" are one and the same. Under the Constitution, all those helping
to execute laws (be they department heads or file clerks) are executive officers,
assisting the President's execution of the executive power.
The next Part analyzes post-ratification understandings of the President's
administrative position. While examining the same statutes that Lessig and
Sunstein inspect, this Part expands the scope of analysis by also scrutinizing
administrative practice in the Washington Administration and congressional
and presidential statements regarding the President's role in administration.
VI. POST-RATIFICATION UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE PRESIDENT'S
ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE
As we cautioned earlier, we ought not conflate the first Congresses (or
Presidents) with the Constitution's Framers and ratifiers, thus confusing the
pre-ratification original understanding with post-ratification views."' But
418. See supra part I.C. A footnote to the contrary notwithstanding. see Lessig & Sunstein. supra note
1, at 13 n.47, the Lessig and Sunstein originalist methodology comes strikingly close to a post hoc
rationalization of congressional action. They have assiduously plotted congressional data points (in the form
of statutes) and then attempted to find a textual theory that makes sense of that data. Unfortunately. as we
saw above, they are missing quite a few extremely relevant data points. See supra pans IV. V. And as we
shall soon discover, Lessig and Sunstein do not plot their data points accurately, in that they misconstrue
the congressional intent behind certain statutes. Though Congress did not expressly sanction presidential
superintendence of certain institutions and officers. there is no evidence to suggest that Congress meant to
deny presidential control over those agencies.
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even if we assume that Congress faithfully hewed to the Constitution, Lessig
and Sunstein's analysis of post-ratification history suffers other serious flaws.
By focusing on statutes and largely ignoring the debates that led up to
their enactment, Lessig and Sunstein completely miss the rancorous exchanges
concerning the President's administrative role.4'9 Congress was divided, and
some members were confused, about the President's constitutional position.
Some- members understood that the President could superintend the
administration of federal law and that officers statutorily charged with
execution would be subject to his direction. Others, however, rejected the
notion of presidential superintendence of federal execution.
Once one fully appreciates congressional division and confusion, it
becomes much more difficult to draw definitive conclusions regarding the
views of the first several Congresses. Indeed, once one realizes that not one
of the statutes cited by Lessig and Sunstein explicitly declares that the
President may not superintend execution of the various departments, agencies,
and officers created, one appreciates that their claims about the import of these
statutes are based on arguments by inference. Lessig and Sunstein construe
congressional silence regarding presidential superintendence as a rejection of
any such assertion. Looking behind the statutes to their legislative history,
however, discloses that members understood that the various departments they
created would be subject to presidential control, notwithstanding the lack of
explicit statutory authority.
Most important, this Part fills a gap in Lessig and Sunstein's account of
the early post-ratification years. Because they focus on post-ratification history
to illuminate constitutional text, they presumably would welcome an
investigation of Washington's views. Unlike Congress, Washington possessed
a lucid understanding: The Constitution granted him the power to execute
federal law. Any departments and officers would be subordinate to him.
420
We will consider Washington's understanding first, moving to
congressional debate about the status of executive officers and ending with a
discussion of specific statutes. As we shall see, no post-ratification evidence
fundamentally calls into question the original understanding that the President
would superintend the execution of all federal laws.42'
419. Their discussion of the congressional debate is largely limited to one page. See Lessig &
Sunstein, supra note I, at 25-26. The rest of their conclusions regarding congressional intent are inferences
drawn from interstatutory comparisons.
420. Since others have already examined issues surrounding administration of law during the
Washington years, we draw heavily from their excellent work. In particular, we rely upon the historical
research of James Hart, Forrest McDonald, Glenn Phelps, and Leonard White. See HART, supra note 372;
MCDONALD, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 139; MCDONALD, PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON,
supra note 368; GLENN A. PHELPS, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND AMERICAN CONSTiTUTIONALISM (1993);
WHITE. supra note 236.
421. In examining historical practices for the purpose of construing constitutional text, we recognize
that we run the risk of perceiving clarity where there is none. Glenn Phelps has noted that Washington set
a number of precedents, not all of which were "natural" or inevitable at the time. See PHELPS, supra note
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A. Washington's Administrative Understanding
1. The Chief Executive and Other Federal Executives
The very first executive transition, that is, the transition from congressional
control of execution to the constitutionally mandated presidential control of
execution, reflected the continuing influence of the Articles of Confederation.
Pending creation of new departments and offices under the new Constitution,
President Washington asked many officers to remain. 22
At the same time, though there may not have been an immediate and
dramatic upheaval in personnel, there were rather striking alterations in beliefs
and practices. Less than a month after his inauguration, before he established
new departments, Washington expressed his view of the President's
relationship to departmental officers. In a letter to Frenchman Count de
Moustier, Washington observed that "[tihe impossibility that one man should
be able to perform all the great business of the State, I take to have been the
reason for instituting the great Departments, and appointing officers therein,
to assist the supreme Magistrate in discharging the duties of his trust." 2'
Undoubtedly, Washington was expressing his understanding that since the
Supreme Magistrate was the only officer constitutionally charged with
faithfully executing federal law, all officers and departments created by statute
to execute federal law existed to assist the President.42
Washington did not wait long to assert his authority as Supreme
Magistrate. A mere month and a half after his inauguration, the President
wrote to the Board of Treasury and the Acting Secretaries of War and Foreign
Affairs, asking them to provide him "an acquaintance with the real situation
of the several great Departments, at the period of my acceding to the
administration of the general Government." Accordingly, he demanded a "full,
precise, and distinct general idea of the affairs of the United States, so far as
they are comprehended in or connected with" a particular department."
420, at 123; see also Monaghan, supra note 6. at 33 (noting danger of reading sharp distinctions into
history). We agree that Washington undoubtedly established precedents that have little to do with our
original Constitution (his decision not to seek a third term comes to mind). At the same time. we do believe
that some of Washington's actions stemmed from his understanding of his consttutional powers and
obligations, in particular, his consolidation of administrative control in his hands.
422. Washington not only asked minor officers like the wardens of the Port of New York to stay on.
see HART, supra note 372, at 138, he also asked senior executive officials, such as John Jay (Secretary of
Foreign Affairs) and Henry Knox (Secretary of War), to continue in office. See id. at 134.
423. 30 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 334 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed.. 1939).
424. As we argued earlier, a magistrate is one charged with executing laws. See supra notes 328-29.
425. 30 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 423. at 344. Washington sent a similar letter
to the Postmaster General. 30 id. at 344 n.30. Though Lessig and Sunstein claim that the Constitution may
distinguish between principal officers and heads of departments. see Lessig & Sunstean, supra note I. at
37-38, Washington made no such distinction. He demanded opinions of all the top administrative officers
of the important departments, even though the departments were holdovers from the defunct Articles of
Confederation era. This was quite natural because they were all executive departments.
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Washington was acutely aware of the consequences of an impotent federal
administration. Perhaps recalling the failure of administration under the
Articles, he considered "the successful Administration of the general
Government as an object of almost infinite consequence to the present and
future happiness of the Citizens of the United States. '426 To this end,
Washington impressed upon the heads of departments the need for an energetic
executive branch, possibly remembering that one of the reasons for the
Constitution's establishment of a unitary Executive was the belief that it would
contribute to a more prompt and vigorous administration. He admonished the
department heads to "deliberate maturely, but to execute promptly and
vigorously.... Without an adherence to these rules, business never will be
well done, or done in an easy manner .... ,427
Leonard White, perhaps the most thorough chronicler of the Washington
Administration, maintained that "[a]ll major decisions in matters of
administration ... were made by the President., 428 Regardless of how
departmental decisions were made, however, White asserts that Washington
accepted full responsibility for all departmental actions; after all, as White
notes, they were nothing but "dependent agencies of the Chief Executive. 429
Likewise, Glenn Phelps, who exhaustively canvasses Washington's views on
constitutionalism, observes that "Washington's presidency reflected [a] concern
for administrative centralization. There would be no divided responsibility or
ambiguity as to who was the chief executive. ' '43°
426. 30 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 423, at 510.
427. 35 id. at 138. Such presidential direction of the departments was not unusual; rather, Washington
was intimately involved in departmental matters, exchanging frequent written and oral communications with
department heads. WHITE, supra note 236, at 32. On occasion, he would have breakfast with Jefferson,
Hamilton, and others. Other times, he proceeded to their offices to discuss matters with them. The contacts
were frequent and administrative matters were discussed. Id. Washington's discussions with the department
heads were not limited to the department heads' statutory responsibilities as the Opinions Clause states,
Instead, Washington consulted his Cabinet on all sorts of matters. See PHELPS, supra note 420, at 162.
Washington's discussions and practices support the proposition that the Opinions Clause is in fact
redundant.
428. WHITE, supra note 236, at 27. Our first President was not involved only in vital administrative
affairs, however, as he intimately involved himself in seemingly trivial matters as well. White insists that
"no collector of customs, captain of a cutter, keeper of a lighthouse, or surveyor of revenue was appointed
except after special consideration by the President." Id. at 106. In a letter to Treasury Secretary Hamilton,
Washington outlined the organization of the Internal Revenue Service. 31 WRITINGS OF GEORGE3
WASHINGTON, supra note 423, at 238-39. Writing to Secretary of War Knox, an irritated Washington
inquired about the activities of a Mr. Rosencrantz, who had attended some Indian Councils: "No person
should presume to speak to the Indians on business of a public nature except those who derive their
Authority and receive their instructions from the War Office for that purpose." 32 id. at 116-17.
429. WHrrE, supra note 236, at 27. All the department heads, including Treasury Secretary Hamilton,
understood that they worked for the President. Id.; see also MCDONALD, PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON, supra note 368, at 40; PHELPS, supra note 420, at 184. Even before Washington was chosen
as President, Hamilton recognized that Washington would head the Administration. Washington's
presidency would "insure a wise choice of men to administer the government and a good administration.
A good administration will conciliate the confidence and affection of the people." 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 225, at 290.
430. PHELPS, supra note 420, at 145. We ought not be surprised by Washington's views regarding the
Chief Executive. During the Confederation's impotent administration, Washington had argued for strong,
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2. The Federal Chief Executive and the State Executives
Lessig and Sunstein observe that many Framers and ratifiers recognized
that state officers would often be called upon to execute federal law." '
Lessig and Sunstein promptly conclude that these state executives could not
possibly have been thought to be under the federal Executive's control. 32
Clearly, "[t]he President had no power to remove state executives who
executed federal law in a way inconsistent with the President's view about
how such laws should be executed .... [E]qually obvious, the President had
no power to recall the authority [granted by statute to] state executives to
execute federal law.,
4 33
Yet neither conclusion is obvious at all. They only seem so if one assumes
the proposition one wishes to establish. Lessig and Sunstein hope to prove that
the President has no constitutional authority to superintend the execution of all
federal law; assuming he does not, he obviously cannot direct state officers
enforcing federal law. Nor can he remove them.
On the other hand, if one accepts the proposition that the President is the
only individual constitutionally granted the executive power and that this
authority includes the ability to direct the execution of federal law, then it
would be "equally obvious" that the President could direct state officers in
their execution of federal law or extract their federal authority from them. The
Framers wished to construct a unitary Executive since they felt it was
conducive to energy, dispatch, and responsibility.4  Insofar as officers
exercise that authority independent of the Supreme Magistrate, there is no
presidential accountability and the design of the founding generation is
thwarted. The President can direct state officers in the exercise of federal
executive authority because when these state officers execute federal law, they
act on behalf of the President, the federal Chief Executive. Moreover, since the
President may remove purely federal officers 35 who fail to carry out their
duties, the President may also "remove" state officers who fail to perform their
duties adequately. That is to say, the President can refuse to allow a state
officer to exercise the federal executive power, just as he can refuse to permit
a purely federal officer to do so. There is no difference."
independent executives. See id. at 56. 59, 142. He was also known to be an influential, albeit largely silent.
Philadelphia delegate in favor of a strong Executive. See id. at 103.
431. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 1. at 31. If one accepts the argument that prosecutors are but
specialized executive officers, see infra part VI.C.3.. then Lessig and Sunstein's treatment of state
prosecutors, Lessig & Sunstein. supra note I. at 19. and state executives can be discussed together. For
now, please accept that proposition.
432. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I. at 19. 31, 69.
433. Id. at 31.
434. See Prakash, supra note 6, at 998-99.
435. See supra part III.F.
436. To some, this may seem highly intrusive to a state's internal executive officer pool. Indeed,
Lessig and Sunstein cite Mr. Prakash's article, Field Office Federalism, for the proposition that the Framers
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We ought not be surprised that when called into federal service, state
executives serve under the President's control.437 This is really no different
from when state militias (state executives by any other name) are called into
federal service to assist the President in executing the laws, crushing
rebellions, etc.435 When state courts hear federal claims, we quite naturally
expect that they will follow the lead of the Supreme Court in the interpretation
of federal law. 4 39 Similarly, state executives (be they prosecutors, police
officers, or tax collectors) must accept instructions from the President when
enforcing federal laws. The President is to state executives as the Supreme
Court is to state courts. 40
But the above is not mere speculation. Once again, Washington put these
understandings into practice. When Citizen Genet, the French ambassador to
the United States, sought American assistance for France's war with Britain,
Washington commanded the assistance of Governor Thomas Mifflin of
Pennsylvania in enforcing the Neutrality Proclamation."' Despite the fact
"imagined that the execution of some federal law could be vested in officers subject neither to the removal
power nor the directory power of the President." Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at 69 (citing Prakash,
supra note 226, at 1990-2007).
Lessig and Sunstein have misconstrued Mr. Prakash's argument. Mr. Prakash merely noted that
though the federal government could make use of state executive officers, it could not regulate the states'
hiring practices. Congress could not, for instance, tell the states whom they had to hire as state executives,
even though Congress might use those executives to help administer federal law. If the federal government
wishes to commandeer state executives, it must take them as is. See Prakash, supra note 226, at 2000. As
Mr. Prakash noted elsewhere in the same section of that article, the state officers commandeered into
federal service would be subject to presidential control. Id. at 1990, 1995.
437. If Lessig and Sunstein wish to believe that it is unconstitutional for the federal Executive to direct
state executives in the administration of federal law, potential inconsistencies in their own theory of
administrative versus executive laws emerge. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at 45-46. They insist
that the President must superintend the administration of so-called executive laws, i.e., those laws that carry
into execution one of the President's Article II prerogatives.
Suppose that Congress directs state executives to help run federal military installations. Lessig and
Sunstein acknowledge that the President must control the military and presumably the civilians that help
administer the military. But they also assert that the President may not direct state executives charged with
execution of federal law. These claims collide in this hypothetical.
438. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; id. art. II, § 2, cl. I. Indeed, Washington used state militias
to help suppress frontier Indians. See PHELPS, supra note 420, at 132-33.
439. The State Judges Clause requires state courts to enforce federal law (to "be bound thereby"). U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Implicit in that requirement is that state courts will be bound by federal court
interpretations of federal law, whether the law is the Constitution, treaty, or plain statute.
440. Moreover, though the Supreme Court has no constitutional authority to preclude a state court
from hearing a federal case, notwithstanding that court's proven incompetence, the President may prohibit
state officers from enforcing federal law. Article II, with its investiture of the executive power in the
President, contemplates a much more hierarchical, administratively centralized branch than the judiciary.
See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 6, at 1203-04. The relationship between the Supreme Court (and other
federal courts) and state courts was meant to be established by statute; both could hear federal cases. See
Prakash. supra note 226, at 2007-20. In contrast, the Constitution empowers the President alone to
administer federal law. Congress determines who assists the President, be they state and/or federal
executives; but once an individual becomes involved in the administration of federal law, the Constitution
decrees that she be subject to presidential direction. Though the President cannot remove a state executive
(and thus interfere with a state's executive officer pool), he may "remove" that state officer's federal
authority, notwithstanding congressional "deputization" of that officer.
441. PHELPS, supra note 420, at 129. Washington needed information regarding a ship docked in the
Philadelphia port. French partisans had captured this former British merchant ship with the intent of
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that Governor Mifflin was an old political foe of President Washington, Mifflin
"never once questioned Washington's authority to subordinate a state governor
on a matter of this sort.' "
2
Asserting authority over governors was not limited to the foreign affairs
context, however. Washington also called upon state courts and executives to
help enforce a federal tax on "spirituous liquors."" 3 Westerners openly
defied the tax as it fell disproportionately on a main source of their income.
Rather than calling in the army to deal with the rebellion, Washington called
upon state officials to help him deal with the rebels. Citing his duty "'to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed,"' Washington urged state officers to
use their "'weight and influence"' to bring the rebels to justice." Based on
his examination of the Citizen Genet Affair and the Whiskey Rebellion, Glenn
Phelps asserts that where law enforcement was concerned, "Washington firmly
believed that governors were constitutionally subordinate to the president." '
Even this cursory review of the Washington Administration demonstrates
that Lessig and Sunstein are mistaken when they insist that Washington
presided over a "meek and timorous" institution.' Contrary to their
assertion that the "Tale of the Bank" marks the "first successful claim by an
executive of a power" to execute all federal laws," Washington, from the
very beginning of his administration, comprehended that he was
constitutionally in charge of execution.s" Indeed, recognizing his preeminent
converting it into a warship.
442. Id. Forrest McDonald recounts other incidents stemming out of the Neutrality Proclamation period
in which Washington enlisted the aid of governors. Governors were "requested to use their subordinate
officials and state militias" to enforce the federal "law" of neutrality. MCDONALD. PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON, supra note 368, at 127.
443. PHELPS, supra note 420, at 131.
444. Id. at 132 (citations omitted). As a means of sapping the strength of the rebellion. Washington
offered blanket pardons to those who would lay down their arms. See McDoNALD. AMERICAN PRESIDENCY.
supra note 139. at 306. Such pardons would seem to be in tension with the notion that the President may
not "suspend" the laws or execution of them. When issuing a pardon, the President is essentially failing
to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Maybe the way out of this
dilemma is to note that when a President issues a blanket pardon pursuant to his pardon authority. the
President is on solid legal ground, as the Constitution (which is after all a law. see Easterbrook. supra note
162, at 919) permits him to suspend application of a statute through the issuance of a blanket pardon.
445. PHELPS, supra note 420, at 132.
446. Lessig & Sunstein. supra note I. at 83. Lessig and Sunstein cite nothing to support their assertion
that the Washington Administration was "weak and timorous." Perhaps they confuse Washington's
reluctance to comment on pending legislation, see id. at 13 n.42 (citing WHITE. supra note 236. at 55). with
a general aversion to administration. Whatever Washington's views on the propriety of discussing
legislation before Congress, his opinion on that matter has little to do with the President's role in the
execution of laws enacted.
447. Id. at 78.
448. Lessig and Sunstem claim that the Tale of the Bank is the starting point for the "mammoth
transformation" in the nation's conception of the presidency. Id. at 8 1. Nothing could be further from the
truth. From the beginning, Framers, ratifiers, and ratification opponents understood that the President would
superintend the execution of federal laws and that he would direct those officers who were to execute
federal law. If anything, President Adams' decentralized administrative philosophy marked a departure from
the original understanding of vigorous, presidentially superintended administration. See MCDONALD.
PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 368. at 184.
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and powerful executive role, Washington referred to himself as the "Chief
Magistrate." 449 To paraphrase Washington, could he execute all the laws
himself, there would be no need for departments. But given the impossibility
of such a task, department heads and the departments themselves existed to
assist him in discharging his constitutional duties and in exercising his
constitutional prerogatives.450
B. A Conflicted Congress' Views Regarding Presidential Administration:
Early Removal Debates
While Washington had a coherent and compelling understanding of his
administrative role, no single understanding of the Executive's role garnered
the favor of a congressional majority. Congress began pondering the
relationship between department heads and the President in its famous removal
debates, the so-called "Decision of 1789." Some understood that the President
would superintend the administration of federal law and that department heads
were to be subordinate to him. Others, however, thought department heads
(and other executive officers) ought to be independent.45' By implication,
federal execution would be free from presidential control as well.
Representative William Smith of South Carolina, the chief proponent of
the impeachment theory, supposed that since no means of removal beyond
impeachment were mentioned in the Constitution, impeachment was the only
method. Only a Senate trial could deprive a department head of his "property
449. PHELPS, supra note 420. at 141.
450. Washington thus held an expansive notion of what constituted the executive power. McDonald
claims that Washington understood "that executive authority was solely the president's, that the Senate had
no share in it beyond that of approving or rejecting his appointments and treaties, and that department heads
were responsible directly to him." McDONALD, PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 368,
at 39.
Lest anyone believe that we are according too much weight to Washington's views regarding
administration, letus recall that we present these views only to fill the gap in Lessig and Sunstein's account
of the post-ratification original understanding. Further, it seems to us that if anyone's post-ratification views
merit deference, Washington's do. Washington, always sensitive to the opinions of his countrymen,
consistently strove to stay within the confines of the Constitution. Phelps notes that Washington even went
so far as to withdraw the nomination of William Patterson to the Supreme Court when Washington learned
that confirmation of Patterson would violate the Constitution's Emoluments Clause. See PHELPS, supra note
420, at 137-38. Phelps claims that the withdrawal was part of a principled strategy of strengthening the
presidency by an "appropriate (and highly visible) deference to the Constitution." Id. at 138. Moreover,
Washington was acutely aware that the precedents established in the beginning would influence posterity.
Accordingly, he "'devoutly wished' that "'these precedents may be fixed on true principles."' Casper,
supra note 246, at 225 (quoting 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 132 (C. Hobson & R. Rutland eds.,
1979)); see also PHELPS, supra note 420, at 122.
451. White labels those who thought department heads ought to be autonomous as "extreme
Republicans," the more extreme of whom believed that even ambassadors were free to do whatever they
pleased. WHITE, supra note 236, at 94; see also MCDONALD, PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra
note 368, at 95 (noting same). Federalists, on the other hand, insisted that the Constitution enabled the
President to control executive officers, be they department heads or subordinate executive officials. WHITe,
supra note 236, at 89, 91-94.
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right" in his office.45 2  Smith must have realized that removal by
impeachment alone would afford these department heads tremendous
independence.
Proponents of the "President-and-Senate theory of removal" contemplated
a somewhat more active presidential role. Representative Alexander White
regarded the Senate as an executive body when it performed its constitutional
functions of confirming officers and approving treaties. Every controversy
concerning either subject had to be considered by the Senate." 3 Hence,
Senate "consent" was necessary not only for appointments, but for removal as
well. Elbridge Gerry asserted that a Senate check on removal would encourage
a stable magistracy.4" Like the impeachment theory, this theory implied
independent department heads, and it was denounced on this ground. Madison
noted that the theory would enable department heads to form alliances with
Senators and thereby render themselves immune from removal. The doctrine
reduced the "power of the President to a mere vapor; in which case his
responsibility [for execution] will be annihilated.""
Though a majority of the House concluded that the President ought to have
authority to remove the Secretaries, this majority was split on the rationale.
Adherents of the legislative grant theory believed that although the President
ought to enjoy authority to remove, the Constitution had not granted such
authority. Rather, Congress could (and ought to) vest the removal power with
the President. Representative John Lawrence asserted that the Constitution left
it up to the legislature to define the terms of office for executive officers."
At the same time, however, he thought that the Constitution considered heads
of departments "as the mere assistants of the President, in the performance of
his executive duties. '45 7 Though department heads might be mere assistants
of the Chief Magistrate, it did not follow that the President could remove them
at will.
Finally, the constitutional grant partisans maintained that the Constitution
had answered all questions regarding removal of executive officers: The
President's executive power granted the authority to remove executive officers.
Echoing Washington's convictions, Fisher Ames affirmed that the Constitution
452. I ANNALS OF CONG.. supra note 2. at 383; see also HART. supra note 372. at 158. Smith
admitted, however, that inferior officers did not need to be impeached to be removed. I ANNALS OF CONG.
supra note 2, at 383.
453. I ANNALS OF CONG.. supra note 2. at 398.
454. Id. at 491. Note that prior to the Constitution's ratification. Hamilton appeared to subscribe to
this theory. THE FEDERALtST No. 77. at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.. 1961) (claiming
that consent of Senate "would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint"). But see THE FEDERALIST
No. 72, at 436 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.. 1961) (insisting that officers executing laws
were to "be subject to [presidentiall superintendence." thus implying that President could remove them).
455. I ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 2. at 480.
456. Id. at 392-93. Representatives Lawrence and Sylvester invoked the Necessary and Proper Clause
for the proposition that Congress could provide means for removal. Id. at 503. 583-84.
457. Id. at 503.
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put "all executive power in the hands of the President, and could he personally
execute all the laws, there would be no occasion for establishing auxiliaries;
but the circumscribed powers of ... one man, demand the aid of others."4s
The President possessed the executive power that gave him "all the powers
properly belonging to the executive department of the Government ... and
such only taken away as are expressly excepted.""4 9 One executive power
was removal.46°
Of course, opponents of presidential power vigorously challenged the
constitutional grant theory. Representative White argued that the Executive
only possessed the executive powers expressly mentioned in Article II, just as
Congress only enjoyed the authorities listed in Article 1.46' Representative
Jackson asserted that "[i]t requires more than a mere ipse dixit to demonstrate
that any power is in its nature executive, and consequently given to the
President of the United States., 462 Giving the President the power of removal
would make "all the officers the mere creatures of the President. 4 63 Smith
claimed the Article II, Section 1 argument "proves too much, and therefore
proves nothing; because it implies that powers which are expressly given by
the constitution, would have been in the President without the express
grant., 461 Smith asked, could the President establish corporations? Could he
prevent citizens from leaving the country? Both were executive powers in
England.46 s
Madison switched sides during the debate.466 Though at first he supposed
that the Constitution did not itself require that department heads be removable
at the pleasure of the President,467 he later joined the constitutional grant
group. According to Madision, where the Constitution
has left any particular department in the entire possession of the
powers incident to that department, I conceive we ought not to qualify
them further than they are qualified by the constitution....
The constitution affirms, that the executive power shall be vested
in the President. Are there exceptions to this proposition? Yes, there
are. The constitution says, that in appointing to office, the Senate shall
be associated with the President .... Have we a right to extend this
exception? I believe not. If the constitution has invested all executive
458. Id. at 492.
459. Id. at 561. If the President had only been granted "the executive power," he would "acquire from
that general expression all the powers properly belonging to the executive department." Id. at 561.
460. Vining also argued that the executive power included removal authority. Id. at 388.
461. Id. at 485.
462. Id. at 505.
463. Id. at 505-06.
464. Id. at 530.
465. Id. at 566-67.
466. See generally HART, supra note 372, at 178-84.
467. I ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 2, at 480-81.
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power in the President, I venture to assert that the Legislature has no
right to diminish or modify his executive authority.
The question now resolves itself into this, Is the power of
displacing, an executive power? I conceive that if any power
whatsoever is in its nature executive, it is the power of appointing,
overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws.
"
Amidst this sea of conflicting congressional views, two points should not
be lost. The First Congress, unlike Washington, was not of one mind regarding
the administrative role of the President. Since the President had the executive
power, which included the authority to superintend those who were statutorily
empowered to execute federal law, many members recognized that the
Constitution had altered the relationship between Congress and executive
officers. Others, however, either refused to accept the Constitution's new
institutional arrangements or failed to understand the new framework fully.
These individuals may have become attached to obsolete Articles-of-
Confederation conceptions. In any event, Lessig and Sunstein's fixation on
statutes blurs these significant disagreements within Congress. By focusing on
the text, neglecting the debates, and then devising a theory to explain these
diverse statutes, Lessig and Sunstein convey the mistaken impression that
"Congress" held one view of the President's executive power.
One should recognize also that no one in the House distinguished between
administrative and executive departments or between administrative and
executive laws-distinctions that Lessig and Sunstein purport to find in :'atutes
and in the Constitution itself. Nor did anyone distinguish administrative
officers, such as the Treasury Secretary, from executive officers, such as the
War Secretary. Instead, members of the House, no matter where they stood on
presidential control, lumped together all departments and officers. Either all
were under the President's control or none was.
The next Section surveys specific statutes with an eye toward examining
how Congress "resolved" these differences in opinion. Congress apparently
seesawed between an explicit acknowledgment that the Constitution
contemplated a unitary, hierarchical Executive and silence on that matter. All
the while, however, no statute explicitly enjoined presidential removal or
presidential command of executive officers.
468. Id. at 481-82: see also HART. supra note 372. at 180-84. Madison also noted that the
Constitution presumed that "'the first Magistrate should be responsible for the executive department; so far
therefore as we do not make the officers who are to aid him in the duties of that department responsible
to him, he is not responsible to his country." I ANNALS OF CONG.. supra note 2. at 479-80. Madison also
commented on the implications of the President's Take Care duties: "If the duty to see the laws be
faithfully executed be required at the hands of the Chief Magistrate, it would seem that it was generally
intended that he should have the species of power which is necessarily to accomplish that end." including
the power of removal. Id. at 479-80.
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C. Administrative Practice Under Certain Statutes
Recall that under the Articles, the Congress was both the legislature and
the Executive. It established different systems of administration. Congress
chose whom to appoint to executive positions, and even though Congress
lacked explicit removal authority, the power to appoint was thought to include
an implicit grant of removal authority as well.469 Congress could also
immediately superintend these officers. In short, Congress had the executive
power-the authority to superintend directly the execution of its laws.
But the Constitution transformed all that. Congress could still create
offices, but the President would have the power to appoint. In turn, the Senate
could refuse to confirm. Congress might attempt to institute a system of
administration, creating departments, boards, and secretaries along lines that
it thought most appropriate; yet, if the President disliked a particular
institution, he could veto it. Most important, if Congress did not approve of the
way a particular law was being administered, it could not promptly command
the relevant officer to alter his practices. A President who had directed the
executive officer could veto any legislative attempt at meddling in executive
details, and absent a supermajority in both chambers wishing to override the
President's veto, the administrative policy in question could continue. Simply
put, with the Constitution's creation of a Chief Executive who could wield a
veto, Congress had lost its ability to superintend directly the administration of
federal law. Executive officers were no longer the servants of Congress, but
instead were all the President's men.
The only question was whether the First Congress would acknowledge that
these executive officers, though created with the assistance of Congress, would
be constitutionally subordinate to the President. Lessig and Sunstein assert that
"[s]ome departments the framing Congress treated as purely executive, and
others not; where the departments were not purely executive, Congress did not
hesitate to create a degree of independence from presidential will. 47 As the
evidence below demonstrates, however, these assertions have only scant
support. A more critical and thorough analysis of these statutes will disclose
that Congress acknowledged presidential superintendence of all departments
and institutions created in the early years.
Rather than examining every statute creating executive officers, we shall
focus on the same institutions and officers that Lessig and Sunstein
469. See HART. supra note 372, at 196 n. 170.
470. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 30.
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examine.47 Specifically, we shall survey the creation and operation of the
Treasury Department, the Post Office, and the U.S. Attorneys.
1. Was Treasury an Executive Department?
Lessig and Sunstein make much of the fact that the Treasury Department
was not originally constituted as an "executive" department. Though the
President was mentioned in the first Treasury statute, he was referred to only
in the context of removing the Secretary."' Moreover, the Secretary was
identified not as a "principal officer" but as a "head of department." ' In
sharp contrast, the acts establishing the Foreign Affairs and War Departments
created "principal officers" in "executive Departments" who were explicitly
made subject to presidential control.474
Lessig and Sunstein draw intriguing conclusions from their comparison of
the three acts. The differences in language not only suggested that the First
Congress did not consider Treasury an "executive" department, but also
implied that Congress recognized that the Constitution distinguished "principal
officers" from "department heads." Executive departments (led by principal
officers) were those in which the President had a constitutional claim to
authority, such as Foreign Affairs and War. In mere departments, such as
Treasury, the President did not have any constitutionally mandated role, other
than appointment of noninferior officers (such as the heads of those
departments). The Treasury Act, we are told, reveals that "the first Congress
considered the organizational form of the government to be mixed rather than
unitary. ' 4
71
All this notwithstanding, we believe that the Treasury Department was an
executive department. While some members of Congress may have wished to
treat Treasury as a congressionally dominated department (as it was under the
Articles and under the laws of many states), overwhelming evidence makes
clear that Treasury was an executive department.
At the outset, the Lessig/Sunstein theory faces a good deal of difficulty
because it cannot adequately explain why, a mere nine days after the
enactment of the Treasury Act, the Treasury Secretary, the Comptroller, and
other Treasury officers had salaries provided in a second act that established
471. we shall not examine the statute creating the second Bank of the United States and subsequent
history because a statute enacted more than a quarter of a century after the Constitution's ratification sheds
little light on congressional original understandings, let alone on the ratifiers" original understandings, of
the Constitution.
472. Act of Sept. 2, 1789. ch. 12. § 7. I Stat. 65. 67: see 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF TIlE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1976 (Chalcne Bangs Bickford & Helen E Veit
eds., 1986) [hereinafter FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS].
473. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12. § I. I Stat. 65. 66.
474. Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4. § I. I Stat. 28. 29; Act of Aug. 7. 1789. ch. 7. § I. I Star. 49. 50,
see Lessig & Sunstein. supra note I, at 34-35.
475. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I. at 28.
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salaries for "the Executive Officers of Government., 476 Did the first statute
mistakenly omit that Treasury was an executive department and the second act
merely correct that error, as Charles Thach has argued?477 Or did the second
statute mistakenly lump Treasury officials with executive officers? Or perhaps
Treasury's executive officers were part of a nonexecutive department? In any
case, the Salary Act casts serious doubt on the administrative/executive
department distinction that Lessig and Sunstein attempt to draw.478 At the
same time, however, we still confront the puzzling question of why Congress
did not declare Treasury an "executive" department from the very beginning.
Adumbrated histories of the Treasury Act and of the Philadelphia Convention's
treatment of Treasury may resolve this question.
On June 4, 1789, several Representatives, including Madison, introduced
the Treasury Bill. The bill sought to "establish an EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,
to be denominated the TREASURY DEPARTMENT," whose numerous officers
would be removable at the pleasure of the President.479 Although the
Department was originally to be run merely by a "Secretary," the House
agreed to add the explanatory phrase "to be the principal officer of the
department. '48' Before the bill was sent to the Senate, however, the title of
the Act was altered to simply "AN ACT to establish the TREASURY
DEPARTMENT" and the Secretary was now merely to be known as the "head
of the department." 48 ' Though the records of House proceedings fail to
provide a reason for these alterations, the debates are nonetheless instructive.
Representative Page opened debate in the House, objecting that the bill as
introduced empowered the Secretary to "digest and report plans for the
improvement and management of the revenue, and the support of the public
credit. '482 Page declared that he could never support any law that permitted
an "interference of an executive officer in business of legislation. 4 3
Similarly, Representative Tucker argued that if "we authorize [the Secretary]
to prepare and report plans, it will create an interference of the executive with
the legislative powers."'  The Constitution had provided the only means of
communicating between the Congress and an executive department: The
476. Act of Sept. 11, 1789, ch. 13, § I. I Stat. 67, 67.
477. THACH, supra note 82, at 144-45.
478. Although Lessig and Sunstein acknowledge the existence of the Salary Act, see Lessig &
Sunstein, supra note I, at 27 n.123, they do not attempt to make sense of it within the context of their
theory. This is particularly odd since their claims rely so heavily on the assertion that Congress supposedly
created a nonexecutive department.
479. 6 FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 472, at 1980.
480. 6 id. at 1980 n.4.
.481. 6 id. at 1983.
482. I ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 2, at 592.
483. Id. at 594 (emphasis added).
484. Id. (emphasis added). Elbridge Gerry opposed the bill because if Congress permitted the Secretary
to report plans to Congress, it would be granting an "indirect voice in legislative business to an executive




President had the duty to deliver information to Congress on the State of the
Union and to submit legislation.8 5
The discussion surrounding the Treasury Secretary's duty to prepare and
submit reports to Congress makes clear that at least some members of the
House considered the Secretary (and presumably other officers in his
department) to be an executive officer (thus suggesting that the Salary Act was
not an anomaly). 6 Worried about the possible influence this executive
officer would have when presenting reports to Congress, opponents of the duty
to report sought to distance him from Congress.48 7 Yet if the Treasury
Secretary was an executive officer, why was the title of the Act subsequently
altered? Once again definitive conclusions are elusive.
Clues as to why the title of the Act was altered can be found by stepping
back and examining the position of Treasury at the Philadelphia Convention.
The Pinckney plan, which provided that the "Head[] of the Department[] of
Treasury" would sit on a "Council of Revision" and that Congress would
create all offices and appoint individuals,"' was sent to the Committee of
Detail, which reported out a congressional power to "appoint a Treasurer by
ballot. 4 89 In the ensuing debate regarding ballot selection of the Treasurer,
Delaware Delegate George Read argued that the legislature was not fit for
making appointments and motioned to strike the clause "leaving the
appointment of the Treasurer as of other officers to the Executive." The Chief
Magistrate "being responsible would make a good choice."' ° George Mason
disagreed. Because the federal government's money belonged to the people,
their representatives (the legislature) "ought to appoint the keepers of it.""'
Read's motion, though seconded, lost. 92
In the waning days of the Convention, John Rutledge sought to strike the
clause.493 Governeur Morris concurred, noting that the Treasurer would be
"more narrowly watched, and more readily impeached" if Congress did not
appoint.' 94 Demurring, Gorham and King admonished that the "people are
accustomed & attached to that mode of appointing Treasurers, and the
485. Id. at 594.
486. To our knowledge, no one suggested that the Secretary was not an executive officer.
487. Indeed, these opponents of permitting the Secretary to make reports to Congres eventually had
that language altered. Instead of the authority to make "report plans" for the improvement of revenue to
Congress, the Secretary could only "prepare" plans. I ANNALS OF CONG.. supra note 2. at 607. Presumably.
that would prevent the Secretary from coming to the floor of the House or Senate to make a report.
488. 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 134. at 135-36. For attribution to Pinckney. see 2 id. at 134
n.3.
489. 2 id. at 182. Note that the Committee of Detail also reported language stating that the President
would appoint all officers "not otherwise provided for by this Constitution." 2 id. at 185.
490. 2 id. at 314-15.
491. 2 id. at 315.
492. Id.
493. 2 id. at 614.
494. Id. Similarly, Pinckney maintained that legislative appointment made legislatures unwilling to
discipline their own officers. Id.
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innovation will multiply objections to the System" if the President had this
power of appointment.495 Roger Sherman thought that since the Congress
would appropriate, it ought to appoint the officer who would disburse. 96 As
we know, supporters of congressional appointment lost.497  Since the
Constitution would not provide for the appointment of a Treasurer, the
President would make the appointment.
4 s
The House's alterations to the Treasury Bill as introduced suggest that
some Representatives may have wished to make Treasury a congressionally
dominated department once again, as it had been under the Articles, 499 and
as it was under many state constitutions."° Though opponents of a robust
Executive recognized that Treasury was an executive department (witness their
numerous statements labeling the Secretary an executive officer), once they
successfully altered the Secretary's reporting power, perhaps they grew
emboldened and attempted to remove Treasury from the Chief Executive's





498. Note that this change was foreshadowed, for the final discussion of congressional appointment
of a Treasurer occurred against the backdrop of previous comments from several delegates that the
Secretary of Treasury would be subordinate to the President. The Morris-Pinckney Council of State, which
would "assist the President in conducting the Public affairs," would have created a "Secretary of Commerce
and Finance" who would serve the President "during pleasure." 2 id. at 335-36 (Secretary would
"superintend all matters relating to the public finances, and prepare and report Plans of revenue and for the
regulation of expenditures"). Indeed, it was Morris who had noted that "the minister of finance" would be
subordinate to the President. 2 id. at 54. An executive officer, whether designated the Treasurer or Treasury
Secretary, would be executing laws and ought to be appointed by the Chief Executive who would be, after
all, in charge of the execution of all federal laws. Though the Convention did not immediately eliminate
the provision providing for a congressionally appointed Treasurer, enough delegates eventually recognized
its inconsistency with the responsible, unitary Executive. Defenders of legislative prerogative lost by a
lopsided three to eight vote. 2 id. at 614.
499. SANDERS, supra note 225, at 151.
500. Learned argues that the Treasury Act's peculiar language was "due to general recognition of the
force of popular tradition and colonial precedent in the matter of financial administration." Prior to the
Constitution, "financial administration had been all but completely within the control of the popular
bodies." LEARNED, supra note 223, at 101.
501. McDonald contends that the House added restrictions to the Secretary's powers in order to bind
the Secretary to the will of the House, rather than of the President. McDONALD, PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON, supra note 368, at 36-37. Casper observes that Congress did not affirmatively prohibit
presidential superintendence. Rather, it imposed legal duties on the Secretary, something that was not done
with the departments of War or Foreign Affairs. Casper, supra note 246, at 241.
Indeed, anachronistic Articles-of-Confederation thinking seemed to infect both sides. As
Representatives Livermore and Madison recognized, the original bill created a Treasury Secretary with
duties very similar to those of the Continental Congress' Superintendent of Finance. Representative
Livermore observed that the reporting requirements were derived from Continental Congress precedent. I
ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 2, at 605. The former Superintendent of Finance had such authority, and
the authors of the bill had merely copied from the old statute, failing to recognize
the different circumstances of the present and former Congress; ... [the former Congress]
possessed the legislative and executive power; they could abolish his plans and his office
together, if they thought proper;, but we are restrained by a Senate, and the negative of the
President. We have no power over him ....
Id. at 598. Given the changed circumstances, Congress ought not to place "dangerous powers into" the
Secretary's hands. Id. Madison also observed that the language of the bill derived from language passed
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Or maybe the alteration of the Treasury Act's title was without
significance. After all, prior to the title change, opponents of the Secretary's
power to report plans to Congress recognized that the Secretary was an
executive officer.0 But whatever the First Congress' understanding of the
Department, Treasury was an executive department because its personnel
executed federal law-the quintessential function of an executive department.
Treasury would be collecting levies and disbursing funds-in other words,
executing the nation's tax and appropriation laws.
Washington had just such an understanding of Treasury's position. From
the beginning, Washington asserted his constitutional authority over the
Treasury Department.503  Washington unmistakably understood that the
Constitution empowered him to superintend the execution of appropriation and
tax laws.
Nor did Hamilton attempt to gain a measure of independence from the
Chief Magistrate." As Forrest McDonald notes, "[i]n administrative matters
that were clearly executive [such as] the short-range borrowing and disbursal
of funds ... Hamilton continued to report directly as a subordinate and to act
only upon orders from" Washington.05 Indeed, one of Hamilton's most
memorable deeds was in response to an order from Washington: the opinion
on the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States. In that opinion,
Hamilton clearly notes that he is responding to Washington's "order."'
Given the lack of statutory language authorizing Washington to "order"
Hamilton, Washington's authority must have come from the Opinions Clause
of the Constitution, which by its own terms applies to executive departments.
by the 1783 Continental Congress. Id. at 604. In other words, the pro.unitary Executive authors of the bill
seemed to be unconcerned that what was entirely appropriate in another context, that is. having a Secretary
report to Congress, was perhaps inappropriate when the Secretary served a new master, the President.
Perhaps their comments about the Continental Congress' control of the administration of the Treasury may
have rekindled a desire on the part of some wistful members to recapture the mighty executive/legislativc
powers wielded by the Continental Congress. The subsequent Salary Act might be seen then as a successful
pro-unitary Executive counterrevolution that ovcrcame opposition to calling Treasury an executive
department.
502. Casper provides yet another reading. Hamilton may have desired direct dealings with Congress
and some independence from the President, and thus he may have been the originator of the odd Treasury
language. Casper, supra note 246, at 227-28.
503. Recall that upon becoming President, Washington wrote to the Board of Treasury to gamer an
accurate understanding of the administrative business of the United States. See HART. supra note 372. at
135. As noted earlier, he advised Hamilton on the structure of an agency that would collect revenue.
WHITE, supra note 236, at 33. In addition, he regularly conveyed his approval or disapproval of Hamilton's
plans or actions. For instance. "[tihe appointment of that gentleman to negotiate the Loans in Holland. and
the Instructions you have given for his government, meet my approbation.- 31 WRITINGs OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON, supra note 423, at 118.
504. White claims that Hamilton. like all department heads, never "settled any matter of importance
without consulting the President and securing his approval." WHITE. supra note 236. at 27
505. MCDONALD, PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON. supra note 368. at 65.
506. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act To Establish a Bank. in PAUL
BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEctsIoNSIAKING 15 (2d ed. 1983). We
are indebted to Professor John Harrison for bringing this point to our attention.
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Focusing on the language of the Treasury Act, Lessig and Sunstein have
largely ignored the Act's legislative history, subsequent administrative practice,
and the ramifications of the Salary Act. As a result, their interpretation of the
Treasury Act suffers. Yet they do examine legislative history regarding the
Treasury Comptroller. As Lessig and Sunstein point out, Madison moved to
modify the Comptroller's tenure, asserting that the Comptroller-who would
decide "upon the lawfulness and justice of the claims and accounts subsisting
between the United States and particular citizens"--possessed judicial and
executive qualities.50 7 When an officer was a blend of executive and judicial
functions, he believed, Congress could modify that officer's tenure. 8
Accordingly, Madison's Comptroller would have held office for a fixed
number of years "unless sooner removed by the President.' '""9
The response to Madison's proposal is instructive: incredulity.
5 10
Representative Benson said the issue of tenure had already been settled: Judges
would hold office during good behavior, while all others would serve at the
pleasure of the President.5" Attempting to insulate executive officers from
the Chief Executive might enable Congress to "overthrow the executive
507. I ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 2, at 611.
508. Id. at 612.
509. Id. Madison's proposed tenure "modification" was rather odd. The tenure of Madison's
Comptroller was not markedly different from the tenure of other officers. Moreover, all officers, including
the Comptroller, would be removable by the President. Officers other than the Comptroller, however, would
enjoy potentially limitless tenure. If a subsequent President wished to keep them in office, he would not
have to reappoint them and subject them to Senate confirmation a second time. The Comptroller, however,
because he was to have a fixed term, could be subject to more frequent confirmation proceedings. Madison
seems to have recognized that his tenure proposal would have this effect:
[Tihe Comptroller would be dependent upon the President, because he can be removed by him;
he will be dependent upon the Senate, because they must consent to his election for every term
of years; and he will be dependent upon this House, through the means of impeachment, and
the power we shall reserve over his salary; by which means we shall effectually secure the
dependence of this officer upon the Government.
Id. Madison's justification for modifying the Comptroller's tenure would seem to be in tension with his
actual tenure proposal. As noted above, Madison thought that since the Comptroller would have certain
"judicial" duties, a modification of tenure was in order. That would seem to suggest that more
independence from the political branches was the order of the day. Yet Madison strangely proposed a
tenure modification that he acknowledged would lead to a Comptroller more subject to the whim of the
political branches and thus less independent.
Moreover, all officers (except judges and the President) are beholden to Congress for the provision
of salaries. Thus it is hard to see exactly what additional control Congress would gain by specifying the
tenure of the Comptroller. If Congress wished, it could always refuse to fund the Comptroller's activities,
thus effectively firing the existing Comptroller. It could simultaneously create a new office, labeled
Treasurer, which would undertake all the functions previously exercised by the Comptroller. The President
would then have to subject either the old Comptroller or a new appointee to new confirmation hearings.
Madison's discussion of the Comptroller, then, reflects uncharacteristic confusion on two separate levels,
both of which call into question his understandings. Gerhard Casper has also noted the oddity of Madison's
proposal. Casper, supra note 246, at 238.
510. Representative Smith, an avid proponent of the impeachment theory of removal. would have done
Madison one better, arguing that the Comptroller ought to be completely independent of the Executive. I
ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 2, at 613.
511. Id. at 614. Representative Stone also thought that "all officers, except the judges, should hold
their offices during pleasure." Id. at 613.
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power. 5 1 2 Representative Sedgwick also agreed that a majority had already
determined that executive officers should only hold office at pleasure." 3
After all, he said, "they were the eyes and arms of the principal Magistrate, the
instruments of execution." '5 14 The Comptroller ensured "'the regular and
punctual payment of all moneys which may be collected, and [directed]
prosecutions for delinquencies," and was thus an executive officer.5"' Though
that debate adjourned with Madison once again reasserting his earlier position,
Madison withdrew his Comptroller tenure motion the very next day."16 Given
the vehement response from unitary executivists such as Benson and Sedgwick,
and Madison's subsequent retreat, attempting to use Madison's Comptroller
motion for the proposition that the First Congress contemplated an
executive/administrative distinction seems rather suspect." 7
Lessig and Sunstein are unable to cite any statutory language or history
supporting the notion that the Comptroller "was not directly within the
President's control"; they rely instead upon commentators.518 Yet there is no
language in the Treasury Act to support the theory that the Comptroller was
not an executive officer, subject to presidential direction. As the above debate
reveals, members of Congress understood the Comptroller to be an executive
officer.5t9 Moreover, a perusal of the Salary Act for executive officers
confirms that Congress considered the Comptroller to be an executive
officer.5'0  The case for an independent, nonexecutive Comptroller21




516. Id. at 615. Why Madison withdrew his amendment remains unclear. Conceivably. Sedgwick and
Benson's powerful arguments swayed him. The Comptroller would execute federal law, after all. Did this
not make him an executive officer, superintended by the President? Of course, we may never know
precisely why Madison withdrew his amendment. His retreat may well have been merely tactical. He may.
for example, have clung to his beliefs but sensed defeat- deciding instead to withdraw his motion.
517. Lessig and Sunstein acknowledge that opponents of the unitary Executive theory have made too
much of Madison's tenure proposal. See Lessig & Sunstein. supra note I. at 17 n.70. Yet. they too seem
trapped in this pitfall. See id. at 28-29 (quoting Madison's proposal in order to show congressional
understanding that "Congress has the authority to immunize Isomel agencies from presidential control").
518. See id. at 27 n.124.
519. The only two who expressly reject this position are Madison. who subsequently withdrew his
Comptroller amendment, and Representative Smith, who clung to his fantastic notion that all officers
created by Congress should be independent of the President. See I ANNALS OF CONG.. supra note 2. at
612-14. Thus, Lessig and Sunstein's assertion that "not all" shared Madison's views about so-called quasi-
judicial officers is an extreme understatement. No one but Smith voiced any support for the notion.
520. Act of Sept. II, 1789, ch. 13, § I, I Stat. 67, 67.
521. Lessig and Sunstein maintain that the Treasury Act "shielded the Comptroller .. from
presidential direction." Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at 27. The Treasury Act, however. contains no
explicit provision that shields the Comptroller from presidential superintendence. Instead. L.cssig and
Sunstein infer the Comptroller's independence from statutory language requinng both the Comptroller's
and the Treasury Secretary's signature on warrants for money. See id. at 28 n.124. Under the Treasury Act,
the Secretary has authority to issue "all warrants for monies ... from the Treasury, in pursuance of
appropriations by law." but the Comptroller was to "countersign all warrants drawn" by the Secretary. Act
of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, §§ 2, 4, I Stat. 65, 66. Based on this countersignature requirement. Charles Ticfer
has argued that the Comptroller must have been independent. Charles Tiefer, The Constitutonality of
Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of Executive Power. 63 B.U. L REv. 59. 73-74 (1983). Surely
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seemed rather flimsy, and ended with Madison's capitulation to
Representatives Sedgwick and Benson.522
if the Comptroller were subordinate to the Secretary, the argument goes, such countersignature would have
been superfluous.
This argument suffers from two flaws. First, the countersignature requirement does not necessarily
indicate that the Comptroller was independent from the Secretary. Countersignature requirements where one
officer is clearly subordinate to the other are common in business. The requirements stem from the
commonsense notion that embezzlement is more difficult if two officers must sign before money can be
disbursed. Indeed, under the Articles of Confederation, the Continental Congress had similarly required that
the "Register" countersign warrants whether they came from the Treasurer, the Superintendent of Finance,
or the President of Congress. See SANDERS, supra note 225, at 133.
Second, even if the Treasury Act contemplated a Comptroller who was independent of the Secretary.
that says nothing about whether the Comptroller was independent of the Chief Executive. Tvo executive
officers can be independent of each other without violating the unitary Executive theory. The Constitution
only dictates that both be subordinate to the Chief Magistrate.
Tiefer also cites a 1795 statute for the proposition that the President could not direct the Comptroller.
See Tiefer, supra, at 74. That statute stated that Comptroller decisions regarding claims the United States
held against individuals who had received funds from the Treasury were ."final and conclusive."' Id.
(quoting Act of March 3, 1795, ch. 48, § 4, 1 Stat. 441,442). Tiefer concludes that since the Comptroller's
decisions were "final and conlusive," the President could not superintend the Comptroller. He argues that
the federal judiciary, however, could overtum the Comptroller's decisions. Id. at 74 n.65.
Tiefer's conclusions suffer from several defects. First, making Comptroller decisions "final and
conclusive" may imply that the President cannot direct the Comptroller after a decision is made, but that
in no way suggests that the President cannot direct the Comptroller before any decision is made. Second,
and more importantly, it seems to us that Tiefer's claim about finality vis-l-vis the judiciary is backwards.
Most likely, the Comptroller's decisions were made "final and conclusive" because there was to be no
judicial review of his actions. That would explain Madison's views. Since the Comptroller would be
making final decisions regarding "the lawfulness and justice of the claims" between the United States and
citizens, the Comptroller possessed judicial qualities. See supra notes 507-09 and accompanying text. That
the decisions were final and conclusive with respect to the judiciary, however, does not mean that they
were final and conclusive with respect to the President.
We observe that the Continental Congress' Comptroller also had the authority to settle claims the
United States had against those who managed federal monies. See SANDERS, supra note 225, at 133. These
decisions were also "final." Id. In the context of the Continental Congress, finality made sense because
there was no federal judiciary to oversee these decisions. Evidently, Congress wanted such administrative
finality to continue under the Constitution, notwithstanding the existence of the Supreme Court and the
statutory creation of inferior federal courts.
In any event, we have yet to see any evidence that, in the early years of the Republic, the Comptroller
was independent of the President.
522. The President's control of Treasury does not contradict the notion that the Executive ought not
to have the power of both purse and sword. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at 82. The President has
the power of the sword (e.g., the Commander-in-Chief authority), but Congress may refuse to appropriate
funds and thereby keep that sword sheathed. Similarly, the President has the authority to execute only
appropriation acts, not the power to appropriate itself. Though located in the first Article, Section 9, Clause
7 seems to speak to executives: "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. The Anti-Federalist "Impartial Citizen" said
as much: "Nor can [the President] appropriate the public money to any use, but what is expressly provided
by law." 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 225, at 295. Hence, even with
presidential control of Treasury, Congress still controls the purse; it may choose to take a few coins from
the public's purse and give them to the Executive to expend according to law. Without this congressional
decision, however, the President may not even reach into the purse. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at
82.
Moreover, if there was any congressional concern about presidential "control" of purse and sword that
animated the decision not to label Treasury an executive department in the Treasury Act, Congress
expressed it rather haphazardly. Statutes of the first several Congresses repeatedly endowed the President
with both appropriation and debt authority. See Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 4, § 3, 1 Stat. 104, 105
(authorizing President to draw from Treasury $10,000 for contingent government expenses); id. § 7, I Stat.
at 105-06 (authorizing President to empower Secretary of Treasury to take on new loans as may be
necessary to fund appropriations); Funding Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 34, § 2, 1 Stat. 138, 139 (authorizing
654-
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Lessig and Sunstein's discussion of the differences in phrasing between the
Treasury Act and the two other departmental acts, and of Madison's statements
regarding the Comptroller's tenure, raises fascinating questions. Some members
of Congress, relying upon the history of the Articles period or state practices,
may indeed have believed that Treasury was "theirs" to control. But when
viewed in the context of the legislative history and administrative practice, the
Treasury Act offers little support for Lessig and Sunstein's theory. Rather,
there is much that bolsters our claim.
2. Post Offices and the President
In their analysis of the Post Office, Lessig and Sunstein once again insist
that Congress did not believe that the administration of all federal law had to
be superintended by the President. 23 Since the Post Office would be
executing a power of Congress (the postal power), they argue, it could be
independent of the President.524 As they acknowledge, however, though the
Second Congress did not explicitly sanction presidential control over the Post
Office, the First Congress did. It temporarily established a Post Office and a
Postmaster General who would "be subject to the direction of the President of
the United States in performing the duties of his office." 52 In contrast, the
1792 Postal Act made no mention of presidential superintendence of the
Postmaster. From this difference in language (and from the 1798 establishment
of the Navy Department as an executive department), Lessig and Sunstein
conclude that Congress sought to isolate the Post Office from presidential
control and that Congress did not believe that the postal administration had to
be under presidential superintendence. 526 As with the supervision of
Treasury, however, this claim is suspect.
Had Congress wished completely to isolate the Post Office from
presidential influence, it would have affirnzatively prohibited executive
direction. Given that Washington treated the Post Office like every other
executive department prior to the 1792 Act-namely as a presidentially
controlled institution-if Congress wanted to grant the Post Office autonomy,
President to borrow $12 million to help pay interest on foreign debt): Sinking Fund Act of Aug. 12. 1790.
ch. 47, 1 Stat. 186 (authorizing President to borrow S2 million to retire existing U.S. debt); Act of March
3, 1791, ch. 15, § 58, 1 Stat. 199, 213 (authorizing President to determine pay of supervisors and inspectors
assigned to execute and enforce duties on imported spirits). The list of instances where Congress directly
empowered the President to "meddle" in fiscal matters goes on and on.
We do not believe that a purse-and-sword fear animated the peculiar wording of the Treasury statute,
and we find it significant that the only evidence that Lessig and Sunstein cite for that proposition is a
comment by Henry Clay some 50 years after the enactment of the Treasury Act. Lessig & Sunsten. supra
note 1, at 82. While Clay is undoubtedly a good source for congressional intent of his own period, he
seems an inappropriate choice of authority for the Treasury Act.
523. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at 29-30.
524. Id. at 30.
525. I ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 2. at 2179.
526. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at 29-30.
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language to that effect would have made its intentions evident to the President.
As enacted, the 1792 Postal Act said nothing whatsoever barring the President
from directing postal affairs. The lack of such language ought to prompt us to
question Lessig and Sunstein's underlying premise, for they seem to argue no
more than that the absence of a congressional prohibition upon presidential
control signifies that Congress meant to preclude it.
There is an alternative explanation for the omission of a statement relating
to presidential superintendence: Perhaps it was so well understood that the
President was constitutionally empowered to control the Post Office that a
statutory provision to that effect was unnecessary. Having established from the
first Act that Congress understood that the President could control the
Postmaster General (and by implication the Post Office), it was superfluous to
repeat the obvious in the subsequent reauthorization bill.
Debate on the postal bill supports this interpretation. In discussions
regarding whether the President or Congress ought to have the authority to
designate post roads, members contemplated that the President would
superintend the Postmaster General. Representatives treated the President and
the Postmaster interchangeably, implicitly acknowledging that though the
President would be granted explicit authority to designate post roads, he could
delegate such authority to his assistant, the Postmaster General. Representative
Sedgwick, who proposed giving the President the post road authority, said that
when the previous Congress had considered this subject, the sense of the
House had been to delegate the power to the President. "[T]he only difference
had been with respect to the mode of expression-but the effect was still to
have been the same-some gentlemen thinking it best to leave the details of
this business entirely to the supreme Executive, others wishing to name the
Postmaster General. '527
Opponents of ceding the post road authority to the President also
understood that the Postmaster General would be subject to presidential
control. Representative Livermore argued that if the President could select post
roads, Congress might as well pass a law empowering the Postmaster to "have
the whole government of the post office." 528 Similarly, Representative
Hartley noted that if the President could pick post roads the whole postal
administration would be "thrown into the power of the Executive. '529 Hartley
also warned that through the Post Office, the President could obtain "a weighty
influence" throughout the nation. He lamented that the bill did not guard
527. 2 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 106, at 229 (1791) (emphasis added). Representative Bourne
similarly thought the President and the Postmaster would be better able to select post roads than Congress,
thus indicating that he saw an identity of interest between the Postmaster and President. Id. at 232.
528. Id. at 230. In other words, by empowering the President to select post roads, Congress would
effectively transfer a great power to the Postmaster. The Congress could just as well give the Postmaster
plenary control.
529. Id. at 231.
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against such prospects.53 In other words, the bill did not bar the President
from extending his influence throughout the country by means of the Post
Office. Thus the lack of statutory authority to superintend the Post Office was
not thought to preclude presidential control. Rather it was understood that the
President would continue to direct postal affairs. 3'
President Washington also perceived that he was constitutionally
authorized to administer the nation's postal laws. Recall that when Washington
became President, he asked the Postmaster General (along with the other
department heads) to provide a detailed account of the Department and its
business.53 In July of 1789, the President, believing that the Post Office was
not generating enough revenue, commanded the Postmaster General to send "in
detail, the receipts and expenditures of the Post Office" for the years 1784 and
1788."'3 In 1791, Washington, by administrative fiat, made the Post Office
a subunit of the Department of Treasury."' Since the Post Office brought in
stamp revenue, the Post Office properly belonged in Treasury.53
Though Lessig and Sunstein insist that Congress "removed the language
making the Postmaster General subject to the direction of the President," 536
nothing of the sort occurred. Rather than enacting a law that repealed the
existing postal act's provisions regarding presidential control, Congress enacted
a wholly new act that was silent as to presidential superintendence. By
claiming that Congress specifically "removed" the presidential direction
language, Lessig and Sunstein suggest that Congress focused on this provision
and consciously decided to repeal it. We see no evidence of such an intent
animating Congress. 57
530. Id. at 232.
53 1. Note that Hartley's comments indicate that he thought that Congress could enact laws to prevent
the President from obtaining too much influence in the Post Office. Whether this meant that Congress could
preclude presidential control or merely enact laws to prevent malfeasance, nepotism, and corruption is
unclear.
532. HART, supra note 372, at 135.
533. Id. at 136.
534. WHrrE, supra note 236. at 30-31, 226-27.
535. See id. White notes that after the passage of the 1792 Act. Jefferson tried to convince Washington
to move the Post Office from Treasury to the State Department. Washington declined. The incident shows
that Jefferson recognized that Washington controlled the Post Office. See id. at 226-27.
McDonald asserts that Washington was not as involved in postal affairs as he was in the other
departments. MCDONALD, PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON. supra note 368. at 41-42. The lack of
vigilant supervision might reflect Washington's sensitivity to charges that he would use the postal
department as a means of extending his influence throughout the nation.
536. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at 29.
537. As in their Treasury discussion, Lessig and Sunstein cite no relevant authonty for the proposition
that a purse-and-sword concern motivated Congress when it repealed the presidential supcnntendence
provision. They cite only a statement from George Mason at the Philadelphia Convention on the need to
keep sword and purse separate generally. See id. at 30 n.137. Importing Mason's generic comment into a
wholly alien context hardly constitutes evidence of a congressional concern with vesting purse and sword
in the Executive.
To be sure, there were concerns about sword and purse at the Founding. The Ant.-Federalist Samuel
lamented the fact that the President and Congress shared the power of the purse and the sword. 4 ANn-
FEDERALIST, supra note 277, at 193. But see THE FEDERAUST No. 78. at 465 (Alexander Hamilton)
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Once one grasps some background facts, the absence of language
confirming executive control of the Post Office is easy to explain: Everyone
presumed that the President would superintend the Post Office and thus it was
unnecessary to include such language. The Post Office would be executing the
nation's postal laws and therefore had to be subject to executive control.
3. The Prosecutorial Power and the President
Although unitary executivists maintain that prosecution is a core executive
function, Lessig and Sunstein assert that the original understanding does not
support this proposition. The U.S. Attorneys, created in the Judiciary Act to
prosecute suits on behalf of the United States, were not put explicitly under the
control of the Attorney General or the President.538 In practice, the attorneys
acted under the control of the Comptroller with respect to ensuring that the
debts owed the United States were promptly paid.539 But, we are told, not
only were public prosecutors free from presidential direction, but private
citizens also could bring qui tam actions against individuals, and thus even
private citizens had federal prosecutorial authority. Lessig and Sunstein claim
that these "bits of history are devastating to the modern unitarian's originalist
claims about prosecution. ' ' 4°
We disagree. Notwithstanding the lack of any language mentioning
presidential superintendence, administrative practice suggests that President
Washington thought he could control prosecutors. Indeed, as we shall see,
English practice also supports the notion that the Executive controls
prosecutions.
Lessig and Sunstein are entirely correct in observing that U.S. Attorneys
exercised a great deal of independence and were placed only at the service of
the Comptroller in bringing actions against those who owed the federal
government money."' Indeed, Washington's Attorney General, Edmund
Randolph, recognized his lack of authority to direct the attorneys: "[T]he want
of a fixed relation between the attorneys of the districts and the Attorney
General[] has rendered it impossible for me to take charge of matters on which
I was not authorized to give instructions. '542 Though the Attorney General
might seem the most obvious officer to direct the U.S. Attorneys (after all, he
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (suggesting that the President controls the sword, Congress the purse, and the
courts neither). But once again, presidential direction of those who collect revenues pursuant to an act of
Congress does not constitute executive control of the purse. When Congress tells the President how to
collect funds and then tells him how to spend the funds, Congress still holds the purse,
538. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92.
539. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at 17.
540. Id. at 20.
541. Id. at 17.
542. WHITE, supra note 236, at 167. Though Washington requested that Congress grant the Attorney
General supervisory powers over the attorneys, his proposal went no further than a favorable committee
report. Id. at 168.
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was the "general" of the attorneys), historian Leonard White contends that the
Secretary of State played a much more significant role in the early days of the
Republic, while admitting that the Secretary did not direct attorneys to bring
suit either. 
43
But even if subordinate executive officials could not direct U.S. Attorneys,
their lack of authority in no way undermines the unitary Executive. The
Secretary of State and the Attorney General were mere creatures of law; they
only had such authority as the law granted them and the President ceded. The
key question, which seems not to have been confronted, is whether U.S.
Attorneys could have refused to accept a direct order of the President either
to prosecute or to cease a prosecution. Clearly, the President lacked express
statutory authority to direct the U.S. Attorneys. But he did not need such
authority, for his authority flowed from a higher source: the Constitution's
grant of "executive power."
In fact, Washington did exercise such authority over the U.S. Attorneys.
One volume of Washington's writings reveals that Washington "instructed" the
attorney for the Pennsylvania district to nol-pros an indictment against the two
individuals who had been accused of rioting; he also directed the Attorney
General "to instruct the District Attorney to require from the [Revenue]
Collectors of all the several Parts ... information of all infractions [of the
Neutrality Proclamation] that may come within their purview."" Contrary
to Lessig and Sunstein's assertion, then, Thomas Jefferson was not the first
President to assert control over prosecutors! 6 Presidential superintendence
of federal prosecution was asserted from the very beginning!"
543. See id. at 406. The Secretary of State directed legal actions against pnvateers and foreign vessels.
Id. at 407. In the John Adams Administration. Secretary of State Timothy Pickenng read opposition
newspapers and passed on seditious items to U.S. Attomcys. so that individuals could be prosecuted under
the Alien and Sedition Acts. Id. Pickering also occasionally asked U.S. Attorneys to discontinue suits
against foreign officials. Id. at 408.
544. In other words, Washington ordered a district attorney to discontinue prosecutions. 32 WRImGs
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 423. at 455 n.35.
545. 32 id. at 386. Washington had earlier asked Hamilton about the wisdom of directing the Attorneys
to prosecute violations of the Neutrality Proclamation. Apparently Washington had made up his mind.
546. See Lessig & Sunstein. supra note I, at 18 n.75. 22 n.92.
547. Professor Krent has argued that there was a lack of "'centralized control within the executive
branch over criminal law enforcement." Harold J. Krcnt. Executive Control over Criminal Law
Enforcement, 38 AN,. U. L. REV. 275, 286 (1989). Following Leonard White's lead. Krent notes that the
Attorney General lacked supervisory authority and that the Secretary of State assumed "titular
responsibility" for supervising district attorneys. Id. at 289.
The problem with Krent's argument is that it confuses Congress' perceived unwillingness to grant
supervisory authority to a creature of statutory law (such as the Attorney General) with executive inability
to direct district attorneys. As Washington's actions confirm, notwithstanding congressional failure to create
an officer who would supervise district attorneys, the President had such authority secured by the
Constitution.
Krent's point about the lack of centralization, however, is not without force. In an era of poor
communication and long journeys, we might expect that executive officers in the hinterland received less
instruction and direction from President Washington than they would have if communication and travel had
been easier. Thus marshals, revenue collectors, postal officials, and so forth had a great deal of latitude in
executing their duties. That latitude, driven by the simple fact of poor communications, however. says little
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English understandings of the prosecutorial power confirm that such
authority rests with whomever has the executive power. Blackstone clearly
considered prosecution to be part of the power to execute laws. Though
violations of the law "seem ... to be rather offences against the kingdom than
the king; yet, as the public ... has delegated all it's [sic] power and rights,
with regard to the execution of the laws, to one visible magistrate," '548 such
infractions should be considered affronts to the Chief Magistrate to whom the
public has delegated its right to execute. The Executive is "therefore the proper
person to prosecute for all public offences and breaches of the peace, being the
person injured in the eye of the law."54 9 Similarly, when "We the People"
delegated to the President the right to execute the laws, we at the same time
empowered him to prosecute those who transgress the law. The right to
prosecute flows from the power to execute.
The pardon power, far from being "conceptually and politically
distinct ' 550 from the prosecutorial power, is intimately connected with it.
Pardons and prosecutions are really two sides of the same coin: control of the
execution of federal law. As Blackstone observed, "it is reasonable that he [the
Executive] only who is injured should have the power of forgiving. '5' The
President is injured by infractions of federal law, because such violations
demonstrate that his administration of federal law is less than perfect. It is
therefore only natural that he possess the authority to pardon those who have
violated the laws.
Finally, though qui tam actions contemplate prosecution by individual
citizens, that is a far cry from the notion that the Chief Executive has no
control over such suits. As Blackstone observes, qui tam actions are those
actions in which "any such person or persons [who] will sue" receives the
"forfeitures created by statute." '52 In other words, individuals may sue for
monetary penalties owed by those who have violated the laws. Such actions
are brought by persons "'qui tam pro domino rege, &c., quam pro se ipso in
hac parte sequitur [who prosecutes this suit as well for the king, &c. as for
himself]."' 553 Though prior to commencement of the suit, the king could
about formal presidential ability to control execution. To our knowledge, no official charged with execution
of laws (e.g., prosecutors, revenue collectors, marshalls) ever disregarded a direct order from Chief
Administrator Washington.
What Krent's article also demonstrates is that the President probably lacks the authority to structure
administration as he sees fit. Congress creates the executive officers and departments that assist the
President. If Congress, by law, does not vest control over all federal prosecution in the Attorney General,
the President probably cannot grant such control to the Attorney General. See id. at 290. Krent's claim is
perfectly consistent with our assertion that Congress. through the Necessary and Proper Clause, determines
how to structure the administration (and, indeed, whether there will be any purely federal administration).
548. I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *258-59.
549. I id. at 259.
550. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at 21.
551. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *259.




have pardoned an individual, once a qui tam action begins, the private
prosecutor "has made the popular action his own private action."", In other
words, the king cannot control the suit.
From the originalist perspective, then, the constitutionality of qui tam suits
reduces itself to two related questions: (1) Under our Constitution, does
Congress have the authority to create such "popular" actions, and (2) are there
any Article m restrictions on creating such causes of action? Without going
into great detail, suffice it to say that qui tam actions are rather
problematic. 5  In any case, even Blackstone recognizes that the Executive
may preemptively pardon an individual and thus thwart potential qui tam suits.
At most, English practice suggests that qui tam actions can be understood as
but an extremely limited exception to the rule of presidential control of all
aspects of prosecution. This exception is hardly fatal to the rule of presidential
superintendence of federal and state prosecutors. Once again, the history is
perfectly consistent with the Chief Administrator constructed by the founding
generation.
D. Some Final Thoughts on Post-Ratification Views of the President's
Administrative Role
Excessive reliance on statutes led Lessig and Sunstein to miss the more
messy and confused congressional debates behind those acts. Some
Representatives clearly were concerned about the implications of having a
Chief Magistrate in charge of executing all federal law. Others were not
interested in implications; the Constitution had already established that the
President was responsible for the execution of federal law.
The latter group was largely successful. No statute prohibited presidential
superintendence. Nor did any statute even hint that the officers and institutions
created therein were to be free from presidential control. Given the
overwhelming evidence from the pre-ratification period indicating that the
Constitution was understood to vest the President with the power to
superintend the execution of federal law, we ought not to construe statutory
silence as a congressional repudiation of that widely understood constitutional
principle. Surely Congress would have made its intentions much more apparent
had repudiation of the unitary Executive been its goal. Moreover, all statutes
554. 2 id. at *437. Penalties available through qui tam actions are "in a state of nature, accessible by
all the king's subjects... : open therefore to the first occupant. who declares his intention to possess them
by bringing his action." 2 id. at *438.
555. See James T. Blanch, The Constitutionality of the False Claims Act's Qui Tam Provision. 16
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 701 (1993) (discussing dubious constitutionality of qui tam actions after Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992)).
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implicitly acknowledged the constitutional basis for the President's power of
removal.556
But whatever one's reading of the congressional debates and the resulting
acts,557 one cannot quibble with the notion that if one wants to gain a
complete picture of post-ratification understandings of the President's
administrative role, one must consider the first President's views and
administrative practice. President Washington had a coherent, compelling view
of the President's constitutional role, one that matched the viewpoints
expressed by Anti-Federalists and Federalists alike before ratification: The
President is responsible for execution of all federal law and may superintend
all those statutorily authorized to execute it. Department heads and other
executive officers recognized the President's commanding administrative role
from the beginning.5 ' Far from calling into question the unitary Executive
theory, the early statutes and practices actually advance that theory. As
Madison so pointedly put it in his dispute with Hamilton regarding the scope
556. It would seem that the congressional understanding of the President's executive power only
expanded over time. Casper notes that rather than ordering the President to investigate the destruction of
the Army at the hands of the Indians, Congress conducted its own investigation. Ordering an investigation
was apparently seen as an encroachment on the President's executive power because Congress would be
telling the President how he ought to execute the laws. See Casper, supra note 246, at 228-29. If Casper's
characterization of Congress' decision not to order the President to investigate is correct, it constitutes
conclusive proof that Congress did not hold Lessig and Sunstein's vision of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, as Congress specifically thought it did not have the authority to specify the "how" of execution.
Any congressional desire to insulate the President from the Administration reflected an antiquated Articles-
of-Confederation thinking.
Some might believe that the members of Congress recognized the President's power to superintend
execution, but that there was a great deal of confusion about exactly what constituted execution. We
disagree. We think the text and the history make clear that, prior to the Constitution's ratification, both
opponents and supporters of the Constitution understood that the execution had to do with implementing
or administering laws. Any supposed ignorance of this elementary concept among members of Congress,
it seems to us, stemmed from a desire to rewrite the Constitution in a manner favorable to Congress. Those
who claimed that the Executive lacked the power to control execution, then, were not ignorant, but rather
acted out of the natural tendency to find what one wishes to find in the Constitution and ignore what Is
inconvenient. One might expect such problems when switching from one regime to another. Indeed, as Mr.
Prakash demonstrates in Field Office Federalism, many in the founding generation incorrectly thought that
Congress could constitute state courts as federal courts by statute, without the requirements of presidential
nomination and Senate confirmation. See Prakash, supra note 226, at 2030-31.
557. Though Lessig and Sunstein discern a pattern in postratification statutes that supposedly supports
their interpretation of the Opinions and Inferior Officers Appointments Clauses and the distinction between
administrative and executive law, we see no such pattern. Let us consider the administrative institutions
created by Congress. State and War were executive departments headed by principal officers. Treasury was
a department led by a head. The Postmaster (in charge of an Office, but not a department) was explicitly
put under the President's control in 1789, but not in 1792. In 1798, the Department of the Navy was
created, with a Navy Secretary as its "chief." See generally Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at 27-30.
Where Lessig and Sunstein see "a variety of structures, not a single one," id. at 23, we see one.
Administrative practices and statutory history suggest that all these officers and departments were executive.
558. Historians Elkins and McKittrick observe that once created, there was no doubt that the




of the Executive's authority, "[t]he natural province of the executive magistrate
is to execute laws. 559
VII. CONCLUSION
We have arrived at the conclusion of a long argument, having established
several points. First, our Constitution creates a trinity of types of governmental
powers and personnel. The constitutional text thus forecloses historical
arguments for a headless fourth branch of government. Second, the Vesting
Clauses of Article II (and Article III) are general grants of power that are
explicated (to different degrees) by the subsequent Sections of those Articles.
The Executive Power Clause in particular gives the President the authority to
execute federal law. Third, since the President's grant of "the executive Power"
is exclusive, Congress may not create other entities independent of the
President and let them exercise his "executive Power." Fourth, the hierarchical
structure of Article II is further confirmed by the language of the Take Care,
Opinions, and Militia Clauses. Finally, the Necessary and Proper Clause does
not give Congress any power to deviate from the basic constitutional structure.
Congress can no more use that Clause to abolish the unitary Executive than it
could use it to abolish the states. The pre-ratification history fully supports
these understandings, and little in the post-ratification history calls any of this
into question. Indeed, there is more post-ratification evidence to support our
textual theories. We should not be surprised that the founding generation read
the text according to its "plain meaning."
Having said all this, we would be the last to deny that there are scraps of
evidence that can be dutifully collected and woven together to establish that
some members of the First Congress (and its successors) may have been
confused some of the time about the full extent and nature of the President's
powers of control over subordinate officials in the executive branch."
Members of the post-Reconstruction Congresses likewise exhibited similar
confusion some of the time about the effects of the newly ratified Fourteenth
Amendment on various forms of legal segregation.
559. James Madison, Letters of Helvidius No. I (Aug.-Sept. 1793). in 6 TIE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 138, 145 (Gaillard Hunt ed.. 1906). cited in Monaghan. supra note 6. at 21 n.96.
560. As Professor Harrison has pointed out to us. some of the evidence that Lessig and Sunsten focus
on involves a distinction about which the Constitution is not very clear, the line between exercises of
executive governmental power and exercises of "powers" that are in some ways nongovernmental
altogether. Thus, although the Constitution is very clear in its division of governmental powers into three
categories, it is quite obscure about problems of execution once the public/privatc line has become blurred.
The problem is that the Framers did not think much about the public/private line. Difficulties arise
respecting bodies such as territorial governments, which carry out functions that put pressure on the line
between federal government power and the private sector. See Gary S. Lawson. Ternrtonal Governments
and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CAL L. REV. 853 (1990) (discussing separation-of-powers problems
involving territorial governments). The Framers' trinitarian catechism is obviously strained in such
situations, but it is less strained by calling these functions executive than it would be by calling them
anything else.
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What this suggests is that if a case is to be made against the unitary
Executive, and such a case can most assuredly be made, it must rest on a non-
originalist theory such as Henry Monaghan's precedent-driven common law
constitutionalism 561 or Bruce Ackerman's theory of three originalisms.
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A common law constitutionalist or an Ackermanian who opposed the theory
of the unitary Executive might have a theoretically consistent argument, but we
believe that the Lessig and Sunstein thesis cannot be right given their article's
originalist premises.
An Executive without the power to execute is gibberish linguistically and
bears no relationship to the Chief Executive Magistrate created by the
Constitution. Such a view of the Executive is typically advanced by those who
believe that administration of federal law should be kept independent of the
President. Individuals who believe in the detached, depoliticized, and
"scientific" administration of federal law undoubtedly sincerely regard such an
administrative structure to be superior to one superintended by the President,
who is, after all, a mere creature of politics. This belief in the soundness and
wisdom of an "independent" administration, though genuine, has little
relevance to or grounding in the Constitution. As the Framers, ratifiers,
ratification opponents, members of the First Congress, and President
Washington understood, the Constitution grants the President the authority to
superintend the administration of federal law.563 There are no caveats. There
are no exceptions.
We can now appreciate our Constitution's elegant simplicity. Our grade
school and high school civics teachers were right all along: The Constitution
separates our federal government into three branches, each exercising one of
three types of powers. There may be some portions of the "structural
Constitution" that are less than clear, but the Executive Power Clause of
Article II is not one of them. The Framers and ratifiers consciously and
deliberately chose to put one person in charge of executing all federal laws.
Those who would question this must necessarily view the members of the
561. For a thoughtful discussion of the role of precedent in constitutional law, see Henry P. Monaghan,
Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988). Note, however, the
continuing importance of text to Professor Monaghan. Monaghan, supra note 6. For an originalist argument
against common law constitutionalism and the bindingness of precedent, see Lawson, supra note 349, at
25-28.
562. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991); Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures:
Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L. 1013 (1984).
563. Lessig and Sunstein assert that unitarians believe that the Constitution enshrines a "single
organizational value-unitariness--at the expense of other possible governmental values-such as
disinterestedness or independence." Lessig & Sunstein, supra note I, at 9. Their characterization of the
unitarians' understanding of the values enshrined in the Constitution is much too superficial and narrow.
As Mr. Prakash has argued elsewhere, the Framers and ratifiers thought that having one Executive would
promote an energetic and accountable administration. See generally Prakash, supra note 6; see also
Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments, supra note 9 (advancing modem normative case for unitary
Executive). The values of disinterestedness and independence did not animate the founding generation when
it came to execution.
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founding generation as political naifs, with no knowledge of Locke,
Montesquieu, or Blackstone; with no memory of the failed congressional
administration under the Articles; and with no understanding of the centrality
of administration in the success or failure of the great new experiment. This
view disregards what the Founders said about the Constitution in the
ratification debates. And most damning of all, it distorts the Constitution's text.
Tempting though it may be, we must resist our propensity for making the
Constitution into something more complex and inscrutable than it really is.

